20 Stewardship--Contained Firing Facility
The commentor asks how much CFF will cost.
- Response: Design and construction of CFF is expected to total
$53 million. While cost and whether and how the President and
Congress should allocate funds for CFF is outside the scope of
the PEIS, cost is one of the many factors which will be considered
by decisionmakers in the PEIS ROD as it relates to CFF.
21 Stewardship--National Ignition Facility
The commentors believe the technical justification for NIF in
the PEIS is poor and not cogent and the facility will only benefit
an elite few. Commentors believe that NIF is the least relevant
alternative as far as safety and reliability and it will provide
only marginal information on reliability. Commentors question
whether there are alternative means of obtaining each of the categories
of data that NIF is intended to provide. Another commentor asks
if DOE could identify a single past safety or reliability issue
that NIF would have the ability to evaluate. The commentor states
that the PEIS does not acknowledge that DOE cannot assure high
confidence in achieving ignition at NIF and that construction
of NIF should be delayed.
- Response: The President has declared that the maintenance
of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile will remain a
cornerstone of national security policy for the foreseeable future.
Changes to U.S. national security policies in the post-Cold War
have placed two significant constraints on the way DOE has traditionally
accomplished its statutory nuclear mission: the United States
has declared a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, and
has stopped the production of new-design nuclear weapons. In August
1995, the President declared that the United States was seeking
ratification of a zero-yield Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Within these constraints, the proposed actions in the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management PEIS will enable DOE to maintain the
core intellectual and technical competencies necessary to ensure
the continued safety and reliability of the stockpile under a
CTBT. In this situation, the United States needs a comprehensive
computational ability and a set of experimental facilities that
can replicate conditions expected to occur within a nuclear detonation.
NIF is one of those experimental facilities. It is a key component
of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and is necessary
to help maintain confidence in the reliability of the nuclear
deterrent.
As stated in the appendix section I.2.2, the purpose and need
for NIF is to achieve fusion ignition and to use inertial fusion
technology for helping nuclear weapons scientists maintain the
safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile in the
absence of nuclear testing. Therefore, NIF experiments can be
used to verify computer models associated with the reliability
of nuclear weapons and assess the impact of age- or remanufacture-related
changes in the weapon. NIF would reach temperatures and pressures
closer to those in a nuclear detonation than any other technology
and is the only facility in the program capable of fusion ignition.
This national security mission is the principal justification
for NIF; it is necessary to help maintain confidence in the reliability
of the nuclear deterrent. However, the high energy density experiments
proposed to be performed at NIF would also help determine if inertial
fusion can be developed as a practical energy source. The challenging
science at NIF would help attract the best scientists and engineers
to work on these issues of national importance (appendix section
I.2.2.3).
The facilities for enhanced experimental capability would complement
each other and produce more sophisticated and comprehensive computer
models which would be able to provide data on all processes in
the seven relevant physical regimes (appendix section I.2.2.2)
that occur in weapons. NIF was designed to be a minimum-sized
facility that has a reasonable probability of achieving ignition
and the same ability to access high temperatures and densities
that occur in weapons materials. NIF would address weapons processes
that occur in five of the seven regimes, including some of the
processes that occur in weapons' primaries and secondaries. The
purpose of NIF is to study isolated phenomena in weapons in the
stockpile. In the future, the complex interactions which occur
in the detonation of a complete weapon would be investigated through
advanced computer modeling.
There is a high probability that NIF would achieve ignition and
an even higher probability that NIF would achieve its weapon physics
mission. A 1990 National Academy of Sciences study, Second Review
of the Department of Energy's Inertial Confinement Fusion Program,
Final Report, September 1990 (1990 National Academy of Sciences
study) (cited as NAS 1990 in appendix I), concluded that the probability
of achieving ignition was great enough to justify proceeding with
the next steps in designing such a facility. It also recommended
that DOE establish a standing review group to continue tracking
progress in target physics. That group, the Inertial Confinement
Fusion Advisory Committee, has followed the program for more than
three years and concluded (Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory
Committee Report, January 1996) that there is a high probability
of achieving ignition if NIF is built as currently designed.
To fulfill its mission in stockpile stewardship, NIF is designed
to achieve ignition and, in addition, to perform experiments at
high temperatures and densities using the laser energy alone.
Many of the needs of the weapons program can be met with these
ignitionless experiments. Indeed, experiments are planned well
before it is expected that ignition is likely to occur. Ignition
would enhance NIF's capabilities for weapons studies but NIF is
not necessary for many of them. In 1994, the JASONs group of independent
academic scientists reviewed the science-based stockpile stewardship
program and concluded that NIF is "... the most scientifically
valuable of the programs proposed for SBSS [science based stockpile
stewardship]..." In 1996 JASONs reiterated this position
and stated its "... support for proceeding to the next step
of achieving ignition with NIF because of NIF's expected value
to science-based stockpile stewardship as well as its collateral
scientific and energy interest." In summary, the Inertial
Confinement Fusion Program and NIF have been reviewed by many
independent expert groups, such as the National Academy of Sciences,
Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory Committee, and the JASONs,
over the years and all have endorsed moving ahead quickly with
a facility as currently designed.
A projection from past experience with the stockpile (Stockpile
Surveillance: Past and Future, SAND95-2751, January 1996) indicates
that there will be cases that will require a weapon scientist
to make a judgment about a change that could affect safety or
reliability. NIF would be able to help with many of them.
If NIF would not achieve ignition, the environmental impacts associated
with construction would not change; however, the potential environmental
impacts associated with operation could be smaller, but probably
similar, to those presented in the PEIS. Delaying the construction
of NIF would not cause any planned differences in the inertial
confinement fusion R&D nor change the environmental impacts
which are described in the PEIS.
A commentor notes that with respect to environmental impacts the
public should be skeptical with the statement "... there
will be no significant impacts." Another commentor notes
that LLNL's environmental report claims "no significant impact"
yet over a million Ci of radiation has been released in the air.
The commentor states that 120 cancers and 60 cancer deaths resulted
from the top 10 accidents that occurred at LLNL. A commentor points
out that tritium levels in rainwater and drinking water in Livermore
has been measured to be over seven times the acceptable level.
The commentor also points out that plutonium-contaminated soil
was discovered at a local playground.
- Response: Over the past 40 years of operations at LLNL, tritium
gas was released as a result of accidents and normal operations.
The releases consisted of mostly tritium gas which is much less
of a hazard to human health than tritiated water which can be
absorbed more easily into the body. Additional information concerning
radiological health impacts can be found in appendix section E.2
of the PEIS.
The 1994 LLNL Environmental Monitoring Report states that the
tritium activity levels in drinking water in the Livermore Valley
are less than 1 percent of the EPA drinking water standard. Over
the past 40 years, there was one rainwater sample that read seven
times the EPA guideline for tritium in potable water. This occurrence
may have been caused by tritium releases during cleanup operations.
There is some groundwater (not drinking water) tritium contamination
greater than EPA standards for drinking water under the eastern
portion of the LLNL site. However, the tritium in this groundwater
will decay (due to radioactive disintegration) to levels well
below EPA standards before it leaves the site boundary. Therefore,
it presents no health impact to humans or the environment. In
addition, LLNL monitors the groundwater under the site on a regular
basis (as reported in the annual LLNL Environmental Monitoring
Reports) and can ensure that the public will not be exposed to
tritium at levels that exceed EPA standards. Additional information
concerning accidental release can be found in a report by Myers,
et al., Health Physics Aspects of a Large Accidental Tritium Release,
published in 1993.
Routine releases from NIF are estimated to be about 30 Ci/yr (0.003
g/yr), which is roughly 100 times lower than the routine average
annual releases that took place from the LLNL tritium facility
prior to 1989. Therefore, the use of standard risk coefficients
for the extremely low doses and dose rates under discussion in
the PEIS is at the least, extremely health conservative, and may,
in fact, be significantly overestimating the risks (if any) associated
with such low doses.
The commentor refers to levels of plutonium that were detected
in soil samples taken from Big Trees Park in Livermore. The plutonium
levels in two of the 16 areas sampled in the park were found to
be above the normal range of global fallout levels (from aboveground
nuclear weapons testing many years ago). The soil in this park
was investigated for plutonium in 1995 as a joint effort among
LLNL, EPA, and the California Department of Health Services. The
investigation of park soils also involved various community stakeholders--the
city of Livermore, the park and school districts, the local homeowners
association, and Tri-Valley Citizens Against a Radioactive Environment.
The investigation found that there is no soil at the park that
has plutonium levels above the current EPA risk-based preliminary
remediation goal of 2.5 pCi/g for residential areas. The EPA concluded
that there is no health risk from this plutonium and that no remedial
action is necessary.
Commentor wants to know what the key factors were in the NIF preferred
alternative decision and if the timetable for NIF is the same
as the PEIS.
- Response: The Secretary of Energy stated in a press release
in October 1994, "Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
was chosen as the preferred site because it contains the Nation's
leading experts in large laser facilities. Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory has constructed five consecutive versions
of the world's largest laser, including the currently operational
Nova laser. The National Ignition Facility would be the successor
to Nova. Alternative sites will be examined, and a final site
selection will be not be made until completion of the National
Environmental Policy Act process, which includes public meetings."
In the letter approving Key Decision 1 (approval for start of
a major new project), the Secretary supported the statement "The
National Environmental Policy Act requires that any preference
related to the siting of a facility be stated by the Department
of Energy. Given the resident technical expertise and existing
infrastructure at LLNL, we believe that Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory is preferable at this time to other candidate sites."
Following completion of the Final PEIS, but at least 30 days after
it is issued, DOE will issue an ROD. The ROD will explain all
factors, including environmental impacts, that DOE considered
in its decisions for NIF. The timetable for NIF is within the
envelope for the PEIS. It is anticipated that NIF would be constructed
between late 1996 and 2002, with operations commencing in 2003.
Several commentors do not support NIF, a new experimental $4.5
billion facility, feeling that it is not the policy direction
the United States should undertake and the public should inform
elected officials that NIF is not necessary. Some commentors disapprove
of the funding allocation on the basis that NIF competes for funds
with cleanup programs and waste management. Other commentors feel
it costs too much and the funds could be better spent on health
care, social services, low-income housing, education, and infrastructure.
Still others prefer funds spent on socially beneficial programs,
such as conservation, renewable energy, and clean cars.
- Response: The cost of NIF is estimated at $1.1 billion for
construction (including escalation and contingency) through 2002.
After construction is complete, NIF operating costs are anticipated
to be $60 million per year (in fiscal year 1996 dollars) to provide
approximately 600 experiments per year. The incremental cost of
the Inertial Confinement Fusion Research Program is estimated
to be $55 million per year (in fiscal year 1996). Cost is one
of many factors which will be considered by decisionmakers in
the ROD for NIF.
DOE has the responsibility for ensuring the safety and reliability
of the downsized U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, a policy priority
for the President and Congress. Congress determines how the funds
are allocated among programs.
Commentors believe that the discussion of NIF in the PEIS is inadequate
in scope and content. A commentor believes that a reasonable range
of alternatives is not provided for the NIF in the NEPA context.
The commentors also question whether there are alternative means
of obtaining each of the categories of data that NIF is intended
to provide. A commentor states a fair and impartial environmental
analysis of NIF, as required by NEPA, should include the extensive
concomitant environmental impacts from the potential for nuclear
weapons proliferation resulting from the spread of inertial confinement
fusion technology and the environmental impacts from the successful
deployment of fusion as a commercial power source. Several commentors
state that in regard to the site-specific review of the various
stockpile stewardship facilities, and NIF in particular, that
it is inappropriate to include site-specific reviews in the PEIS.
- Response: DOE believes that appendix I, the National Ignition
Facility Project-Specific Analysis, was adequate. The NIF project-specific
analysis assessed the direct, indirect, and cumulative environmental
impacts of the proposed action (appendix section I.3.2), which
is to construct and operate NIF (two operational options--Conceptual
Design Option and Enhanced Option) and the No Action alternative
(appendix section I.3.3). NIF was designed to be the minimum-sized
facility that has a reasonable probability of achieving ignition
and achieving its high temperature density weapon physics goals.
No other known technologies are capable of achieving ignition
and the high temperatures and densities that occur in weapons
materials. Specifically, the pulsed-power technology alluded to
in a commentor's letter is not a substitute for NIF capabilities.
In general, high intensity laser facilities, like NIF, can achieve
temperatures and pressures closer to those in a weapon than can
pulsed-power facilities. On the other hand, pulsed-power facilities
can put more but less concentrated energy on target than laser
facilities, and are, therefore, able to follow certain phenomena
for longer times, albeit at much lower temperatures. Thus, rather
than providing the same capabilities, laser and pulsed-power facilities
complement one another. There are no other design alternatives
that would enable NIF to perform its intended mission, therefore,
no others were assessed. Thus, the only alternatives that are
judged reasonable are to build NIF or not to build it, and if
so, where. These two alternatives were explained in detail in
appendix I.
Section 1.5 of the PEIS explains the DOE NEPA strategy for the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. During the second
phase of the NEPA strategy, which would follow the ROD, DOE would
prepare any necessary tiered project-specific NEPA documents to
implement any programmatic decisions. However, for the three facilities
in the proposed action for stockpile stewardship--NIF, CFF, and
Atlas--the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS is intended
to include sufficient project-specific analyses to complete NEPA
requirements for siting, construction, and operation, and thus,
satisfy both phases of the NEPA strategy. Including the project-specific
analyses for the three facilities in the PEIS does not prejudice
the programmatic review. In addition, the CEQ regulations do not
preclude this approach.
NIF is not capable of being a prototype for a commercial inertial
confinement fusion reactor. As stated in the Justification of
Mission Need, the purpose of NIF is to achieve fusion ignition
and to use inertial fusion technology for helping nuclear weapons
scientists maintain the reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile
in the absence of nuclear testing. This national security mission
is the principal justification for NIF. However, the high energy
density experiments done at NIF would also help determine if inertial
fusion can be developed as a practical energy source. In this
context, obtaining ignition on NIF at the lowest laser energy
possible would be an important set of experiments. If this is
successful, other experiments would study target science that
is applicable to any laser or particle accelerator driver that
may be used in the future to study inertial confinement fusion
as an energy source. NIF experiments could also provide the data
necessary to design an engineering test facility, which would
be the true engineering basis for a commercial reactor.
A comparative study of the four driver concepts under consideration
(Laboratory Microfusion Capability Study Phase I Report, DOE/DP-0069,
April 1989)--the solid state laser, the krypton flouride laser,
the heavy ion accelerator, and the light ion driver--was done
in the late 1980s for what was called the Laboratory Microfusion
Facility. This study provided a technical analysis of each driver,
a description of their respective research programs, their status,
cost, and, in general, the features asked for in the above comment.
The Laboratory Microfusion Facility was designed to achieve ignition
and high gain, with fusion yields of 200 to 1000 megajoules (MJ),
a much larger facility than NIF. During 1989 and 1990, the National
Academy of Sciences reviewed the Inertial Confinement Fusion Program
and all of these drivers. It was given the information from the
previous comparative study. Some of the drivers required several
intermediate facilities before the technologies would be mature
enough to propose as the driver for a machine of the scale required.
In its 1990 study, the National Academy of Sciences recommended
that DOE plan on building an ignition facility (eventually this
was called NIF) rather than the Laboratory Microfusion Facility
and it recommended that DOE pursue this option quickly. Indeed,
it suggested that start of the project be in 1992. Finally, the
study also concluded that the only driver capable of achieving
ignition within the next decade or so is the neodymium glass laser.
DOE accepted the recommendations of the 1990 National Academy
of Sciences study and began concentrating resources on NIF, driven
by a neodymium glass laser. Four inertial confinement fusion laboratories
participated in the conceptual design study for a neodymium glass
driven NIF. A prototype beamline of the NIF neodymium glass laser
was built and tested successfully. While there has been progress
in all driver technologies since the 1990 National Academy of
Sciences study, it is clear that the neodymium glass laser's readiness
to perform the NIF mission has grown faster than that of any other
driver. Thus, for NIF's mission, the neodymium glass laser was
judged to be the only reasonable option that would meet program
goals.
The programs and facilities that make up the existing weapons
program have evolved to their present state because of diverse
technical, programmatic, and budgetary considerations. The present
programmatic change is the need for improved science-basis to
ensure the safety and reliability of our nuclear weapons within
a zero-yield test ban. In the case of inertial confinement fusion,
technical reviews by the JASONs and the Inertial Confinement Fusion
Advisory Committee specifically questioned the technical status,
issues, and activities mix of the program within the context of
changed programmatic need. Neither the programmatic changes nor
the technical reviews have provided any basis for defining a change
in the existing program other than adding the significant new
capabilities that NIF could contribute. The technical reviews
provide a strong basis for continuing today's program and facilities
except that the NOVA laser might reasonably stop operation after
"NIF construction is well underway ..." (JASONs JSR
96-300 p.16).
Since there is no reasonable basis for defining an option for
inertial fusion that is a reduction from today's program, no such
option has been considered in the PEIS. Like most research programs,
inertial fusion can be adjusted in pace and level of effort based
on scientific findings or budget considerations. Any required
changes in the program, including reductions, would be accommodated
but there are no apparent break points for existing facilities
and activities, in a programmatic or environmental sense, that
suggest analysis of a particular reduced case.
The addition of an ignition facility to the program has been technically
defined and endorsed since 1990. The addition of NIF is considered
because it addresses science-based stockpile stewardship needs
and is technically consistent with the logic and status of inertial
fusion research. Technical reviews have not identified any alternatives
to NIF for the mission needs. Any follow on facilities are, at
present, too ill defined and speculative to analyze.
Issues such as the environmental impacts from nuclear weapons
proliferation resulting from the spread of inertial confinement
fusion technology and the environmental impacts from the successful
deployment of fusion as a commercial power source are beyond the
scope of the PEIS. Knowledge does not, in itself, have environmental
impacts, and thus is not analyzed in the PEIS.
Many commentors support the NIF project on the basis of their
perception that NIF would: 1) ensure world peace; 2) maintain
a safe, reliable, and viable stockpile through science-based stewardship;
3) keep weapons scientists knowledgeable and equipped with the
best available tools; 4) increase security of the United States;
5) continue the evolutionary process for eventual cessation of
nuclear weapons and final disarmament; 6) not contribute to proliferation;
7) provide economic benefits; 8) create data on enhanced nuclear
fusion energy; 9) help negotiations for the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty (NPT) and CTBT; 10) justify the need to eliminate underground
nuclear testing; 11) create many employment opportunities in the
region as a result of new fusion technology; and 12) have a benign
environmental and safety impact with mitigation measures minimizing
any possible impacts.
- Response: The purpose of and need for the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management Program, and NIF's role within a science-based
stockpile stewardship program, are detailed in chapter 2 of the
PEIS. The purpose of and need for the NIF project are detailed
in appendix section I.2.1. NIF is one of the technologies that
is enabling the United States to seek a CTBT. The study, The National
Ignition Facility (NIF) and the Issues of Nonproliferation, Draft
Study, Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, August 23,
1995 (citation: U.S. Department of Energy, 1995a in appendix I)
concluded that NIF can contribute positively to the U.S. nonproliferation
policy and arms control goals. NIF would perform a key role in
ensuring the reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile
without the need for underground testing. Performing this function
requires extensive research and experimentation in the areas of
weapons physics and advanced computation that can only be provided
at the proposed NIF. In addition, through the same scientific
accomplishments resulting from stockpile stewardship, science
and technological research endeavors can be advanced, including
optics, lasers, materials, and measurement techniques, fostered
by the challenges of constructing and operating this facility
(appendix section I.2.3).
The commentors believe the NIF superlaser affords excellent nonweapons
research opportunities into the potential of thermonuclear fusion
energy without damaging the environment. Commentors believe advancing
research into areas such as new energy sources are vital to our
civilization considering there may be a lack of natural resources
in the 21st century. A commentor states there is no programmatic
discussion of the full Inertial Confinement Fusion Program and
the follow-on facilities to NIF or other inertial confinement
fusion programs in operation. Other commentors state NIF's justification
of inertial confinement fusion as a commercial energy source is
suspect because inertial confinement fusion cannot serve as the
basis for a commercial reactor since it has high cost, low driver
efficiency, and the needed repetition rate of target implosions
cannot be obtained with neodymium glass lasers. The commentors
also state that the NIF design should be modified to increase
driver energy to a higher level to give a greater confidence that
ignition could be achieved. A commentor believes that no nuclear
waste will be generated because fusion will be studied, not fission.
Another commentor notes that if NIF is to be used for civilian
purposes like DOE claims, then let private companies compete for
the funding for this program.
- Response: Research opportunities and scientific and technological
benefits would derive from NIF being a multipurpose, multi-use
facility. NIF would be constructed for its national security and
weapons research role, but it also would present the scientific
community with a range of civilian applications. The unique properties
of NIF are attracting a broad spectrum of interest from the international
community for basic science applications. Although diverse programs
of scientific and technological research have been conducted at
large lasers in the United Kingdom, France, Germany, and Japan,
information on equivalent research in the United States has been
restricted because of past substantial classification requirements
on much of the research and development associated with the Inertial
Confinement Fusion Program.
Recent changes in U.S. classification guidelines have modified
the atmosphere for research at NIF, with the result that U.S.
scientists are designing programs of basic and applied research
that could be accomplished openly at NIF. The NIF role in fusion
energy would be to demonstrate ignition, optimize target gain
curves, provide initial data on fusion reactor materials, and
allow sound decisions to be made concerning inertial confinement
energy development. These data would determine if inertial confinement
fusion can be a viable source of electrical power in the future.
NIF is not intended to be the basis for a commercial inertial
confinement fusion reactor. The neodymium glass laser that would
power NIF is recognized not to be a good candidate for a reactor.
Several other drivers, including crystalline solid state lasers,
krypton flouride lasers, heavy ion accelerators, and light ion
diodes are under development. The National Academy of Sciences
stated that ignition should be the next goal for inertial confinement
fusion and that the only way to achieve that in the next decade
or so is with a neodymium glass laser driver (1990 National Academy
of Sciences study). The Inertial Confinement Fusion Advisory Committee
stated that achieving ignition by any driver was the most important
next step in development of inertial fusion energy.
NIF would also establish new capabilities in many other potential
areas of study, including: astrophysics, hydrodynamics, material
properties, plasma physics, radiation sources, radiative properties,
and other potential applications, such as nonlinear physics, geophysics,
other atomic physics applications, and optical physics. NIF could
also spur high-technology industries in optics, lasers, materials,
high-speed instrumentation, semiconductors, and precision manufacturing.
Further discussion is included in appendix section I.2.3.
Any follow-on facilities to NIF are, at present, too ill defined
and speculative to include. For accomplishing the mission of NIF,
there are no reasonable alternatives.
Article IV of the NPT commits parties to facilitating the "fullest
possible exchange of "... scientific and technological information"
related to peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This commitment was
included in the NPT at the insistence of nonnuclear weapons states
that were concerned that they would suffer scientific and technological
disadvantages compared to the nuclear weapon states.
Environmental impacts associated with the construction and operation
of NIF are detailed in appendix sections I.4.1.2, I.4.2.2, I.4.3.2,
I.4.4.2, and I.4.5.2. The comment that no nuclear work would be
generated by NIF is incorrect; however, the small quantities of
low-level radioactive wastes estimated to be generated by NIF
can be handled by current or planned waste management capabilities
at each alternative site for NIF.
The commentor suggests the unevenness of LLNL's early expenditure
estimates, coupled with the rapid growth of spending a year ahead
of when it would be expected to occur based on past projects,
leads commentor to conclude that NIF may overspend early in the
project cycle and may experience significant delays due to the
attempt to "push" the project in the first four years.
- Response: The proposed NIF funding profile is based on the
annual funding necessary to construct a facility which begins
operation in 2003. The apparent rapid growth of funding "a
year ahead of when it would be expected to occur based on past
projects" is required so that initial construction contracts
and long lead procurements can be placed near the end of fiscal
year 1997 for actual accomplishment during fiscal year 1998.
Commentors note that there are several varying estimates regarding
the number of jobs which would be created each year by NIF and
the regional economic impacts were misleading. One commentor notes
that the regional economic impacts from building NIF cited in
the Conceptual Design Report are inflated and misleading. According
to the commentor, the regional economic effects of the construction
and pre-operation of NIF will be small over the 7-year construction
period. A large influx of construction employees during years
3, 4, and 5 of the construction period and a correspondingly large
decrease in construction employees during 6 and 7 has the potential
to create a boom-and-bust scenario in the Livermore region since
approximately 1,200 people would move in and out during the last
4 years of the construction of NIF. The commentor states that
the jobs will vary during each year of construction from 22 jobs
the first year to 600 jobs the fifth year. The commentor contends
that construction jobs would decrease to 120 by year 7 and only
about 230 long-term jobs will stay at NIF.
- Response: The socioeconomic analysis provides data on the
peak number of jobs, in-migrating population, number of housing
units required, increase in local jurisdiction (revenues and expenditures),
and number of daily vehicle trips associated with the construction
and operation of NIF. Several other sources have analyzed the
impact of NIF on employment, and have reached different conclusions
regarding the employment impact of the facility. The differences
are attributable to different data, methodologies, and assumptions
used in the studies. For example, the project-specific analysis
supporting NIF in appendix I is of greater depth than that performed
for the PEIS alternatives.
Socioeconomic impacts were measured using the latest version of
RIMS II, an accounting framework model developed by the U.S. Bureau
of Economic Analysis (section 4.1.8). The model is used by Government
agencies, university researchers, and economists to measure economic
impacts. The database used for the socioeconomic study was developed
using the most recent information available from the Departments
of Commerce and Labor, as well as financial reports provided by
cities, counties, and school districts. The model estimates impacts
occurring in the local area surrounding each site and those that
occur in the regional and national economy as well. Appendix table
I.3.6.1-1 provides a comparison of socioeconomic impacts across
the five candidate sites.
Appendix section I.4.1.2.6 provides information on the effects
of constructing and operating NIF at LLNL in the San Francisco
Bay area economy. A number of related industries are located outside
the San Francisco Bay area, and therefore, some of the economic
benefits would be gained elsewhere in the U.S. economy. However,
in terms of impacts across all industries that would provide inputs
to NIF, the majority of employment created from construction at
LLNL would occur in the San Francisco Bay area economy. The expected
demand for housing for in-migrating construction workers is less
than 2 percent of the housing units available, therefore NIF construction
would not create a boom-bust effect in the local housing market
(appendix section I.4.2.6). Text has been added in appendix I
to explicitly address the issue of retained jobs.
The analysis performed for the NIF project-specific analysis (appendix
section I.4.1.2.6) estimated that a total of 1,900 construction-related
workers and their families would move into the LLNL area from
the start of construction in 1996 to the peak in 1998. The project-specific
analysis estimates that this would result in the demand for an
additional 690 housing units in the area surrounding LLNL. Baseline
projections show that 54,000 housing units would be available
over this period in the local area, indicating that NIF-related
in-migration would use less than 2 percent of locally available
housing. It is unlikely, therefore, that NIF construction would
create the boom-bust effect in the local housing market described
by the commentor.
Commentors feel that jobs being created by NIF would be costly,
not prosperous, come at the risk to other LLNL programs, ignore
those created from technological inventions, and are at risk because
of the annual budget process. Other commentors support NIF at
LLNL and feel that NIF is a responsible project which would not
be trivial work and should not be minimized.
- Response: NIF would be a unique, state-of-the-art scientific
facility whose primary mission would be to ensure the continued
reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. Creating employment
at the site chosen and for the surrounding economy is secondary
to this objective. Many commercial facilities are likely to create
more employment than NIF at a lower cost of investment, but many
of these facilities do not have a research mission and none use
comparable technologies. It is not, therefore, possible to compare
the costs and benefits of NIF versus commercial facilities solely
on the basis of the number of jobs created.
The estimates of employment impacts associated with NIF do not
include the economic benefits of any additional new technologies
and scientific enterprises that might result from experimentation
at NIF and that could be transferred to the commercial sector.
For example, no assessment was made of the potential economic
benefits from a possible development of inertial fusion as a source
of electrical power for use by the commercial sector. As the nature,
scale, and timing of any future benefits of new technological
and scientific developments associated with NIF are uncertain,
these are not currently included in the assessment of economic
impacts in the EIS.
As with any government research facility and program funded through
the annual appropriation process, funding for NIF would be dependent
on annual decisions by the President and Congress. The purpose
and need for NIF are tied directly to U.S. decisions to maintain
a safe and reliable weapons stockpile as a key element of the
deterrence policy. In the appropriations process, all Government
programs compete for funding based on their merits. There is no
direct causal relationship between funding one program and an
increase or decrease in funding for another program at the same
site.
The commentor feels the construction of NIF will be delayed because
the decision regarding NIF will drag on for the next few years.
- Response: DOE has developed a timeline of numbered sequential
Key Decisions, now known as critical decisions. This management
system will be used to ensure the orderly progress of the proposed
NIF project. The Secretary of Energy in Key Decision 0 (January
1993) affirmed the need for NIF. Key Decision 1 (October 1994)
approved the preliminary engineering design and site evaluation.
Critical decision 3, scheduled in 1997 after the PEIS ROD, would
authorize construction and major procurements. Critical decision
4, scheduled in late 2002, would authorize operation and first
experiments.
The commentors state that DOE cannot state that the radiological
health threat of NIF is small with certainty from a threshold
exposure basis. Commentors are concerned that the use of tritium
and deuterium fuel at NIF will add to the amount of tritium and
other toxic chemicals being released into the environment and
create radioactive waste. Another commentor is concerned that
plutonium-239 or tritium would be produced at NIF. Other commentors
express confidence that NIF is a safe facility which is not hazardous
to the environment and that they believe that LLNL will accept
and diligently implement any mitigation measures contained in
the NIF appendix.
- Response: Appendix section I.3.6.7 summarizes and compares
the radioactive and hazardous chemicals impacts from normal operations
at NIF, a low hazard radiological facility, to the general public
surrounding all candidate sites. Conservative assumptions were
used to ensure estimated potential radiological doses were maximized
in the PEIS analysis. The calculated doses were then multiplied
by 0.0005 fatal cancers per rem to obtain radiological health
effects, assuming no threshold exposure limits. Results indicated
that no cancer deaths would occur among workers and in the general
public due to construction and operation of NIF.
The maximum tritium effluent (atmospheric release) from normal
operations would be 10 Ci/yr (0.001 g/yr) for conceptual design
operations and 30 Ci/yr (0.003 g/yr) for enhanced operations (appendix
sections I.3.2.2.1 and I.3.2.2.2). No latent cancers are projected
from NIF's 30 years of operation at any of the candidate sites.
The quantities of hazardous chemicals used are small and the only
emissions would be from the small quantities of volatile materials
used for optics cleaning.
Under the postulated accident conditions at any candidate site
over the 30-year lifetime, the risk of radiation-caused cancer
fatalities to the public would be essentially zero (less than
1 in 700,000) when the anticipated extremely low accident frequency
during NIF operations is taken into account. Modeling of four
release scenarios covering a wide range of nonradiological chemical
releases for each candidate site for NIF revealed that offsite
nonradiological impacts would be negligible and no fatalities
would occur (appendix section I.3.6.7).
The fuel for NIF experiments would consist of a mixture of tritium
and deuterium and the experiments would create small amounts of
activation products. The ratio of the mixture of tritium to deuterium,
however, has not been determined. The unignited fuel and any activation
products would be removed from the target chamber as described
in the NIF appendix (appendix section I.4.1.2.8.1) and disposed
of according to established procedures. The amount of low level
radioactive waste projected to be generated is small and it is
analyzed in the PEIS (appendix section I.3.6.8) for all candidate
sites. Although each alternative site would implement waste minimization
practices, the generation of additional wastes would be unavoidable.
All alternative sites have current or planned capacity to handle
wastes associated with construction and operation of NIF; however,
this would entail offsite shipment of some of the wastes for all
sites, except at LANL.
Experiments that use fissile material, such as plutonium-239,
have been postulated, but not defined. However, no experiments
of this type are foreseen in planned NIF operations and thus are
not considered in this document. Any future determination to conduct
experiments that have implications beyond the currently defined
operational envelope and safety analysis would require both additional
safety analysis and NEPA action in addition to possible facility
modifications. Additional information can be found in appendix
section I.3.5 of the PEIS.
NIF would monitor the release of elemental tritium and tritiated
water. In addition, the tritium air monitoring system would measure
NIF tritium emissions as part of the total from all site operations.
Since tritiated water is 25,000 times as toxic as tritium in the
hydrogen gas form, the site monitoring system concentrates on
measurement of tritiated water. These measurements would be peer
reviewed and would be done in accordance with the procedures approved
by the respective regulatory agencies.
NIF would be constructed and operated in compliance with all applicable
statutes, regulations, and standards (see appendix section I.5).
In addition, specific mitigation measures that the selected site
would implement are addressed in appendix section I.4.7. If specific
mitigation measures, monitoring, or other conditions are required,
they will be adopted as part of the ROD.
The commentor states that a "total systems life-cycle-cost"
study should be performed, and updated every few years, for NIF.
This would be similar to what is required of the Yucca Mountain
project under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Another commentor
states that whatever the estimate of how much NIF is going to
cost, the life-cycle cost will probably end up being greater than
the estimate.
- Response: The individual elements of the NIF life-cycle costs
such as design, construction and equipment procurement, installation
and inspection, start-up testing, environmental and safety reviews,
operations, and D&D were estimated in the Conceptual Design
Report, which is available in the DOE Public Reading Rooms near
each site. These cost elements, except for D&D, were independently
reviewed in 1994. The review of D&D costs was performed in
1996. DOE requires that all projects conduct a life-cycle cost
study, though not in the depth and complexity of that performed
for the Yucca Mountain project under the Nuclear Waste Policy
Act. NIF would perform a life-cycle cost study as part of the
design process. The life-cycle cost study would be updated if
any significant assumptions change.
The commentor suggests that both the proposed areas considered
for "laydown" or temporary staging of equipment, materials,
and supplies at LLNL, in the construction of NIF, be designated
in the project-specific assessment in appendix I. The commentor
also suggests that the potential impacts of the staging of NIF
construction equipment and supplies at LLNL, as well as the impacts
of construction of the proposed NIF, also be addressed in appendix
I, as well as in the PEIS text.
- Response: The proposed areas considered for "laydown"
or temporary staging of equipment, materials, and supplies at
LLNL, in the construction of NIF, are designated in appendix section
I.3.4.1.3 and shown in appendix figure I.3.4.1.1-2 of the project-specific
assessment in appendix I. The potential impacts of the staging
of NIF construction equipment and supplies at LLNL, as well as
the impacts of construction of the proposed NIF are addressed
in appendix section I.4.1.2, as well as in the main text of the
PEIS. Discussions of this same topic are also included in the
appropriate sections of appendix I for the other alternative sites
for construction and operation of NIF.
Commentors believe that the purpose of NIF
is to advance nuclear weapons research, science, design, development,
and testing. Commentors believe new materials require new designs,
as occurred from the 1960s through the 1980s, and the combination
of new materials and NIF will help contribute to new designs today.
One commentor states that it is already known and certified through
nuclear tests that the secondaries will operate as designed, if
driven by the test certified primary, and questions the need for
NIF for stockpile stewardship. Another commentor thinks NIF will
probably have a major role in weapons research and design, wants
an analysis of the long- and short-term impacts. Another commentor
states that because NIF will continue weapons development that
the PEIS should evaluate the impacts of nuclear explosions. A
commentor is concerned with NIF being like a "super-oven"
and is opposed to it being sited at LLNL.
- Response: The President has declared that the maintenance
of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile will remain a
cornerstone of national security policy for the foreseeable future.
Changes to U.S. national security policies in the post-Cold War
period have placed two significant constraints on the way DOE
has traditionally accomplished its statutory nuclear mission:
the United States has declared a moratorium on underground nuclear
testing, and has stopped the development and production of new-design
weapons. In August 1995, the President declared that the United
States was seeking ratification of a zero-yield CTBT. Within these
constraints, the proposed actions in the Stockpile Stewardship
and Management PEIS will enable DOE to maintain the core intellectual
and technical competencies necessary to ensure the continued safety
and reliability of the stockpile under a CTBT. In this situation
the United States needs a comprehensive calculational ability
and a set of experimental facilities that can access the physical
regimes that exist inside exploding weapons. NIF is one of those
experimental facilities. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Program was constructed with the national mission of maintaining
U.S. security in response to requests from the President and Congress.
In the science-based stockpile stewardship program, NIF nuclear
weapons research experiments can be used to verify increasingly
sophisticated and comprehensive computer models and codes of the
performance (reliability) of nuclear weapons and to assess the
impact of changes in that performance due to age- or remanufacture-related
changes in the remaining weapons stockpile in the absence of nuclear
testing. This type of evaluation can be done for a weapon that
has been tested before. NIF experiments, in combination with the
existing nuclear test database, would be used in the computer
calculations to determine if changes detected have an adverse
effect on weapon reliability.
A study of the technical vertical and horizontal proliferation
concerns surrounding NIF occurred between September 1994 and December
1995, including external reviewers, interagency coordination (DOD,
Department of State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the
National Security Council), and public meetings. The unclassified
results were published in the DOE document, NIF and the Issues
of Nonproliferation Draft Study . In that study, the weapons
design capabilities of NIF were extensively examined. It concluded
that the development of new weapons requires integrated testing,
such as occurs in nuclear explosive tests, in order to determine
if the thousands of individual events interact properly. NIF by
itself cannot perform such integrated testing of new concepts
and, therefore, cannot replace nuclear testing for development
of new nuclear weapons designs.
The commentor wants DOE to take a leadership role in preventing
NIF from polluting the San Francisco Bay area.
- Response: The construction and operation of NIF would not
pollute the San Francisco Bay area. The analysis has shown that
NIF would have no significant impacts to workers, the environment,
or the public. The public would be exposed to a very small dose
of radiation over the 30-year operating lifetime of NIF. No cancer
fatalities would be expected to occur from exposures associated
with routine operations (appendix section I.3.6.7). The release
of volatile organic materials used for optics cleaning is small.
All candidate sites have current or planned waste management capability
to handle the wastes generated by operation (appendix section
I.3.6.8).
Commentors feel that NIF will contribute to proliferation and
lead to a less secure nation. Several commentors request that
the short- and long-term nonproliferation aspects of NIF be further
analyzed and included in the EIS. One commentor states that the
detailed analysis in the report, National Ignition Facility and
the Issue of Nonproliferation, does not support its conclusions.
A commentor states there is no substantial analysis of the ongoing
controversy on potential proliferation impacts of NIF. Another
commentor believes that the only way NIF contributes to U.S. nonproliferation
goals is by making the test ban acceptable to the U.S. weapons
establishment. One commentor feels that discussions to determine
the impacts of NIF on proliferation had occurred. A commentor
states that the Draft PEIS does not have substantive detailed
discussions about specific experiments NIF will do, such as studies
of mixing of fissionable material into fusion fuel, on which to
base a conclusion about NIF's worth and effect on nonproliferation.
- Response: The Secretary of Energy committed the DOE's Office
of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, an independent branch of
DOE, which has no programmatic responsibility for NIF, to examine
whether the facility would aid or hinder U.S. nonproliferation
efforts before proceeding with substantial budgetary commitments
to construct NIF. A study of the technical vertical and horizontal
proliferation concerns surrounding NIF occurred between September
1994 and December 1995, including external reviewers, interagency
coordination (DOD, Department of State, the Central Intelligence
Agency, and the National Security Council), and public meetings.
The original draft was classified so that all aspects of NIF operations
could be analyzed. An unclassified version was then prepared and
both versions were reviewed by seven independent experts in the
technical, policy, and arms control fields to ensure accuracy,
comprehensiveness, and consistency. The unclassified results were
published in the DOE document, NIF and the Issues of Nonproliferation
Draft Study and submitted to the Secretary of Energy for her decision.
It concluded that the technical vertical and horizontal proliferation
issues of NIF are manageable and can be made acceptable, and that
NIF can contribute positively to the U.S. nonproliferation policy
and arms control goals. DOE believes that the conclusions of the
report are supported by the body of the report and the process
that was followed assured that all views were accounted for and
dealt with.
Article VI of the NPT calls for all of the parties to the NPT
to "undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective
measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an
early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general
and complete disarmament under strict and effective international
control." NIF and other stockpile stewardship programs are
designed to provide the United States with the confidence that
its arsenal is adequately maintained during size reduction without
testing.
The NIF and the Issues of Nonproliferation Draft Study does discuss,
to the extent allowed by classification, the areas of weapons
physics that can be addressed by NIF and the types of transparency
and access control measures that can be used to assure support
of the U.S. goals for nonproliferation. Detailed discussions,
such as the mixing of fissionable material into fusion fuel, and
its specific relevance to weapons physics issues remains classified.
Such specific issues were addressed in detail in the classified
version of the study and in classified discussions with the independent
expert reviewers. These reviewers determined the conclusions of
the unclassified report were supported by the full content of
the study.
The commentor believes that NIF may contribute to exceedances
of state standards for PM10 and VOC emissions and that complying
with air quality standards will help sustain economic growth and
vitality in the San Francisco Bay area. Therefore, the commentor
recommends that NIF obtain offsets to mitigate its emissions of
PM10 and VOC from operation even if they are not legally mandated.
- Response: NIF would have small PM10 emissions during construction
and small VOC emissions from operation largely from optics cleaning.
Emission offsets will be provided for this project as required
by air district regulation. California law prohibits any air district
from issuing a permit which represents a growth in emissions after
January 1, 1988. The air districts comply with this requirement
by offsetting emissions from other sources. Each permit application
is evaluated and offsets are provided from the Small Facility
Bank, which is operated by the district or by the facility making
the application in the form of emission reductions or emission
banking certificates. Sources such as LLNL, with very small total
emissions, may use the Small Facility Bank until their growth
reaches a trigger level where the facility is required to offset
all they have borrowed from the Small Facility Bank plus the emissions
for the permit tripping the requirement. This offsetting policy
provides for economic growth while at the same time reducing emissions.
Facilities must offset to "permitted" emission levels
and operate at "actual" emissions levels. The difference
between "permitted" and "actual" levels is
a reduction in the district's total emissions as required by California
law. Also facilities may only obtain banking certificates for
"actual" emissions while offsetting to "permitted"
levels for their next project. This also provides for a reduction
in emissions and is often referred to as the "transaction
cost."
The commentor feels LLNL is not accurately reporting tritium in
the yearly annual environmental report and values presented are
underestimated. The commentor feels the tritium released from
NIF will probably not be reported accurately as well. The commentor
points out that the problem exists because the values reported
represent contaminated water only. The commentor notes that tritium
organically bound in organic surroundings, such as grass and tritiated
water, is not being measured and it represents a hazard which
is approximately 25,000 to 2,500,000 times more toxic than tritium
gas.
- Response: As described in the 1994 LLNL Environmental Monitoring
Report, LLNL collects vegetation samples (usually annual grasses)
quarterly from about 15 different locations throughout the Livermore,
San Joaquin, and San Ramon Valleys. Vegetation samples are analyzed
using a freeze-drying method, which removes essentially all of
the water (which would, of course, include any tritium) from the
sample. It is possible that some small fraction of tritium in
the vegetation may be "organically bound," and not recovered
in the freeze-drying process. However, this small fraction of
unrecovered tritium would not add significantly to the amount
of tritium reported. These measurements have been peer reviewed
and are completely accepted by state and Federal agencies.
NIF would emit less than 30 Ci/yr (0.003 g/yr) of tritium. The
impact of this small release to the public or the environment
would be negligible. NIF would continuously monitor the release
of elemental tritium and tritiated water. The LLNL sitewide monitoring
system will monitor tritium emissions as part of the total from
laboratory operations.
Commentors ask how LLNL became the preferred site, several encourage
a Federal decision to proceed with NIF at the LLNL site because
of the site's advantages and the analyses of environmental impacts
showing any adverse impacts are generally not significant. Commentors
desire to know if there was any possibility that NIF may come
to NTS or LANL. Commentors are troubled by political siting decisions,
including that elected officials lobby for NIF at LLNL on the
basis of jobs and economics.
- Response: Five locations (LLNL, LANL, NTS, North Las Vegas
Facility [NLVF], and SNL) are considered in the PEIS for the NIF
based on a two-step process for selection (appendix section I.3.4)
and DOE has assessed the impacts of constructing and operating
NIF at all of the candidate locations at the candidate sites.
The PEIS provides information to decisionmakers and the public
to allow a comprehensive assessment of the purpose and need, and
to compare potential environmental impacts of constructing and
operating NIF at all of the candidate sites. In the ROD, the Secretary
of Energy will make a final site selection taking into account
the results of the PEIS and other considerations such as cost
differences, availability of scientific and technical personnel,
and capability of facility infrastructure to support NIF. In the
ROD, to be published at least 30 days after the Final PEIS is
completed, DOE will explain all the factors, including environmental
impacts, that DOE considered in reaching its decision on siting
NIF.
In her October 20, 1994 approval letter for Key Decision 1, Energy
Secretary Hazel O'Leary announced LLNL as the preferred site (appendix
section I-5.6) because of its prominence as a leading center for
laser science, engineering, and technology. LLNL has the required
combination of existing facilities, equipment, infrastructure,
and technical and management personnel required. The other weapons
laboratories, SNL and LANL, meet all of the criteria, but not
to the extent of LLNL. NTS meets four of the five primary siting
criteria, lacking only a significant inertial confinement fusion
infrastructure.
The environmental analysis for the construction and operation
of NIF at each of the alternative sites is described in appendix
sections I.4.1.2, I.4.2.2, I.4.3.2, I.4.4.2, and I.4.5.2. Impacts
to human health from NIF operations would be within regulatory
limits. NIF would be operated in accordance with applicable statutes,
regulations, and standards (appendix section I.5) and enacting
appropriate mitigation measures, including the development of
a monitoring and mitigation plan which accompanies the ROD.
The commentor asks why a new Atlas Facility is under construction
in Los Alamos when DOE already has an Atlas Facility in North
Las Vegas, NV. The commentor questions why both are needed if
they are the same. If they are different, the commentor states,
the name of the new one should be changed to avoid confusion.
- Response: The two facilities are not the same and have different
purposes. The Atlas Facility in North Las Vegas was developed
by LLNL from a plan called the Augmented Test Logistics Assembly
System (ATLAS). The purpose of the facility was to provide a location
for canister fabrication, instrumentation preparation, and other
prestaging operations prior to vertical emplacement for underground
nuclear testing at NTS. These activities were related to mechanical
operations of the past experimental program. As a potential future
stockpile stewardship facility, the purpose of Atlas at LANL is
to perform high-energy pulsed-power experiments to simulate certain
hydrodynamic and radiation effects and to predict the effects
of aging on the weapons in the existing stockpile.
The commentor states that the description of the Atlas Facility
is limited in both the executive summary and in section 3.3.2.3
of Volume I. Commentor recommends that DOE expand the discussion
of the uses of the facility since it is unclear and, therefore,
difficult to review the potential environmental impacts.
- Response: A detailed description of the Atlas Facility and
its potential environmental impacts and accidents are included
in appendix K, Volume III of the PEIS.
The commentor states that the Atlas Facility is not needed because
defects in secondaries (the primary area of research for Atlas)
are quite rare. The commentor, noting that the Pegasus II Facility
is used for up to 24 experiments annually while Atlas is supposed
to perform up to 100 experiments, asks what is the need for the
dramatic rise in experiments.
- Response: This stockpile stewardship facility would be used
to gauge the safety and reliability of weapons in the enduring
stockpile. As noted in section 2.3.3, of the approximately 400
defects which required some corrective action since 1958, 110
were in the nuclear package. Of these the majority (approximately
90) were indeed associated with the weapon primary. However, the
remaining number were still associated with the weapon secondary.
The lower frequency of these relative to the primary related defects
does not imply that DOE need not develop capabilities to address
such defects, which might otherwise compromise stockpile reliability,
when they arise. The existing weapons will age beyond the point
in which DOE has historical experience. Furthermore, even defects
which are determined to not require corrective action would have
to be evaluated by DOE through the stockpile stewardship program
including relevant experiments such as those for which Atlas is
proposed.
There is no correlation between the number of experiments conducted
annually at the Pegasus II Facility and the design capacity for
Atlas because Pegasus II currently supplies limited data regarding
weapons physics and Pegasus II's power capacity is insufficient
to reach the conditions necessary for experiments planned for
Atlas. Pegasus II, which was developed before the cessation of
nuclear testing, does not readily support larger numbers of experiments
because of operational procedures related to the facility design.
The capability of Atlas to support up to 100 experiments per year,
to meet anticipated programmatic needs, would be enabled by the
design of that new facility.