41 Regulatory
Compliance
Commentors state that DOE did not provide enough advance public
outreach and notice for the public hearings. Several commentors
believe many groups were underrepresented at the hearings including:
minority, downstream, and rural communities; Georgia government
officials; and SRS employees. The commentors suggest that DOE
should make a special effort to involve these groups in public
involvement and should also train the minority communities in
order for them to contribute substantial comments. Commentors
recommend that DOE include visiting schools and universities,
and produce better advertisements to notify the public about the
program. Another commentor suggests that DOE should automatically
notify those who have participated in the past and national offices
of groups that would be interested in the topics at stake. One
commentor suggests that notices should be at least one month in
advance. Other commentors state that there was plenty of notice
for meetings and commended DOE for the effort in writing the document,
holding the public hearings, and answering questions from the
public. One commentor asks how to receive copies of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS.
- Response: The CEQ's minimum comment period requirement on
draft EISs is 45 days (40 CFR 1506.10[c]). The public comment
period on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS
was 60 days and was considered appropriate for review and comment
on the document since preferred alternatives were identified in
the Draft PEIS. DOE has had an extensive and ongoing public outreach
program on the Complex since the Reconfiguration Program was proposed
in 1990. DOE has utilized several different methods for publicizing
public meetings and providing Program information to the public.
In addition to advertising in the traditional media, notices and
meeting information have been made available electronically and
various program documents can be requested or accessed using the
toll-free information line, the electronic bulletin board (Internet),
and the World Wide Web DOE Home Page. A speaker's bureau has also
been established with DOE officials available on a limited basis
as requested to speak with interested groups concerning DP activities
and issues. This can be requested through the toll-free line or
the electronic bulletin board services. DOE has continued to keep
the public informed during the public comment period and will
continue to do so through the publication of the ROD.
The commentor does not understand the recent decision on DAHRT,
where the judge claims that it is only required that an environmental
study be completed, not that it would be found to not have negative
effects. Commentor believes that NEPA just delays actions; it
does not change them. The commentor notes that NEPA only requires
EISs and public hearings; it does not mandate that anyone choose
the least destructive course of action.
- Response: The regulations for implementing NEPA state, "The
NEPA process is intended to help public officials make decisions
that are based on understanding of environmental consequences,
and take actions that protect, restore, and enhance the environment"
(40 CFR 1500.1[c]). Preparation of NEPA documents as the commentor
points out are part of the process. "The primary purpose
of an environmental impact statement is to serve as an action-forcing
device to ensure that the policies and goals defined in the act
are infused into the ongoing programs and actions of the Federal
Government" (40 CFR 1502.1). The scheduling of proposed actions
which require NEPA review includes the necessary time for complying
with NEPA and in most cases does not delay the action. NEPA does
not mandate that an agency select the least destructive course
of action but does require that the agency "... identify
and assess the reasonable alternatives to proposed actions that
will avoid or minimize adverse effects of these actions upon the
quality of the human environment" (40 CFR 1500.2[e]). DOE
must demonstrate compliance with the procedural requirements of
NEPA before making final decisions on its major Federal actions.
Commentors state that decisions to be made in the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program were predetermined and that input from
the public and local officials has little impact on the PEIS or
decision process. Commentors express disappointment that DOE did
not consider comments and suggestions from the scoping meetings
and wonder to what extent public support at various candidate
sites was considered in the PEIS process. One commentor points
out that the preferred alternative is not always the final choice,
while another commentor asks if there was a mechanism for citizens
to get the ROD changed. A commentor states that if this is a democracy
and majority rules, then the public should be allowed to vote
on the PEIS. A commentor warns DOE that they must not underestimate
the comments the public makes and that the public will not go
away. The commentors also state that Congress and the President
control DOE funding and they feel shut out of the defense spending
authorization process. Specifically, one commentor notes that
money has already been allocated for NIF in DOE's budget for fiscal
year 1997. Commentors feel that DOE is withholding important information
from the public. Another commentor states that DOE should provide
the public with information that would allow them to participate
in policy development, and that the "classified for national
security" blanket should be removed. Another commentor perceives
DOE's position on national security policy as being a policy of
so much complexity that it is well beyond the grasp of the public.
- Response: DOE has not made any decisions on the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS proposed actions. DOE has identified
in section 3.8 of the Final PEIS the preferred alternatives for
both stockpile stewardship and stockpile management. The ROD on
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will be issued
no earlier than 30 days following the issuance of the Final PEIS.
The decisions on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
will be identified in the ROD. The ROD, which will be published
in the Federal Register and is a publicly available document,
will also include the rationale and various factors used by DOE
in making the decisions on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program.
Chapter 2 of the PEIS discusses the national security policy considerations
and the role they play in defining the purpose and need of the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program was developed in response to changing world
conditions, an end to the Cold War, and the reaffirmation of the
proposed CTBT. DOE participates regularly in Congressional hearings
on defense issues in which the stockpile stewardship and management
issues are discussed. Congress determines how funds are allocated
and DOE spends monies consistent with Congressional direction.
Therefore, Congress ultimately determines whether the decisions
resulting from the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS will
be implemented.
Commentors state that DOE cannot expect the public to make decisions
on DOE programs in bits and pieces.
- Response: Since the time when the original commitment was
made to prepare a PEIS on reconfiguration of the Complex and a
PEIS on environmental restoration and waste management, the world
has changed significantly. Most importantly, the Cold War has
ended, the Nation's nuclear arsenal is being reduced significantly,
and a significant amount of special nuclear materials have become
surplus to national security needs. These changed circumstances
have had a significant effect on DOE's strategic planning, and
the PEISs being prepared are responsive to these new circumstances.
Because of the large scope of these programs there is no way to
avoid some overlap of issues. However, the purpose and need for
DOE's proposed programs and relationships between these programs
are clearly described in each of the PEISs and site-wide NEPA
documents. Section 1.7, Other National Environmental Policy Act
Reviews, of the PEIS discusses other DOE programs and their relationship
to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.
The commentors express widely differing views on the PEIS public
hearing scheduling, formats, and content. Commentors state that
DOE did not tell the truth to the public in the PEIS and the meetings
were nothing more than public relations efforts and not worth
the cost and effort to hold them; that transcripts be taken at
meetings and incorporated into the PEIS so that comments could
be accurately tracked and responses verified; that the modified
format was better than before because some people may hesitate
to approach a microphone during public hearings; that the format
should be adhered to and not changed mid-meeting, and that the
meetings should focus on environmental impacts, not impacts to
peace. Other commentors express the view that the public meetings
are a valuable forum for the public and hope that DOE will continue
their use. Many commentors favor the formal hearing format rather
than the workshop format. One commentor also points out that 1)
public meetings are attended by and large by the same people grinding
out their own agendas and obviously not interested in facts; 2)
too many participants suggest they are representing the public;
often this amounts to a public of 1 or 2; and 3) meetings provide
a forum for many negative anti-establishment and emotional, vitriolic
attacks on any good faith efforts. Commentors ask many questions
including: why didn't DOE have a meeting in Oakland, in addition
to LLNL, for similar reasons Santa Fe hosted a public meeting;
does NEPA allow DOE to lie in the PEIS; is DOE required to respond
to comments from the public; why the comments collected do not
go through an impartial agency rather than to the reading rooms;
and why aren't there more means available for the public to express
their opinions to DOE, rather than just NEPA. Another commentor
states that the charts handed out at the meetings should be clearly
labeled.
- Response: The public hearings on the Draft PEIS were conducted
using a modified traditional hearing format. The change in format
was in response to past public comments on the interactive public
hearing format used for the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS
and more recent requests by interested parties near several DOE
sites. The modified format included a formal statement period
in addition to the interactive session, and the recording of a
verbatim transcript of the hearing in addition to the notation
of comments by designated notetakers. Efforts were made by DOE
to accommodate the public to as large an extent as was feasible.
For this reason, modifications were also made between sites as
necessary to fulfill special needs or requests from the public,
elected officials, and site representatives. The additional public
hearing was held in Santa Fe because of substantial public requests
and because the city is located in proximity to two of the proposed
alternative sites (LANL and SNL) which could potentially receive
both stockpile stewardship and stockpile management missions.
The principal area affected and public interest area for LLNL
potential stewardship missions was the city of Livermore; therefore,
only one meeting was held at Livermore.
Commentors state that the PEIS process was procedurally defective.
One commentor states that there are perceived advantages which
go to the locations where the PEIS authorship (Albuquerque Area
Office) takes place. Another commentor believes that the PEIS
pitted LANL and ORR against each other. In addition, the commentor
suggests that DOE obtain competent independent evaluations, not
location centered, but more broadly centered, using the expertise
of people attending the meeting and elsewhere in the Nation to
add more credibility to the entire PEIS process.
- Response: The analysis for the PEIS is conducted in accordance
with CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1500-1508), and DOE's NEPA regulations
(10 CFR 1021) and procedures. The DOE Albuquerque Operations Office's
lead in preparing the support stockpile management alternatives
reports with oversight of DOE Headquarters represented the best
coordination point between stewardship and management elements
of the Program. All proposed management alternatives were developed
in cooperation with all DOE weapons complex sites. In addition,
all supporting data and peer review were provided by each affected
site and underwent a substantial comment and revision process.
Technical experts at each site with relevant experience in each
of the proposed mission areas at both the management and working
level provided input and review. The process used in developing
the management alternatives and the screening process for determining
the preferred alternatives can be found in the Analysis of Stockpile
Management Alternatives report and the Stockpile Management Preferred
Alternatives Report which are available in the DOE Public Reading
Rooms near each site.
A commentor suggests that a civilian review board be set up to
oversight DOE. Other commentors point out that the Defense Facility
Safety Review Board performs that responsibility now and that
it has been recommended that EPA and OSHA be added to DOE facility
oversight. One commentor states that citizen advisory boards are
not accountable to the local citizens and do not speak for the
citizens with respect to safety concerns.
- Response: Section 4.14 describes the regulations and requirements
under which all DOE sites conduct their operations during the
normal course of their work activities. This section also describes
the applicable DOE orders requiring the reviews performed by the
sites of all planned and existing construction and operation for
potential accidents and the assessment of the associated human
health and environmental consequences of an accident. The sites
associated with the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
would comply with these DOE orders and update the appropriate
safety documentation before authorization of construction or start
of operations.
On January 25, 1995, DOE created the Advisory Committee on External
Regulation of Department of Energy Nuclear Safety and charged
it with providing advice, information, and recommendations on
whether and how new and existing DOE facilities and operations,
except those covered under Executive Order 12344, might be externally
regulated to ensure nuclear safety. The Advisory Committee has
made the following recommendations concerning the structure of
the external regulation: (1) an existing agency-either the NRC
or a restructured Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board-regulate
facility safety at all DOE nuclear facilities under the Atomic
Energy Act; (2) OSHA regulate all protection of workers at DOE
nuclear facilities under the Occupational Safety and Health Act,
unless regulation of worker risks at a given facility could significantly
interfere with maintaining facility safety in which case all worker
protection would be regulated under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954;
(3) EPA continue to regulate environmental protection matters
for all DOE nuclear facilities and sites under the environmental
statutes; and (4) states with programs authorized by the EPA,
OSHA, or the regulator of facility safety acquire or continue
to have roles in regulation of environmental protection, facility
safety, and worker protection comparable to those they now exercise
in the private sector. The committee believes these recommendations
will strengthen, streamline, and simplify the regulation of safety
at DOE nuclear facilities. The Secretary of Energy has convened
a DOE working group to review the recommendations and determine
how to implement them. A report is due to the Secretary by the
Fall of 1996. DOE, the Administration, and Congress will be involved
in determining external regulations for DOE facilities.
Advisory boards act as liaisons between the public and Federal,
state, and local governments and agencies. The boards provide
an important forum for stakeholders and agencies to explore complex
problems and generally provide independent policy and technical
advice to affected parties.
The commentors believe that the threat of using
nuclear weapons and the environmental impacts that result from
using the weapons are impacts that should be analyzed in the PEIS.
According to a commentor, the nuclear arsenal is a temptation
to those in power. Another commentor adds that stockpile stewardship
and management does not cover the global consequences an accident
like Chernobyl could cause. One commentor notes that the PEIS
should state that the stockpile sizes discussed could obliterate
the planet. The commentor believes that LANL is a bomb designer's
dream come true and that the United States will use these weapons
if it wants to. The commentor believes this because of a quote
from DOD attorney John McNeil stating, "Nuclear weapons can
be targeted in ways that either increase or decrease resulting
incidental civilian injury and collateral damage, and their use
may be lawful or not depending upon the enemy's conduct."
The commentor does not agree with these views, especially the
idea of incidental civilian injuries, considering the fact that
there were 210,000 dead within months of the bombing of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, and 300,000 survivors suffering slow deaths and
painful lives over the next 50 years. Commentors state that the
American people cannot trust that our nuclear weapons, if they
exist, will not be used on civilians again. The commentors cite
the dropping of the atomic bomb on Japanese cities, stating that
it could have been demonstrated in a nonpopulated area to show
U.S. capability. Commentors feel that there is no way to be aware
of all the possible effects of nuclear weapons at this time. According
to commentors technically there is too much that is unknown, and
the world needs to obtain a better understanding of the impacts
of nuclear materials. A commentor asks where in the PEIS the impacts
to the present agricultural economy which has built and sustained
the Texas Panhandle were; why were the risks to this economic
stronghold not assessed; what will happen when we no longer produce
food for people, where is our priority; are bombs more important
than food. The commentor states that those in agriculture strive
to produce quality, wholesome food for the world population--one
farmer feeds in excess of 131 people, yet the industry across
the road from us builds bombs to annihilate people. The commentor
asks where is our sense of morality and respect for life. Food
is the most important commodity we produce--it must be protected.
- Response: The use of nuclear weapons and the resulting environmental
impacts are beyond the scope of this PEIS.
Commentors are concerned with the cost of the PEIS and would like
DOE to spend taxpayer money more frugally. Another commentor asks
how much money has been spent on the PEIS.
- Response: NEPA requires DOE to assure that major Federal actions
are taken only after due consideration of their environmental
impacts. Preparing a PEIS in compliance with NEPA is a complex
and costly task for a program as complex as Stockpile Stewardship
and Management. The cost to complete the PEIS was approximately
$10 million, which is commensurate with the complexity of the
issues analyzed.
Commentors feel that issuing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Draft PEIS, and the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS, the Pantex
Site-Wide Draft EIS and NTS Site-Wide EISs at the same time prohibited
them from thoroughly and responsibly reviewing and commenting
on the proposed programs and actions. The commentors state that
DOE has placed an unnecessary and unreasonable burden on the affected
communities and the public, and request DOE provide assistance
to have an independent evaluation performed. Commentors state
that by releasing all these documents, DOE was restricting public
comment and placing more emphasis on proposal preparation than
proposal analysis and review. Another commentor sees the combined
meetings as a step forward and feels that DOE is recognizing that
there are some overlaps among programs.
- Response: The CEQ's minimum comment period requirement on
draft EISs is 45 days (40 CFR 1506.10[c]). The public comment
period on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS
was 60 days and was considered appropriate for review and comment
on the document. The public comment period on the Storage and
Disposition Draft PEIS, which did not identify any preferred alternatives
for storage and disposition, was extended from 60 to 90 days to
allow the public to fully review and comment on the proposed alternatives.
Each of the other documents, as with all DOE NEPA documents, has
a public comment period of at least 45 days. Although DOE coordinates
all programs and the preparation of NEPA documents, the sheer
number of documents being prepared by DOE sometimes results in
the release of several documents at the same time. Every effort
is made to provide adequate public review of the documents in
these cases, balanced with DOE's needs and mission.
The PEIS and site-wide EISs prepared by DOE comply with the letter
and spirit of NEPA. Each document has a concise summary of the
most important information found in the entire document. Moreover,
the PEISs are organized so that a focused review of any individual
site can be readily accomplished. For example, if a member of
the public (or a local community) is most interested in just one
site (e.g., ORR), each PEIS covers the potential environmental
impacts at that site in about 100 pages. Lastly, the main body
of each environmental document is written to be understood by
the general public, with more detailed, supporting information
in appendixes. As a final point, DOE provides a significant amount
of funding to states to oversee DOE's operations at the DOE sites
as they relate to the health and safety of the public in surrounding
communities. We do not believe it is appropriate to provide separate
funding to local governments and organizations for document reviews
of this kind when we are providing large block funding to the
state for such reviews and oversight.
The commentor feels the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS
represents a sequence of site-specific reviews which is not an
adequate EIS.
- Response: The format of the PEIS (i.e., discussion of the
environmental impacts of the proposed Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program alternatives by site) was selected as the most
efficient and user friendly way to communicate the complex issues
covered in the document. It allows members of the public who may
only be concerned about potential impacts at the DOE site nearest
them to focus their review. The use of the format was for the
convenience of the public and does not make the PEIS inadequate.
The commentor feels the NEPA process requires by law a range of
reasonable alternatives so the public may evaluate an evenhanded
analysis which includes many analyzed alternatives and their ramifications
on the environment and international policy. Several commentors
feel that DOE has unreasonably constrained the alternatives it
analyzes in order to support the one alternative that is preferred.
Another commentor states that there is no discussion of the current
proposed alternatives' relationship to the anticipated next generation
stockpile stewardship facilities.
- Response: Chapter 2 of the PEIS discusses the purpose, need,
proposed action, and the reasonable alternatives for the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program. The range of reasonable alternatives
was developed based on two different perspectives discussed in
detail in this chapter. The discussion of the purpose and need
describes the constraints placed upon DOE in meeting the Program
objectives and the formulation of reasonable alternatives addressed
in the PEIS. One perspective (section 2.2) is from the top level
of national security policies for nuclear deterrence, arms control,
and nonproliferation. The other perspective (section 2.3) focuses
on the relevant technical efforts to maintain a safe and reliable
U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. The alternatives considered and
the reasons they were eliminated from detailed study are discussed
in section 3.1.2. Also see the response to comment summary 40.85
for additional discussion of the range of reasonable alternatives
considered.
The commentor feels statements such as "none," "minimal,"
"within regulatory statutes and guidelines," "manageable,"
and "amenable" are not credible when describing environmental
impacts.
- Response: The terms that the commentor refers to were used
by DOE at the public hearings to summarize information presented
in the PEIS. Their use was prefaced with the statement that these
were DOE's subjective opinions of the impacts described in the
PEIS. They were used in an effort to simplify complex information.
Others may disagree with these subjective terms. The potential
impacts identified in the PEIS are described using some of the
terms identified by the commentor as appropriate based on the
detail of the analysis. Where data was sufficient to quantify
the potential effects of the proposed action they are provided.
When regulations, guidelines, or standards were available for
comparison purposes they are shown in tables or text with appropriate
discussion. In some cases the data and level of analysis was insufficient
to quantify effects and the description of impacts are described
qualitatively. When qualitative analysis is presented, the discussion
necessarily uses terms similar to those noted by the commentor.
The discussion supporting both quantitative and qualitative analysis
is appropriate to aid the reader in interpreting the potential
impacts of the proposed action.
The commentors request an extension of the public comment period
on the Draft PEIS and ask if there will be another public comment
period after the Final PEIS.
- Response: DOE did not extend the comment period beyond May
7, 1996, although late comments were considered to the extent
possible. Members of the public may submit comments on the Final
PEIS, including the preferred alternatives. A decision on the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program will not be made
until at least 30 days after the EPA Notice of Availability of
the Final PEIS appears in the Federal Register.
The commentor believes that NEPA mandates an analysis of economic
and impacts on future generations. The commentor also believes
that costs, timing, and consumption of nonrenewable resources
should together drive the PEIS. The commentor wants a complete
environmental impact assessment which includes the impact on future
generations. The commentor points out that the words "future
generations" are not stated in the document. The commentor
questions why these items are missing.
- Response: Chapter 4 of the PEIS describes the affected environment
and the potential environmental impacts, including the socioeconomic
impacts, expected from the proposed Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Program. Nonenvironmental issues concerning cost, schedule,
and technical risk are presented and analyzed in the Analysis
of Stockpile Management Alternatives report and the Stockpile
Management Preferred Alternatives Report which are available in
the DOE Public Reading Rooms near each site. The consumption of
nonrenewable resources for each of the alternatives is discussed
in section 4.17. By completing this PEIS, DOE is meeting the requirements
of section 101(b)(1) of NEPA (i.e., "it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs,
and resources to the end that the Nation may fulfill the responsibilities
of each generation as trustee of the environment for succeeding
generations...").
One commentor states that a policy document
is needed as the "mother" of all of these NEPA processes.
The commentor states that such a document would provide the bridge
between the PEISs (and other NEPA processes as needed) and explain
their relationship.
- Response: DOE is a diverse and highly complex department with
many varied activities. At any given time a number of actions
are being planned, constructed, and implemented. Accordingly,
there are a number of NEPA actions being conducted simultaneously.
In order to explain how the actions proposed by the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS fit into the context of actions
proposed by other NEPA documents, section 1.7 was constructed.
This section provides the reader with a description of the other
major NEPA actions presently being conducted by DOE and describes
their relationship to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS.
DP has an office solely devoted to NEPA coordination. This office
reviews all NEPA actions to assure consistency of assumptions,
data, and factual information. Besides this internal DP consistency
control, all major NEPA actions are reviewed by the Office of
Environment, Safety, and Health, the Office of the General Counsel,
and other appropriate departmental elements for consistency with
DOE NEPA requirements, DOE policy, and other DOE actions. Such
a review and concurrence process is dynamic and constantly reflects
current policy and other program considerations.
The commentor states that the Draft PEIS has not considered the
full range of proposed and potential stockpile stewardship alternatives
that is required by NEPA. The commentor states that DOE has characterized
a number of potential stockpile stewardship facilities as not
"ripe" for NEPA review because they have not reached
the stage of development and definition that is necessary for
evaluation and decisionmaking (Draft PEIS, section 1.2). The commentor
states that next generation facilities are included in budget
planning and, thus, should be proposed actions in the PEIS. The
commentor also believes the ability to perform detailed (i.e.,
site-specific) environmental impact analysis is not the relevant
standard for inclusion of a project in a PEIS. Commentor contends
that the exclusion of the Advanced Hydrotest Facility (AHF), HEPPF,
ARS (X-1), and Jupiter facility from the analysis of proposed
actions is not supported by the facts, and is a violation of NEPA.
- Response: In the Notice of Intent for the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management PEIS (60 FR 31291, June 14, 1995), DOE expressed
its intent to propose six new facilities for stockpile stewardship:
(1) CFF; (2) Atlas Facility; (3) NIF; (4) HEPPF; (5) AHF; and
(6) Jupiter Facility. While DOE recognized that these six facilities
were at different stages of research, development, and definition,
the intent was to make the PEIS as forward-looking and complete
as possible, with regard to the future stockpile stewardship program.
Following scoping, when preparation of the PEIS actually began,
DOE realized that three of these facilities (HEPPF, AHF, and Jupiter)
were so minimally defined that it would have been premature to
"propose" them, in the NEPA-sense, for the purpose of
decisionmaking, since more R&D was needed. Therefore, in section
3.3.3 of the Implementation Plan for the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management PEIS (DOE/EIS-0236IP), DOE explained that these
three facilities were "not currently defined well enough
to be considered as proposed stockpile stewardship alternatives."
Events associated with R&D of the Jupiter facility illustrate
the point that the next generation facilities are not currently
defined well enough to be considered as proposed stockpile stewardship
alternatives. The Jupiter Facility would be a significant technological
advancement in the pulsed-power x-ray source capability. During
the time the Implementation Plan was being prepared, scientists
at SNL realized that, although the concept of Jupiter was defined
(a 32 MJ pulsed-power x-ray source), how to achieve that concept
was unclear. In fact, SNL scientists concluded that Jupiter represented
so large a technological advancement that they developed the concept
of the Advanced Radiation Source (ARS) (X-1). The ARS (X-1), which
is envisioned as an interim step to an eventual Jupiter facility,
would be a four-fold increase over current pulsed-power x-ray
sources, yet would only be one-fourth the power envisioned for
Jupiter. The performance requirements for the ARS (X-1) have not
been fully established; the type of technology to provide the
basis for the facility has not been determined, nor have concepts
for the resultant physical plant. Consequently, impacts from facility
construction as well as from facility operation can only be theorized.
Thus, not even ARS (X-1) has reached the stage where the concept
can be defined well enough for decisionmaking purposes. Jupiter,
which is dependent on ARS (X-1) development, is even further from
definition.
However, even though the next generation stockpile stewardship
facilities are not defined well enough to be "proposals,"
they are programmatically assessed in the PEIS to the extent practicable.
As DOE stated in section 3.3.3 of the Implementation Plan, "these
next generation facilities can be described in general terms such
that a consideration of cumulative impacts that might be related
to the ultimate science-based stockpile stewardship program can
be qualitatively assessed." Section 4.11 of the PEIS describes
what the impacts of these three next-generation facilities might
be, to the extent they can be forecast at this time. The purpose
of section 4.11 is to provide an assessment of the potential cumulative
environmental impacts associated with the ultimate science-based
stockpile stewardship program.
For each next generation facility, data were developed using a
surrogate facility. For example, for AHF, which would be a facility
for conducting hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments, the
tests and experiments themselves can be anticipated to be similar
to such activities as analyzed at DARHT; therefore, the DARHT
impacts were used for reference. For HEPPF, surrogate data from
BEEF, an HE test facility at NTS, were utilized. For the ARS (X-1)
and Jupiter, surrogate data were developed from the existing Saturn
and Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA) facilities at SNL.
Section 4.11 has been expanded in the Final PEIS to describe more
fully the foreseeable impacts of the next generation facilities.
Regarding the comments that next generation facilities are included
in budget planning documents and thus, should be analyzed as proposed
actions in the PEIS, the budget process does not address the issue
of whether, for NEPA purposes, a project has been proposed or
not. Because of the time requirements for Congressional funding,
projects are often submitted for line item funds before NEPA completion.
Some money needs to be spent during R&D in order to define
facilities so that they can then be proposed and evaluated; it
is therefore consistent with NEPA to spend money to develop this
information. In the case of sophisticated scientific R&D like
that for enhanced experimental capability for weapon physics,
these expenditures often can be substantial, just for the preliminary
stages of exploring theories and proving concepts. This process
often involves performing complex experiments using existing facilities
that have high operating costs. This experimentation occurs well
in advance of the development of the basic information needed
for eventual conceptual facility design.
DOE agrees that the ability to perform detailed (i.e., site-specific)
environmental impact analysis is not the relevant standard for
whether a facility should be included in a programmatic EIS. This
is why DOE has included the next generation facilities in the
PEIS and has developed a programmatic-level evaluation of potential
cumulative program impacts. However, in order for a facility to
be a "proposal" in the NEPA sense, the facility must
be ripe for decisionmaking. This in turn requires more than just
speculative definitions of facility designs.
The following is a more detailed discussion of why each of the
next generation stockpile stewardship facilities is not included
as a proposed action in the PEIS:
AHF: DOE has modified the Final PEIS (section 3.1.2) to include
additional clarifying information on the status of research toward
a definition of a future AHF. The commentor quotes extracts from
DOE's fiscal year 1997 budget request, among other items, and
concludes that DOE's plans for an AHF are sufficiently mature
to warrant full consideration and NEPA analysis in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS. R&D activities relevant (and
indeed, necessary) to DOE's ability to determine the feasibility
and form of a future AHF are being pursued within the ongoing
DOE R&D program. Such radiographic technology R&D has
been a historical part of weapons R&D activities. At this
point, the feasibility and definition of an AHF is still insufficiently
determined for DOE to propose such a facility or adequately analyze
it for the purposes of NEPA. For example, performance requirements
for such a facility have not been fully established; the type
of technology to provide the basis for the facility has not been
determined and concepts for the resultant physical plant vary
significantly; and therefore impacts from facility construction
and operation remain speculative. DOE's present judgment is that
significant R&D activity, spanning years, will be necessary.
Early in its planning for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS, DOE intended to propose that an AHF, representing the next
generation of hydrotest capability beyond DARHT, be included within
the scope of the PEIS. Conceptually, AHF would improve on the
capabilities of DARHT and apply data and information gained from
DAHRT. AHF thus could never be an alternative to DAHRT, because
DAHRT is an essential precursor to AHF. The intent to propose
AHF was to make the document as forward-looking as possible with
regard to the future of science-based stewardship. Upon further
reflection, however, DOE decided not to propose AHF in the PEIS
because AHF's parameters were so minimally defined that a meaningful
analysis of its environmental impacts would have been impossible
to perform.
Possible technology approaches to an AHF have been discussed within
the DOE technical community. These technologies still require
development and validation. The specifications and technical requirements
for an AHF (that is, determination of what capabilities should
be required of an AHF for assessment of stockpile aging and related
effects, beyond those of DARHT) are also still being defined.
This was noted in the DARHT Final EIS (Volume I, page 3-45) and
in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS. The items
excerpted by commentors from the DOE fiscal year 1997 budget request
reflect a portion of the research activities both ongoing and
anticipated, that are necessary to evaluate and develop these
technologies, understand requirements, and provide a decision
basis for a possible future AHF proposal by DOE.
Three basic technology approaches are currently being examined.
These include linear induction accelerators of a type similar
to those in the baseline DARHT design, an inductive-adder pulsed-power
technology based on technology now in use for other purposes at
SNL and elsewhere, and high-energy proton accelerators similar
to technology in use at Los Alamos Neutron Science Center and
elsewhere in the United States and internationally. The first
two represent different approaches to accelerating a high-current
burst of electrons, which produce x rays when stopped in a dense
target. The x rays actually produce the flash radiograph. This
is the approach used in the existing PHERMEX and FXR facilities
and to be used in DARHT when completed. The third approach would
use bursts of very energetic (approximately 20 billion electron
volt) protons, magnetic lenses, and particle detectors to produce
the radiographic image. The impacts associated with construction
and operation of facilities based on these different technologies
cannot be fully defined at this time (because of technical uncertainties)
and could be significantly different depending on the technology
approach. For example, acreage required could be comparable to
or somewhat larger than the 3.6 ha (9 acres) of land resources
required for DARHT, but use of proton radiography could require
an accelerator comparable in scale to the kilometer-long Los Alamos
Neutron Science Center or to other large accelerators operated
by DOE. Therefore, the size of the footprint, as well as other
factors which to some degree govern environmental impacts, is
speculative at this time.
Each of these technology approaches not only has some technical
promise, but also has technical issues to be resolved or demonstrated.
Therefore, DOE is examining approaches to perform the necessary
R&D. As commentors have noted, DOE has proposed increases
in future operating budgets to Congress to better address these
research issues. DOE does not believe that these individual details
of its ongoing and evolving R&D activities, within the historical
and ongoing mission of the DOE's weapons R&D responsibilities,
in themselves constitute a distinct "proposed action"
appropriate for NEPA analysis and alternatives in this PEIS.
HEPPF : DOE has modified the Final PEIS to include additional
clarifying information on HEPPF, and its relationship to ongoing
pulsed power research and the Atlas Facility. A discussion of
the relationship of HE pulsed power with Atlas and of the complementary
nature of laser and pulsed-power experiments is also contained
in the Atlas site-specific analysis in appendix K, which has also
been revised in the Final PEIS to incorporate updated information.
A new HEPPF would be a direct outgrowth of the longstanding Athena
program; however, this activity is no longer known by that name.
(The name Athena was a Los Alamos identifier only, and such R&D
has also been performed under other designations. It is now pursued
within the high energy density physics element of Los Alamos'
Stockpile Stewardship Program activities.) Since the 1960s, DOE
has pursued weapon research applications of electrical pulsed
power on the microsecond time scale. This R&D program has
involved HE pulsed-power generators of various types, which have
been exploded at existing HE firing sites in the Complex, as well
as fixed-facility capacitor banks such as Pegasus II. Some HE
firing sites (e.g., TA-39 at Los Alamos) have been specially configured
to support these pulsed-power experiments; a principal firing
site at TA-39 has within its bunker a capacitor bank to provide
the seed electrical current for the HE pulsed-power generators.
Impacts of these ongoing R&D activities are included in the
No Action alternative in the PEIS.
Commentors may be confusing evolutionary development beyond a
particular design of HE pulsed-power generator (Procyon), with
a possible follow-on HE firing site, configured specially for
pulsed-power experiments, beyond the existing capabilities in
the Complex. It is the latter that would be the prospective purpose
of HEPPF. The Final PEIS has been modified in order to clarify
this distinction. An HE pulsed-power generator, such as Procyon,
is basically an assembly of HE and metal (e.g., copper) and other
components which is explosively and destructively detonated a
single time, resulting in a brief pulse of high electrical current
being delivered to the experimental configuration. High magnetic
fields result from the high current pulse and may either be directly
used to study materials phenomena or may be used to produce high
pressures and implosions of (typically) cylindrical shells. (See
the discussion in the Atlas site-specific analysis, appendix sections
K.1 and K.2.1.) Procyon is therefore the name of a type of explosive
generator, and is not a facility. A typical Procyon generator
with the experimental region attached is about 3 m (10 ft) long.
In principle such an experiment could be performed at any appropriately
equipped explosive firing location, within applicable environmental
limits. DOE believes that the continued evolutionary R&D on
explosive generators and their use in pulsed-power experiments,
within the historical and ongoing mission of DOE's weapons R&D
responsibilities, do not in themselves constitute a distinct "proposed
action" appropriate for NEPA analysis and alternatives in
this PEIS. Rather, such R&D activities are needed to develop
the required information so that DOE can formulate a proposal.
As distinct from an explosive generator, a firing site is a facility
typically consisting of a firing location, associated hardened
bunkers, and related equipment, in an area from which personnel
can be excluded. Many different HE experiments (including those
in which pulsed electrical power is produced) can be performed
at a HE firing site, as long as the explosive blast, and other
experiment parameters, do not exceed the capabilities of the firing
site. Currently most of the largest-scale HE pulsed-power experiments
in the United States, whether for technology development, weapons
stockpile stewardship, or for unclassified scientific collaborations
(conducted separately) including those with Russian scientists,
are conducted at a Los Alamos pulsed-power firing point at TA-39.
As noted in the PEIS, section 3.3.4.2, this experimental capability
has a limit of approximately 500 kg (1,100 lbs) of HE. Therefore
a potential need for a new HEPPF was postulated to support generators
using much larger explosive charges, which though not yet demonstrated
could produce higher pressures in larger masses and volumes than
can be accessed at the LANL site. Existing laboratory sites cannot
readily support experiments with much larger charges, as noted
in the section 3.3.4.2.
Since the idea of an HEPPF was first conceived some years ago,
BEEF was separately developed as a firing site at the NTS, based
on refurbished bunkers originally developed for atmospheric nuclear
tests. Although not specially configured for HE pulsed power like
the principal LANL firing site, in its current configuration BEEF
is suitable for a variety of HE experiments including many pulsed-power
technology experiments, and experiments related to such purposes
have been part of recent qualification tests. Therefore, it may
be possible to make modifications to BEEF when the need for and
definition of such modifications is clear, to satisfy any future
need for a new HEPPF. (As at other firing sites many pulsed-power
experiments could be performed at BEEF without capital modifications.)
At this time, the definition of such modifications is insufficient
to make a full analysis meaningful; however, section 4.11 describes
these modifications and impacts to the extent that they can currently
be foreseen. Analysis of the impacts of operating the existing
BEEF facility for explosive experiments, including experiments
that involve pulsed-power technology, is incorporated in the NTS
Site-Wide EIS.
Commentors note correctly that both HE pulsed power and R&D
associated with capacitor banks, such as Pegasus II or the proposed
Atlas, are activities within the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program. For some years DOE has pursued both capacitor bank facilities
and HE experiments in pulsed power, since HE generators offered
a means to explore higher energy (higher current) frontiers without
major capital investment, albeit at a relatively low data rate,
and capacitor banks offered the advantages of repeatable (and
indoors) experimental facilities with higher data rates, for broad
experimental use. Data from HE experiments, for example, have
helped provide validation of technical issues used in the Atlas
design concept. Thus both kinds of activities are sensible aspects
of DOE's overall R&D program. Appendix K considers reliance
on explosive-driven pulsed-power experiments and discusses why
this is not a reasonable alternative to Atlas.
While it is true that if pursued a HEPPF could be available sooner
and with less expense than NIF, microsecond pulsed power is complementary,
rather than a reasonable alternative, to a laser such as NIF.
The technologies provide different physical regimes and experimental
scales, both necessary to address stockpile stewardship issues.
Relative to this specific comment, neither high explosive nor
capacitor-bank microsecond pulsed power is able to provide as
high a temperature or pressure as would be provided by NIF. Discussion
of this point has been expanded in the Final PEIS in section 3.3
and is also provided in appendix K.
ARS (X-1) and Jupiter : ARS (X-1) and Jupiter have been
presented in the PEIS as next generation facilities because extensive
R&D of this technology in the existing Saturn and PBFA facilities
will be required before DOE would be in a position to propose
either of these facilities for NEPA evaluation and decisionmaking.
To the extent that specifics of these yet-to-be designed facilities
are known, the ARS and the Jupiter facilities would both have
an advanced pulsed-power x-ray source to provide enhanced experimental
capabilities in the areas of weapons physics, inertial confinement
fusion, and weapons effects.
The ARS (X-1) facility would utilize a pulsed-power accelerator
capable of producing more than 8 MJ of x-ray energy to study the
physics of radiation flow, opacities, high energy densities, the
effects of radiation on weapons, and potentially inertial confinement
fusion relevant physics. Conceptually, the Jupiter would generate
about 32 MJ of x-ray energy, compared to the existing PBFA which
is expected to generate 2 MJ of x-ray energy. Since both of these
facilities would expand on a research and technology infrastructure
already existing at SNL, it is expected that they would also be
located at SNL.
The concept for ARS (X-1) grew out of the initial vision at SNL
to develop an advanced pulsed-power facility that could provide
the source environments for weapon effects testing after the loss
of underground nuclear testing. That initial capability was called
Jupiter; a 60 MA driver generating ~18 MJ of x-ray energy. In
assessing the feasibility of successfully building Jupiter, SNL
came to the conclusion that the 36 times increase in x-ray output
energy, in going from the existing facility Saturn to Jupiter,
represented too high a technical risk. A more logical step is
the ARS (X-1), which will allow an increase (by a factor of two)
in current to 40 MA and a factor of four in x-ray energy output
to 8 MJ over that of the PBFA. Data to support eventual development
of the ARS (X-1) will be obtained from research associated with
the existing PBFA. This R&D will establish the necessary level-of-confidence
to proceed with ARS (X-1). The step to Jupiter, given validation
of scaling laws on the ARS (X-1), would follow a similar logical
track and would be projected to increase the current by a factor
of two (to ~80 MA) and increase x-ray energy output by a factor
of four (to ~32 MJ).
The entire development process may be viewed as risk management.
It is not prudent to take too large a technical jump at great
risk if it is possible to manage the risk and still achieve significant
technical progress. Recent breakthroughs in pulsed power (generating
record power and hohlraum temperatures) demonstrated on existing
facilities at SNL, may be extrapolated to future facilities such
as the ARS (X-1) and Jupiter to predict sources that could provide
significant new capabilities to support the stockpile stewardship
program. However, the performance requirements for these future
facilities have not been fully established; the type of technology
to provide the basis for the facility has not been determined,
nor have concepts for the resultant physical plant. Consequently,
impacts from facility construction as well as from facility operation
can only be theorized. Thus, neither the ARS (X-1) nor the Jupiter
have reached the stage where the concepts can be defined well
enough for decisionmaking purposes.
Several commentors express disagreement with the justification
for the No Action alternative as an unreasonable alternative and
also state that the alternative is both misnamed and not clearly
explained in the Draft PEIS. Commentors indicate that the No Action
alternative effectively embraces most of the DOE's actual proposed
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, when one looks at
new construction planned or underway. The commentors state that
as a result of its fragmented and segmented approach, the discussion
of the entire Stockpile Stewardship Program has been unreasonably
narrowed down to a discussion of three specific projects. The
commentors contend that the following list of publicly acknowledged
major Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program components
were not adequately discussed, or in many cases mentioned in the
current Draft PEIS: DARHT, Processing and Environmental Technology
Laboratory, Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building, Accelerated
Strategic Computing Initiative, Los Alamos Neutron Science Center,
Weapons Experimental Tritium Facility, Los Alamos Critical Experiments
Facility, Lyner Facility, BEEF, and the contained firing facility
at PHERMEX. Another commentor adds that DOE is already building
stockpile management facilities like the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research building upgrades at LANL and the Processing and Environmental
Technology Laboratory at SNL before any public involvement. Another
commentor indicates that the Enhanced Surveillance Program was
not addressed in the Draft PEIS.
- Response: Given the national security policy decision by the
President to enter into a zero-yield CTBT, our Nation will no
longer have a proof-positive means to ensure the continued safety
and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. The three specific
projects (NIF, Atlas, and CFF) described in the PEIS as enhanced
experimental capabilities, represent the proposed action for the
stockpile stewardship portion of the Program. Each of these projects
would provide new capabilities in distinct weapons physics regimes.
They would be used to assist in the assessment and certification
that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable in the
absence of underground nuclear testing. Also see the response
to comment summary 40.85.
In accordance with NEPA, the PEIS also assesses the No Action
alternative. The No Action alternative is described in broad terms
in section 3.1.4 of the PEIS, and in more detail in chapter 4
and appendix A of the PEIS. Under No Action, DOE would not take
the actions proposed in the PEIS, but would continue with existing
actions. For stockpile stewardship, this means continuing the
existing actions at LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS related to stockpile
stewardship. A table has been added to the site descriptions in
appendix A of the Final PEIS to identify and describe the major
stockpile stewardship facilities and activities. The relationship
between the facilities described by the commentor and the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program is as follows:
DARHT : Impacts of construction and operation are covered
in its own EIS, discussed in section 1.6.2, and DARHT has been
judged to be an appropriate interim action by the U.S. District
Court for the District of New Mexico (No. 94-1306-m, April 16,
1996). The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS considers
DARHT in the No Action alternative in sections 3.1.4 and 3.3.1.1.
See the response to comment summary 41.20 for additional discussion
on DARHT.
Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory: This
project would construct a new building at SNL to consolidate the
activities from three existing buildings that are old and inefficient.
No change in mission or capabilities would result from the construction
of the Processing and Environmental Technology Laboratory. The
EA was completed in November 1995, and a Finding of No Significant
Impact (FONSI) was issued in December 1995. Construction and operation
of this facility are included in the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management PEIS No Action alternative.
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Building Upgrades Project:
Three phases of upgrades have been identified: (1) Phase I-upgrades
to fix ES&H deficiencies; required even if the life of Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research building is not extended; upgrades were
categorically excluded; (2) Phase II-upgrades to extend the life
of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building for an additional
20 to 30 years to support current R&D mission; an EA is in
progress to determine whether a FONSI is appropriate or whether
the project should be included in the LANL Site-Wide EIS; (3)
Phase III-upgrades not required to support current missions, but
rather to support potential future missions; not included in the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building EA, but is assessed
in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS as appropriate
for alternatives that establish new missions at LANL. The Phase
III upgrade is also expected to be included in the LANL Site-Wide
EIS if the ROD for this PEIS expands LANL missions that require
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building Phase III upgrades.
See the response to comment summary 40.90 for additional discussion
on the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building.
Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative: Computer
systems to be procured to support the science-based stockpile
stewardship program. The NOI for the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management PEIS discussed computational capabilities as follows:
"To handle simulations of weapon performance and assessments
of weapons safety without underground nuclear testing, improved
computational capabilities are needed. However, because there
are not expected to be any environmental impacts from this activity,
the PEIS is not expected to provide any assessment of these capabilities."
No comments were received on this issue during scoping, and because
there are no environmental impacts from procuring and operating
computers, they are not assessed in the PEIS. See the response
to comment summary 41.19 for additional discussion on the Accelerated
Strategic Computing Initiative.
Los Alamos Neutron Science Center: In October 1995, there
was an administrative action that transferred landlord responsibility
for this facility from Energy Research to DP. Despite this administrative
change, this facility still performs the same historic missions.
Specific impacts from continued operations are being assessed
in the LANL Site-Wide EIS. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS includes the impacts from Los Alamos Neutron Science Center
in No Action.
Weapons Engineering Tritium Facility: An EA covering
construction and operation of the Weapons Engineering Tritium
Facility was proposed and a FONSI issued in April 1991. This facility
has been operational for the past 2 years to support ongoing stockpile
stewardship and management missions. Continued operations of this
facility are included in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS No Action alternative.
Los Alamos Critical Experiments Facility: The proposed
action would consolidate surplus machines for nuclear materials
criticality training and experimentation from various Complex
sites to LANL. No change to current activities at LANL and no
new capability results from this consolidation. This consolidation
improves the efficiency and management of facilities that are
used for the hands-on training of workers on nuclear materials
criticality issues. The EA was completed in April 1996 and a FONSI
was issued in May 1996. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS includes the impacts from this facility in No Action.
Lyner Facility: Stockpile stewardship activities at NTS
have been analyzed in EISs, as well as the NTS Site-Wide EIS.
These EISs have identified the impacts of nuclear tests, safety
tests, and equation-of-state experiments. Although the term "subcritical"
is not used in the previous EISs, some tests and experiments conducted
over the past decades, as well as their impacts, are substantially
the same as those contemplated by the new terminology. The term
"subcritical experiments" is intended to clarify the
fact that such experiments would not achieve the condition of
criticality, consistent with the President's pursuit of a zero-yield
CTBT. The terminology is not intended to define a new form of
activity. The NTS Site-Wide EIS, the purpose of which is to evaluate
the impacts of near-term (next 5 to 10 years) activities at NTS,
includes a project-specific impact analysis of subcritical tests
and experiments at the Lyner facility under alternatives 1 and
3. The subcritical tests and experiments are not new activities
at NTS for purposes of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS, but rather are considered in the context of continuing activities,
and are included in the No Action alternative. See the response
to comment summary 40.02 for additional discussion on the Lyner
facility.
BEEF: This facility at NTS is used to study hydrodynamic
motion associated with HE detonations as discussed in sections
3.3.1.1 and 3.3.4.3. The operation of BEEF is addressed in the
NTS Site-Wide EIS. See the response to comment summary 41.17 for
additional discussion on BEEF.
PHERMEX: This facility is used to perform high-speed
radiography at LANL. It is discussed in section 3.3.1.1. See the
response to comment summary 41.17 for additional discussion on
PHERMEX.
Enhanced Surveillance Program: This is a term used to
describe R&D activities which are aimed at ensuring that the
nuclear weapons remaining in the stockpile will continue to be
safe and reliable. The Enhanced Surveillance Program is part of
the stockpile stewardship and management ongoing program.
One commentor cites a figure of $2.1 billion for the cost of the
Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative as proof that the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program is already proceeding, and
is doing so without constraint. The commentor states that the
implication of this is that decisions on the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program have already been made, or will be prejudiced
by Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative.
- Response: No decisions have been made for the proposed actions
described in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. Any
decisions resulting from the PEIS process will not be made until
at least 30 days after the Final PEIS has been filed with EPA.
The Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative is a multi-staged
computer development program whose goal is to increase by more
than a thousand-fold the computational speed and data storage
that currently exists. Without underground nuclear testing, computational
simulation will be an essential (and sometimes only) means of
predicting the effects of aging on component and weapon safety
and reliability. Due to the complexity of nuclear weapons, increases
of more than a thousand-fold are needed to simulate weapon performance
and assess weapon safety.
Because each advance in computational speed and data capabilities
is a precursor to the next advancement, Accelerated Strategic
Computing Initiative can only be developed in stages. Through
the end of fiscal year 1996, the commitment of funds to support
the Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative will be less than
$90 million. The funds committed to date are for R&D of the
prototype system that will eventually support the stockpile stewardship
computational requirements. These R&D activities to date are
part of the ongoing stockpile stewardship program, which is independent
of the proposed actions described in the PEIS (i.e., regardless
of whether or not DOE proceeds with enhanced experimental facilities,
all of the expected Accelerated Strategic Computing Initiative
procurements will be part of the existing program to maintain
a safe and reliable stockpile without underground nuclear testing).
Because of the independent utility of these Accelerated Strategic
Computing Initiative procurements, the commitment of resources
that has been made does not prejudice the ultimate decisions related
to the proposed actions in the PEIS.
The commentor believes that it is unacceptable
that the DARHT Second Axis is not included in the PEIS whereas
the Atlas Facility is. In the commentor's opinion, the two projects
(DARHT's Second Axis and Atlas) are roughly comparable in costs
and start dates.
- Response: Splitting a construction project into separate line
items for Congressional budgeting (or combining previously separate
line items) does not automatically imply that additional NEPA
review is needed, especially when the entire project has already
been subject to a NEPA review. While it is true that in the early
1990s, DOE decided to include funding for the second axis of DARHT
as a separate line item for Congressional budgeting purposes,
DOE has recently determined that it will not now be a separate
line item. Citing its decision in the October 1995 DARHT ROD to
complete the dual-axis facility with phased containment, DOE submitted
a new Construction Project Data Sheet to Congress as part of its
fiscal year 1997 budget request. The new data sheet combines both
axes into a single line item (new Budget Number 97-D-102). However,
no additional funding was requested in fiscal year 1997 for the
second axis. The new Congressional data sheet includes all actions
directed by the ROD, including constructing the second axis, but
indicates that funding for the second axis will be requested only
when the "most optimum" funding profile has been determined.
DOE has addressed the need for dual-axis radiography, and the
environmental impacts from implementing a decision to construct
and operate both the first and second axis, in the DARHT EIS and
the related ROD. As commentor notes, the courts have found that
DOE properly analyzed the DARHT proposal in the DARHT EIS prior
to completing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. Therefore,
there is no need to include in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS any additional project-specific analyses of the environmental
impacts of the 1995 decision to construct and operate the second
axis of DARHT since the analysis has already been completed in
the DARHT EIS. This PEIS, however, does include the impacts from
construction and operation of both axes of DARHT in the cumulative
impacts under the No Action alternative.
The commentors urge better integration and timing of the NTS and
Pantex Site-Wide Draft EISs, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Draft PEIS, and the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS. Another
commentor suggests an integrated program to find the most cost-effective
solution. The commentor states that site-wide decisions will be
made before programmatic decisions and that this will limit public
involvement and full analysis of the alternatives. The commentor
wonders why site-wide decisions will be made before programmatic
decisions, especially since the programmatic decisions will have
an impact at the site. The commentor also questions why different
plutonium pit storage options are considered in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS, the Storage and Disposition Draft
PEIS, and the Pantex Site-Wide Draft EIS. Another commentor asks
if there will be an attempt to produce a simplified document showing
the relationship between the PEISs and site-wide EISs.
- Response: The CEQ's minimum comment period requirement on
draft EISs is 45 days (40 CFR 1506.10(c)). The public comment
period on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS
was 60 days and was considered appropriate for review and comment
on the document. The public comment period on the Storage and
Disposition Draft PEIS, which did not identify any preferred alternatives
for storage and disposition, was extended from 60 to 90 days to
allow the public to fully review and comment on the proposed alternatives.
Each of the other documents, as with all DOE NEPA documents, has
a public comment period of at least 45 days. The schedules for
release and the duration of the comment periods for each document
was determined in accordance with the directives of the individual
programs. Although DOE coordinates all programs and the preparation
of NEPA documents, the sheer number of documents being prepared
by DOE sometimes results in the release of several documents at
the same time. Every effort is made to provide adequate public
review of the documents in these cases, balanced with DOE's needs
and mission.
Overlapping issues between the PEISs and the site-wide EISs (e.g.,
storage of plutonium) have been coordinated and analyzed in the
respective documents based on the scope of each document. The
decision strategy has also been identified in each of these documents
for the overlapping issue of concern. For example, the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS will support decisions on the
long-term storage of pits that will be needed for national security
requirements (strategic reserve pits). The Storage and Disposition
PEIS will support decisions on the long-term storage of all pits
(strategic reserve and surplus) and the approach for dispositioning
pits that are surplus to national security requirements. Decisions
on the long-term storage of pits would be made in a joint ROD
of the PEISs, and a decision relating to the storage of the pits
until implementation of the selected long-term storage option
would be made in the ROD for the Pantex Site-Wide EIS.
Sections 1.7.1 through 1.7.5, under Other National Environmental
Policy Act Reviews, of the PEIS discuss the relationship between
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and the Pantex,
LANL, and NTS Site-Wide EISs. As described in these sections,
any decisions on the future roles of these sites in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program will be identified in the ROD
for this PEIS. These Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
decisions will not compromise any of the analyses presented in
the site-wide documents, but will provide additional information
on the future missions at these sites that will require consideration
in the site-wide EISs.
The commentor would like to see additional nonweapons work at
LANL and recommends that the site-wide EIS look at the enhancement
of nonweapons work. Another commentor thinks it is ironic that
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS proposes an upgrade
of pit production at LANL while the Storage and Disposition PEIS
is concerned about what to do with these pits.
- Response: LANL is a multi-disciplinary research facility engaged
in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies.
Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program and related emergency response, arms control,
and nonproliferation and environmental activities. It conducts
R&D activities in the basic sciences, mathematics, and computing
with applications to these mission areas and to a broad range
of programs including: nonnuclear defense; nuclear and nonnuclear
energy; atmospheric, space, and geosciences; bioscience and biotechnology;
and the environment. A more detailed discussion of the complete
spectrum of laboratory activities can be found in the current
LANL Institutional Plan, which is unclassified and available to
the public. The LANL Site-Wide EIS is currently being prepared
and analyzes alternatives for LANL's operation over the next 5
to 10 years. Nonweapons work, and any enhancements thereto, would
be included in the site-wide EIS.
The commentor expresses concern that new programs such as bringing
spent nuclear fuel rods from other countries and wastes produced
from new programs will contribute to waste management problems
since there is no place to dispose of this waste.
- Response: The Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and
Idaho National Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration
and Waste Management Programs Environmental Impact Study (DOE/EIS-0203-F)
analyzes at a programmatic level the potential environmental impacts
over the next 40 years of alternatives related to the transportation,
receipt, processing, and storage of spent nuclear fuel under the
responsibility of DOE. This EIS formed the basis for deciding,
on a programmatic level, which sites will be used for the management
of the various types of spent nuclear fuel to which DOE holds
title. It included the amount of foreign research reactor spent
nuclear fuel that might be accepted in its assessment of potential
impacts, and addressed the sites at which the foreign research
reactor spent nuclear fuel could be stored if a decision is made
to accept foreign research reactor spent nuclear fuel. In addition
to this document, the Final Environmental Impact Statement on
a Proposed Nuclear Weapons Nonproliferation Policy Concerning
Foreign Research Reactor Spent Nuclear Fuel (DOE/EIS-0218F) evaluates
the potential environmental impacts that could result from
the DOE and Department of State joint proposal to adopt a policy
to manage spent nuclear fuel from foreign research reactors. Based
on these and other environmental impact studies, DOE intends to
make decisions and take actions to identify sites for waste management
facilities in order to protect public health and safety, comply
with Federal law, and minimize adverse effects to the environment.
The commentor notes that the Lyner facility remains classified
so that the "enemy" cannot determine the equation of
state information, yet there is no way to determine the environmental
impacts of this project.
- Response: A brief description of the Lyner Complex may be
found in the NTS Site-Wide EIS appendix section A.1.1.1.3, Dynamic
Experiments and Hydrodynamic Tests. Further Lyner Complex details
will be addressed in a classified appendix to the document noted
above. The details of the Lyner Complex were included in the DP
environmental consequences analysis in chapter 5 of the same document.
See the response to comment summary 40.02 for additional discussion
on the Lyner facility.
The commentor states that no DOE NEPA document programmatically
covers reprocessing. The commentor states that reprocessing is
partially covered in a number of different DOE NEPA documents
but that there is a need for an integrated document that evaluates
reprocessing as a whole over the Complex.
- Response: As the commentor noted, reprocessing of spent nuclear
fuel is not relevant to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program. With a decreasing stockpile DOE no longer has a need
for reprocessing and is not proposing this action as part of the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The recent NEPA
studies referred to by the commentor addresses proliferation concerns
and issues, or activities to stabilize nuclear materials because
of a health, safety, or environmental concern related to the condition
of the material. Since the defense-related chemical separations
activities (i.e., reprocessing) were shut down at SRS in March
1992, there is a large inventory of in-process solutions containing
a wide variety of special isotopes including plutonium-242. These
stored solutions could present an unreasonable risk and require
continuing vigilance to assure their continued safe storage and
to avoid potentially severe radiological impacts should an accident
occur. Therefore, the solution containing plutonium-242 is being
converted to an oxide which has a stewardship programmatic use.
This PEIS analyzes the environmental impacts of storing the oxide
material at SRS or transporting the plutonium-242 oxide to LANL
or LLNL for storage (section 4.19). Also see the response to comment
summary 40.41 for more discussion of plutonium-242.
The commentors have reservations about an expanded role for Pantex
that would include permanent storage of plutonium pits, plutonium
scrap, uranium, and such, as well as processing and reprocessing
of plutonium and the possibility that a nuclear reactor would
be built there to burn mixed oxide fuel or to produce tritium.
One commentor asks what kind of capacity does Pantex have right
now and how close are they to reaching that capacity level. Another
commentor asks what was the preferred alternative for HEU storage.
- Response: Storage of the plutonium strategic reserve could
occur at Pantex and does fall within the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program. If Y-12 is selected as the site for the
secondary and case fabrication mission, HEU strategic reserve
storage would remain at ORR. If Y-12 is not selected, then the
HEU strategic reserve could also be stored at Pantex. The strategic
reserve provides pits and secondaries which could be used for
replacement in the enduring stockpile or as feedstock for nuclear
fabrication. If the decision is made that strategic reserves be
stored with non-strategic reserves, then consolidated storage
could be at one of the five sites being considered in the Storage
and Disposition PEIS, one of which is Pantex. The commentor is
referred to the Storage and Disposition PEIS for information regarding
an expanded role at Pantex that would include the long-term storage
and disposition of nonstrategic plutonium. Tritium production
will not take place at Pantex.
The commentor expresses concern regarding the Waste Management
Draft PEIS proposed alternative for LLNL's Site 300, which is
already on the EPA's Superfund List, as a regional facility for
mixed LLW.
- Response: DOE needs to make decisions and take actions to
identify sites for waste management facilities in order to protect
public health and safety, comply with Federal law, and minimize
adverse effects to the environment. The Waste Management Draft
PEIS is intended to provide environmental information to assist
DOE in determining at which sites it should modify existing waste
management facilities or construct new facilities. The waste management
facilities proposed in the Waste Management Draft PEIS include
treatment and disposal facilities for mixed LLW. The Waste Management
Draft PEIS analyzes potential environmental risks and costs associated
with a range of mixed LLW management alternatives, including one
regionalized alternative involving LLNL. After publication of
the Waste Management Final PEIS (in late 1996), DOE will issue
RODs on the treatment and disposal of mixed LLW. Please refer
to the Waste Management Draft PEIS for more information regarding
mixed LLW alternatives.
The commentor feels there are many expensive programs that need
funding before undertaking unneeded installations that have a
strong appearance of tools for the design and development of new
weapons--examples include site cleanup, storage of LLW, long-term
storage of plutonium, development of theater anti-ballistic missiles,
and storage and reprocessing of spent reactor fuel. Commentor
further suggests it would even make more sense to drill contingency
holes in Nevada in case an unexpected international situation
demanded a special nuclear weapon response for which a test would
be required.
- Response: In response to direction from the President and
Congress, DOE has developed its Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program to provide a single, highly integrated technical program
for maintaining the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear
weapons stockpile. It has evolved from existing predecessor programs
that served this mission over previous decades. With no underground
nuclear testing and no new-design nuclear weapons production,
DOE expects existing weapons to remain in the stockpile well into
the next century. This means that the weapons will age beyond
original expectations, and an alternative to underground nuclear
testing must be developed to verify the safety and reliability
of weapons. To meet these new challenges, DOE's science-based
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has been developed
to increase understanding of the basic phenomena associated with
nuclear weapons, to provide better predictive understanding of
the safety and reliability of weapons, and to ensure a strong
scientific and technical basis for future U.S. nuclear weapons
policy objectives.
Because there can be no absolute guarantee of complete success
in the development of enhanced experimental and computational
capabilities for stockpile stewardship, the United States will
maintain the capability to conduct nuclear tests under a "supreme
national interest" provision in the anticipated CTBT. DOE
will need to maintain the capability for nuclear testing and experimentation
at NTS and the necessary technical capabilities at the weapons
laboratories to design and conduct such types.
DOE must set priorities, in consultation with DOD, the National
Security Council, and other Federal agencies, in structuring a
balanced program to meet national security objectives within constrained
funding. The proposed Program is debated each year relative to
Program and funding priorities both within the Executive Branch
and with the Congress. DOE believes the funded program that results
from this debate is one that best strikes a balance between competing
interests, and best meets U.S. national security requirements.
The commentor states that DOE recommends that strategic storage
should be collocated with A/D functions, but does not emphasize
the protection of those reserves to meet future national security
needs. Commentor believes Pantex should be the preferred site
for such a mission in coordination with its stewardship functions.
In addition, the commentor feels Pantex should be selected for
all storage and disposition storage functions as it makes no sense
from budget or other perspectives to site strategic storage at
one site and surplus at another, and that this would minimize
transportation risks and costs.
- Response: Both the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS
and the Storage and Disposition PEIS analyze reasonable alternatives
for the long-term storage of strategic reserves of plutonium and
HEU. Because the overall scope of each PEIS is significantly different,
different long-term strategic reserve storage alternatives are
reasonable for each PEIS. For example, the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management PEIS evaluates alternatives for strategic reserve
storage (in the form of pits and secondaries) at the weapons A/D
facility (either Pantex or NTS; Pantex is DOE's preferred alternative).
The Storage and Disposition PEIS has a relatively broader scope
regarding fissile material storage, which will include the storage
of all surplus material, Naval reactor fuel, and Naval reactor
fuel feedstock, as well as nonweapons R&D materials. It analyzes
alternatives, among others, that would collocate strategic reserve
storage. Pantex is one such alternative for this collocation.
Preparation of these two PEISs is being closely coordinated to
ensure that all reasonable alternatives for long-term strategic
reserve storage are assessed. No decision regarding the long-term
storage of strategic reserves is expected to be made until both
PEISs have been completed. Cost and other factors will be taken
into account during the decisionmaking process.
A commentor expresses opposition to building a tritium facility.
Another commentor asks that Southwestern Public Service comments
on the Tritium Supply and Recycling Draft PEIS be included in
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management and Storage and Disposition
PEISs, and the Pantex Site-Wide EIS. Another commentor states
that better integration between this PEIS and the Tritium Supply
and Recycling Draft PEIS is required because the stockpile sizes
considered in this PEIS builds in a bias toward future tritium
production.
- Response: The Tritium Supply and Recycling Final
Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0161, October
1995) details the need for tritium and analyzes the potential
environmental impacts associated with various site and technology
alternatives for the production of tritium. It also includes responses
to all public comments received on the Tritium Supply and Recycling
Draft PEIS. In addition, the ROD published in the Federal Register
(60 FR 63878) on December 12, 1995, outlines DOE's plans in pursuing
a tritium supply for the enduring stockpile. Section 1.6 discusses
the relationship between tritium supply and recycling and stockpile
stewardship and management. The comments received on tritium supply
and recycling were responded to in the Tritium Supply and Recycling
Comment Response Document and considered in making the tritium
supply and recycling ROD. They have not been repeated in this
document because tritium is an interim action as discussed in
section 1.6 of this PEIS.
The commentor asks, relative to section 1.6.1, what would the
need date be for a new tritium facility if we had used START I
as a planning base.
- Response: The need date for a tritium facility based on START
I stockpile levels would be 2005. Producing tritium to support
a START I-sized stockpile was analyzed in the Tritium Supply and
Recycling Final PEIS in section 4.11.
The commentor states that DOE's approach to the relationship between
its NEPA review for its rebuilt Complex and for management of
waste from that Complex seems to be to simply assume in this Draft
PEIS that all waste management problems will be solved through
the Waste Management Draft PEIS, and in the Waste Management Draft
PEIS it is assumed that all potential conflicts with the Waste
Management Draft PEIS will be resolved in the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Draft PEIS. The commentor states that these documents
are incompatible for comparison purposes. The commentor points
out that there is no analysis in any document which allows citizens
or policy makers to compare the aggregate environmental impacts
of the various programmatic alternatives for the future of the
Complex, no document that provides for any program alternative
or comprehensive picture of that alternatives's impacts from materials
handling and use in manufacturing, through waste management, to
long-term storage or disposal. The compartmentalization of environmental
review (separate analyses for weapons research and production
and waste management) detracts from the usefulness of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS. The commentor further states
that the Draft PEIS waste management analyses for each site for
the stockpile stewardship and management alternatives do not provide
impacts of waste management, but rather impacts on waste management
facilities. There is no analysis of health and environmental impacts
of waste management activities which will be attributable to the
individual alternatives, despite the fact that much of the contamination
of air, soil, and water in the past has been the result of waste
management operations. Additionally, the calculated impacts in
the Draft PEIS do not include the total impacts of radioactive
materials handling to serve stockpile management alternatives,
and of treatment, storage, and disposal of stockpile management
waste.
- Response: DOE has coordinated the preparation of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS with the preparation of the Waste
Management Draft PEIS. The relationship between the two documents
is discussed in section 1.7.1 of the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management PEIS. The waste volume presented in the Waste Management
Draft PEIS are for all DOE sites and facilities and not just the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program activities. Waste
management activities that would support the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program are assumed to be per current site practice
and are contingent upon decisions to be made through the Waste
Management PEIS. The waste volumes from stockpile stewardship
and management alternatives have been provided to the Office of
Environmental Management to include in the Waste Management Final
PEIS analysis. Section 4.13 of this PEIS includes the potential
wastes management cumulative impacts at each site for the different
waste categories and the potential program and projects affecting
that site.
Because the nuclear weapon stockpile level is decreasing and due
to waste minimization and pollution prevention practices, the
volume of wastes generated from weapons program activities is
decreasing. In addition, under the preferred alternative of downsizing
and consolidating A/D, nonnuclear fabrication, and secondary and
case fabrication, the waste generation would actually decrease
at Pantex, KCP, and ORR.
The environmental and health impacts of site waste management
facilities and activities are included in the description of the
affected environment for each site in chapter 4 of the PEIS. The
analysis in the PEIS assumes current and planned site waste management
facilities and current handling, storage, and disposal practices
in place for all site-generated waste. The types and volumes of
waste generated by the stockpile stewardship and management activities
would be handled in these facilities in the same manner as all
other site waste and in accordance with all applicable Federal
and state regulations, and DOE orders. Because these facilities
are permitted and have been addressed by other NEPA documents
and environmental review, and stockpile stewardship and management
waste types and volumes would not change or exceed the operating
conditions or capacities of these waste management facilities,
the environmental and health impacts due to Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program activities would not be substantially different
from that described for the existing conditions at each alternative
site.
The commentor recommends that DOE shut-down NTS and convert it
to a solar energy testing site if the area is not too hot.
- Response: Chapter 3.2 of the NTS Site-Wide EIS explains DOE's
rationale to maintain NTS as a site with multiple programs. NTS
has historically been a multi-purpose facility because of its
remote location, arid climate, controlled access, and size. For
these reasons, a single program alternative, such as the existing
Solar Enterprise Zone, as described in the NTS Site-Wide EIS,
would fail to meet DOE's need for a site that can support evolving
DOE missions, including the capability to resume nuclear testing
as mandated by the President.
One commentor states that the waste figures presented in the Waste
Management Draft PEIS are not consistent with those in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS. Another commentor expresses shock
that the amount of waste to be produced over the next 20 years
by the stockpile stewardship and related nuclear research programs,
as presented in the Waste Management Draft PEIS is much more than
what is currently in storage.
- Response: DOE has sought to assure consistency between the
two PEISs. The commentor should realize, however, that the Waste
Management Draft PEIS makes a bounding analysis of potential waste
generation from all DOE facilities and programs, while the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS limits waste generation estimates
to waste generated for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program. The Waste Management Final PEIS will be updated to include
information consistent with that provided in the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management PEIS.
The commentor is opposed to DARHT and increased weapons production.
- Response: Facilities required for stewardship purposes, such
as DARHT, would be used to assess the safety and reliability of
the nuclear weapons in the remaining stockpile. DOE does not plan
increased weapons production, but rather is supporting a program
to reduce the nuclear weapons stockpile, consistent with international
agreements, while keeping the remaining stockpile safe and reliable.
The commentor states that the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS
and Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS contradict
each other in that the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS indicates
that ORR is considered for plutonium and the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Draft PEIS states that plutonium would not be located
anywhere it is not already located. Conversely, continues the
commentor, one of the sites that was not mentioned at all was
LANL. The commentor wants to know why LANL was not included in
the Storage and Disposition Draft PEIS.
- Response: The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
sought alternatives that both built on existing site infrastructure
and expertise and tended to further consolidate the Complex to
support a smaller nuclear weapons stockpile. For these reasons,
sites for plutonium pit production where no existing infrastructure
and expertise existed were not considered reasonable. In addition,
introducing plutonium to a site with no significant existing infrastructure
and expertise would further expand the Complex and be contrary
to DOE's desire to further consolidate and/or downsize the Complex.
For these reasons, ORR was an unreasonable alternative for the
plutonium pit production for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program. In contrast, the Storage and Disposition Program sought
a broader range of alternatives. These alternatives would, due
to international safeguards and inspection considerations, be
independent of nuclear weapon program facilities. ORR was considered
a reasonable alternative for this mission. Chapter 3 of the Storage
and Disposition Draft PEIS provides further justification for
the selection of ORR as a reasonable alternative site, and the
lack of selection of LANL as a reasonable alternative site.
The commentor asks if DOE currently assumes that as material is
transferred on the books from strategic into surplus, that it
is then covered by the current Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched
Uranium Environmental Impact Statement (DOE EIS, June 1996) or
will there be additional need for documentation to look at the
additional material as it gets transferred over.
- Response: One reason that DOE is covering the storage of strategic
reserve material in both the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
PEIS and the Storage and Disposition PEIS is to address this comment.
Both PEISs cover the storage of this material to assure that future
Program decisions, including decisions to transfer material from
strategic reserve to excess, have adequate NEPA coverage.
The commentor concurs that the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology
Site is not suitable for the stewardship and management of nuclear
weapon components and special nuclear materials and that these
materials must be removed at the earliest date. Commentor indicates
that in addition to nuclear weapons components and special nuclear
material at Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site there are
large quantities of plutonium waste to be removed before D&D
can begin, and that existing buildings are not suitable for this
kind of storage. The commentor requests an immediate decision
on the disposition and schedule of this liability, or permission
for commentor's organization (Rocky Flats Cleanup Commission,
Inc.) to provide interim storage at a dedicated offsite facility.
- Response: The Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site was
not considered for any Stockpile Stewardship and Management alternatives,
and the comment addresses programmatic issues at Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site that are outside the scope of the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program. The commentor should address the DOE Environmental
Management Office or the local DOE office at Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site regarding the potential capabilities of the Rocky
Flats Cleanup Commission, and its ability to address current Rocky
Flats Environmental Technology Site cleanup problems.
43 General/Miscellaneous Environmental
The commentor feels that science has been totally neglected. At
the last DOE meeting of the Yucca Mountain board, the commentor
asked about colloidal studies. The Federal national laboratory
did colloidal studies, according to the commentor, and the commentor
now wants to know why the studies are not commercialized upon.
- Response: The commentor is referring to the basic issue that
radionuclides may attach to colloids and be transported in water
when they would otherwise not be expected to move. There have
been a number of studies of the colloidal transport of radionuclides
from underground nuclear testing in groundwater at NTS. Related
studies on similar radionuclides and rocks have been performed
for the Yucca Mountain geologic repository project, and DOE's
Office of Subsurface Science has conducted studies on other rock
types found at NTS. Migration of tritium in groundwater at NTS
has been found to be more significant than transport of other
radionuclides as colloids. Therefore, present studies focus on
transport rates of radionuclides as a result of all mechanisms,
not solely colloidal transport. It is also important to distinguish
between groundwater flow and the much more rapid flow of water
in streams on the earth's surface. Groundwater is subject to distinctly
different chemical and physical processes than those applicable
to surface waters.
The commentor asks why all of DOE's really bad Superfund sites
are called a National Environmental Research Park (NERP) and suggests
DOE should call it National Environmental Research Disaster Site
(NERDS). Commentor's definition of a "park" is a piece
of ground for ornament and recreation.
- Response: The naming of these sites is outside the scope of
the PEIS.
The commentor believes that denial is a major roadblock to making
progress towards peace in the United States because the people
working in armaments are deep in denial about how their work is
affecting the society and the public's health.
- Response: The proposed actions in the PEIS are consistent
with national security policies. The impacts of these alternatives
on public health are discussed in the PEIS.
The commentor wants to know why, in light of the Chernobyl accident
and its health and environmental consequences, the U.S. Government
insists that it needs to create more radioactive material with
the potential for disaster even if the weapons are never used.
- Response: It is assumed that the commentor is referring to
the production of special nuclear material (plutonium and HEU).
This program does not plan to produce any additional special nuclear
material.
The commentor does not support the new armory proposed for Taos,
NM.
- Response: The siting of a new armory near Taos, NM and the
environmental impacts of its construction and operation is not
within the scope of this PEIS.
The commentor recommends that a section for the catastrophic environmental
impacts of the past weapons program should be included in the
summary of environmental impacts section. The commentor cites
the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site as an example of
how DOE activities have catastrophically affected the public and
the environment. Another commentor suggests that leadership rather
than technology was the problem at the Rocky Flats Environmental
Technology Site. The commentor wants to know if the corporate
culture that lead to the disaster has changed; what happened at
the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site and why it had to
be shut down; how much of the area around Colorado was contaminated;
what is DOE's long-range plan for dealing with the waste; why
is the pit fabrication mission being brought to LANL; and what
measures DOE plans to undertake to ensure that LANL does not become
another Rocky Flats Environmental Technology Site.
- Response: The No Action alternative as it relates to the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Program is discussed in section 3.1.4.
All activities currently supporting the stockpile stewardship
and management activities at each site within the Complex were
projected to the year 2005 and were included in the No Action
alternative. In this baseline, the environmental impacts of all
DP activities, consistent with NEPA requirements, were identified
for each resource or issue area and can be compared to the environmental
impacts of the various stockpile stewardship and management alternative
proposed actions. DOE plans to maintain the weapons stockpile
using emerging technologies as appropriate to mitigate environmental
impacts. These new technologies have the potential to further
reduce waste generation from the rates described in the PEIS and
raw material usage while reducing processing steps and operating
costs.
Commentor suggests that LANL needs competitive bidding for its
management contract and oversight by the New Mexican government.
- Response: Federal and state agencies share regulatory authority
over DOE facility operations. DOE has entered into agreements
with regulatory agencies on behalf of all of the DOE facilities
being considered in the PEIS. These agreements normally establish
a schedule for achieving full compliance at these DOE facilities.
Table 5.3-4 lists the potential requirements imposed by the major
state regulations applicable to the PEIS. DOE is committed to
managing all facilities in compliance with all applicable regulations
and guidelines. Competitive bidding practices are outside the
scope of the PEIS.
The commentor suggests the United States take a leadership role
in the elimination of anti-personnel mines but realizes the U.S.
economic motivation of the production of mines may make this difficult.
- Response: Anti-personnel mines are beyond the scope of the
PEIS.
The commentor states that no consideration is given to all the
chemicals that are poisoning the human body by allowing the chemical
companies to put all of their chemicals into food supplies which
will harm all humanity in the United States. The commentor asks
which is worse: the pollutants that go out by Pantex that affect
the local population, or all the chemicals that go into our food
supplies affecting the whole nation.
- Response: The use and the potential human health and environmental
impacts of chemicals by consumers, manufacturing and industrial
facilities, and the agricultural industry are beyond the scope
of this PEIS. The affected environment section 4.5.2 describes
the existing conditions at Pantex. The environmental impacts from
the proposed alternatives at Pantex are described in section 4.5.3
including the potential impacts from site chemical use and emissions.
The commentor is concerned that the Federal Government is expanding
nuclear programs in the State of New Mexico without investing
any money in the state. The commentor believes that DOE has no
commitment to public health surveillance in the state despite
a rapid large-scale expansion of nuclear programs.
- Response: DOE would not be significantly expanding nuclear
programs in New Mexico with implementation of its PEIS preferred
alternative. However, DOE has and continues to make significant
economic investments in the state. A recent University of New
Mexico study (The Economic Impact of DOE on the State of New Mexico,
jointly prepared by DOE and New Mexico State University, published
July 1995, covering fiscal year 1994) attributed more than one
in ten jobs in the state directly or indirectly to DOE activities.
DOE has also made a significant commitment to public health oversight
for its operations in New Mexico. Agreements exist with state
regulatory and enforcement organizations for the continued oversight
of environmental regulations and waste management. Funding has
been provided to the state by DOE for this purpose.
The commentor asks all the employees of all the laboratories,
all the way up to Hazel O'Leary, if there is a solid foundation
in nonweapons production, then "wouldn't that be real job
security when the balanced budget axe cutters come after you?"
The commentor states that global competition for U.S. businesses
could be affected tremendously. The commentor believes that scientists
in Japan and Germany are helping their businesses design products
to be sold around the world. The commentor states that we are
doing great in weapons production, but in everything else, we
seem to be falling apart.
- Response: DOE has always encouraged its production and laboratory
facilities to perform work for other customers when this work
did not interfere with DOE mission work and it could be shown
that no private industrial facility was willing and capable of
performing the work. Performance of this type of work had the
advantage to the Government of deferring overhead costs and helping
to retain core competencies. As DOD and other Federal agency procurements
have decreased in recent years, it has been increasingly difficult
to attract work of this kind to DOE facilities.
The commentor sees the nuclear issue as an issue for the rest
of human time. We are the last generation, according to the commentor,
that will have the opportunity to address this issue in a responsible
manner simply because we are responsible for it. The commentor
also stresses the need to have the best scientists working in
the nuclear arena. Another commentor wants to know why safer alternatives
to nuclear weapons are not being utilized.
- Response: The United States is promoting nonproliferation
through the NPT and the CTBT and reductions in its nuclear weapon
stockpile through treaties such as START II. Congress and the
President have directed the Secretary of Energy to ensure that
the stewardship program preserves the core intellectual and technical
competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons without nuclear
testing and without new weapons production. This includes competencies
in research, design, development, testing, reliability assessment,
certification, manufacturing, and surveillance capabilities.
The commentor states that Los Alamos has been billed "the
little Oak Ridge" for quite some time, and it looks like
a $600 million project. The commentor would like the PEIS to discuss
whether Los Alamos has received $600 million for a capital project.
- Response: DOE is aware of concerns in the Oak Ridge community
that DOE is taking actions at Los Alamos to establish uranium
fabrication and processing capability to the detriment of future
ORR Y-12 missions. These concerns are unfounded in fact. There
has not been, nor is there planned to be, a "$600 million
project" at Los Alamos to establish a "little Oak Ridge."
The following actions are being taken at Los Alamos that relate
to Y-12 missions.
The Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility is being upgraded
to fix safety deficiencies and to extend the life of the facility.
The primary mission of the facility is plutonium analytical chemistry
in support of the LANL plutonium facility (TA-55). One of four
operating wings of Chemistry and Metallurgy Research facility
contains limited capability for HEU operations. A limited amount
of DOE funding ($2 to $4 million per year) has been given to Los
Alamos for work in this area in recent years. Most of the work
has focused on chemical recovery technology for HEU so that LANL
can process its onsite legacy residues of enriched uranium.
The Sigma Complex facilities constitute the major LANL facilities
for fabrication of components (which do not contain plutonium
or HEU) for R&D. Work performed here that relates to Y-12
missions include fabrication of parts from depleted uranium and
its alloys, lithium salts, and other specialty metals. These are
traditional missions of these facilities that have been ongoing
for decades. No significant upgrades have occurred to these facilities
in recent years, and the only planned modifications are to accommodate
missions transferred from the Rocky Flats Environmental Technology
Site under the nonnuclear consolidation program.
The commentor states that the Government could save $18 million
of the laboratory's $40 million travel budget if the top brass
drove from Albuquerque airport instead of chartering flights.
- Response: DOE and LANL travel budgets and any potential savings
that might be expected from alternative means of travel are beyond
the scope of the PEIS. However, if the commentor is referring
to the routine flights that were "chartered" between
Albuquerque and Los Alamos, these flights were discontinued in
1995 due to reduced traffic demand.
The commentor believes that the history discussion in chapter
2 should go back further than the beginning of the Cold War in
order to provide a better perspective on nuclear weapons issues.
Another commentor asks about the differentiation of the terms
"post-Cold War" and "neo-Cold War."
- Response: The purpose of and need for the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program is discussed in chapter 2. This discussion
provides sufficient justification for the proposed actions and
the alternatives analyzed in the PEIS, and includes a brief discussion
of the Cold War.
The commentor feels that a weapons program is needed to ensure
national security. Another commentor feels national security will
result from people working towards peace and justice.
- Response: Nuclear weapons are a key component of national
security and the President has declared the maintenance of a safe
and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile to be a supreme national
interest. DOE has reduced the size of the stockpile as a result
of arms control and nonproliferation objectives. DOE responds
to the direction of the President and Congress. The preferred
alternatives were chosen, in part, because they do satisfy U.S.
arms control and nonproliferation objectives. One benefit of science-based
stockpile stewardship is to demonstrate the U.S. commitment to
NPT goals; however, the U.S. nuclear posture is not the only factor
that might affect whether or not other nations might develop nuclear
weapons of their own. Some nations that are not declared nuclear
states have the ability to develop nuclear weapons. Many of these
nations rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for security assurance.
The loss of confidence in the safety or reliability of the weapons
in the U.S. stockpile could result in a corresponding loss of
credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and could provide an
incentive to other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons
programs.
The commentor applauds DOE's efforts and the fact that we do have
a Nation that is willing to put things together, and consolidate
nuclear waste and/or enriched uranium and plutonium.
- Response: Within the Complex, there is a common waste management
approach that emphasizes four areas of concern: the reduction
of environmental impacts by hazardous or toxic substances, process
improvements that minimize waste generation, recycling in order
to minimize waste to be disposed and raw material use, and the
treatment of generated waste. DOE is increasing its efforts at
minimizing the use of hazardous materials and the number and volume
of waste streams consistent with programmatic needs through active
pollution prevention and waste minimization programs. DOE plans
to maintain the weapons stockpile using emerging technologies
to mitigate environmental impacts. These new technologies have
the potential to reduce waste generation and raw material usage
while reducing processing steps and operating costs.
The commentor believes that the effects of forest fires must be
included in the discussion of the current environment at LANL.
The commentor notes that a recent fire in the Los Alamos and Bandelier
area came within two miles of LANL before it was brought under
control, and any discussion of the current environment at LANL
must include consideration of such fires.
- Response: DOE agrees with commentor that the Dome Fire, a
wildfire that burned over 16,000 acres of National Forest Service
and National Park Service land just south of LANL in April and
May 1996, aptly illustrates the potential impact of wildfire on
life, safety, property, and natural resources. Accordingly, DOE,
LANL, Los Alamos County, and the Forest Service are working together
to take immediate actions to reduce the fire hazard on and around
LANL, and to plan for long-term forest management that would incorporate
fire management techniques.
AIRNET and NEWNET are the two air quality monitoring systems employed
by LANL; AIRNET data are reported to the public annually in the
Environmental Surveillance Report, and NEWNET data are publicly
accessible over the Internet computer links as they are collected.
Neither AIRNET nor NEWNET stations went off-line during the Dome
Fire. Over the past 8 months, LANL has eliminated several AIRNET
stations that are no longer needed or were redundant with other
sampling as part of an overall effort to streamline the sampling
networks to ensure their effectiveness. Just prior to the outbreak
of the Dome Fire, LANL reprogrammed four of five monitoring stations
in the southern part of the laboratory to transmit data at longer
intervals in order to determine long-clock stability, but returned
to the original transmittal intervals during the Dome Fire to
provide better coverage.
A number of commentors expressed opinions on issues such as changing
the DOE seal, undiscovering plutonium, the neutron source of modern
warhead designs, the cleanup of nuclear waste at Hanford, and
the storage of spent fuel rods.
- Response: These issues are beyond the scope of this PEIS.