APPENDIX F: FACILITY ACCIDENTS

F.2.4 Nonintrusive Modification Pit Reuse

A set of potential accidents can be postulated for the nonintrusive modification pit reuse for which there may be releases of hazardous materials that may impact onsite workers and the public. Any such impacts, however, are expected to be bounded by the impacts associated with weapons A/D or pit fabrication.

F.2.5 High Explosives Fabrication

Evaluation basis accidents and beyond evaluation basis accidents have been studied for the HE fabrication operations. The studies postulated a set of accident scenarios that were representative of the risks and consequences for workers and the public from operations. Although not all potential accidents were addressed, those that were postulated have consequences and risks that are expected to envelop the consequences and risks of the relocated operations.

F.2.5.1 Accident Scenarios and Consequences

A range of hazardous conditions and potential accidents were reviewed as candidates to represent the risks to workers and the public of the HE fabrication operations. The physical releases (of chemicals and energy) from postulated accidents at the existing HE fabrication facilities at Pantex were used as an analog for potential releases at LANL and LLNL. A range of accidents was considered, from the release of particulates and dust through processing techniques, to the release of explosives from a fire or explosion, to the effects of blast pressure and fragment and debris scatter from an explosion.

The release of particulates and dust through processing operations would be contained where those operations occur. There is a probability in the range of 0.01 to 0.1/yr that the filtration systems fail during these operations. If there is filter failure, the operations would be halted. The releases from such accidents would have marginal effects (may cause minor occupational illnesses).

A release of chemical HE to the environment during a fire is estimated to occur with a probability in the range of 1x10 -4 to 0.01/yr. Such a release would range up to 79 kg (175 lb) of explosives (released over a 10 minute period). The resulting environmental concentrations from a release, either triaminotrinitrobenzene (TATB) or TNT, of this magnitude were simulated. The TATB (which is representative of other explosives such as cyclotrimethylenetrinitramine [RDX] and cyclotetramethylenetetranitramine [HMX]) concentrations in the path of the plume would exceed the threshold limit value-time weighted average (TLV-TWA) of 1.5 mg/m 3 for distances up to 1,500, 2,200; and 2,400 m (5,000; 7,100; and 8,000 ft) from the release for Pantex, LLNL, and LANL, respectively. If the explosive were TNT, the plume concentrations would exceed the TLV-TWA limit of 0.5 milligrams (mg)/cubic meter (m 3 ) for distances up to 3,100; 4,500; and 5,000 m (10,200; 14,700; and 16,600 ft) from the release for Pantex, LLNL, and LANL, respectively. Concentrations of HE at each of the site boundaries would be 0.9, 54, and 50 mg/m 3 , respectively. Concentrations of HE at 1,000 m (3,281 ft) from the fire (typical for a noninvolved worker) at each of the sites would be 3.0, 5.2, and 6.2 mg/m 3 , respectively.

A release of chemical HE from the various processing facilities caused by an accidental explosion has a probability in the range of 1x10 -4 to 1x10 -6 /yr. Such a release would range up to 79 kg (175 lb) of TATB (or HMX or RDX) or up to 29 kg (64 lb) of TNT. The explosive force from such an accident would result in elevating the HE to a height of 68 m (223 ft) before its downwind transport. The maximum concentration to those who could be exposed would be 6.7 mg/m 3 for TATB or 2.5 mg/m 3 for TNT, at a distance of 800 m (2,600 ft) from the release; this distance is offsite for LANL and LLNL but onsite for Pantex. The maximum offsite concentration at Pantex would be 3.2 mg/m 3 or 1.2 mg/m 3 for TATB or TNT, respectively. The TLV-TWA limits for TATB would be exceeded between 180 and 3,500 m (580 and 11,600 ft) from the release; these limits for TNT would be exceeded in the interval from 170 to 3,700 m (550 to 12,300 ft) from the release. The noninvolved worker (1,000 m [3,281 ft] from the explosion) could be exposed to TATB or TNT concentrations of 6.4 or 2.4 mg/m 3 , respectively, essentially the maximum concentration found near the ground.

It should be noted that the TLV-TWA represents a TWA limit to a worker for a 40-hour workweek. The toxic exposures considered here are of a much shorter duration, on the order of minutes.

F.2.6 Storage of Plutonium Strategic Reserves

Evaluation basis accidents and beyond evaluation basis accidents have been studied for the storage of plutonium strategic reserves. The studies postulated a set of accident scenarios that were representative of the risks and consequences for workers and the public that can be expected from operations. Although not all potential accidents were addressed, those that were postulated have consequences and risks that are expected to envelop the consequences and risks of the relocated operations.

F.2.6.1 Accident Scenarios and Source Terms

A range of hazardous conditions and potential accidents were reviewed as candidates to represent the risks to workers and the public from operating this facility. Through a screening process, several evaluation basis and beyond evaluation basis accidents were selected for further definition and analysis. A brief description of each of the accident scenarios and source terms is presented below. Table F.2.6.1-1 presents a summary of each accident scenario and source term. Further detail can be found in a topical report (HNUS 1996a).

Scenario 1: Fire-induced release of plutonium from storage vault.

The combustible material within the vault mostly consists of tags and paperwork. Further, the design and configuration of the vault preclude the introduction of combustible materials in sufficient quantities to significantly alter the thermal environment. Therefore, the only proposed method to initiate a fire in the vault is by the introducing and initiating large amounts of gasoline, jet fuel, or other high-energy-density fuel. Additionally, because of vault, storage container, and pit designs, not all of the pits stored in the vault would be affected by the fire.

For an internal fire to cause some storage containers to fail through would take a sustained (more than 30-minute) exposure to a fire. Even if the storage container containing the pit fails, it is assumed that the material encapsulating the pit retains enough of its integrity so that no plutonium is released, or so that the contribution from pits is insignificant.

Table F.2.6.1-1.-- Accident Scenarios for Storage of Plutonium Strategic Reserves
Accident Scenario Site   Accident Frequency (per year) Total Material Release to Environment  
1. Fire-induced release of plutonium from storage vaults Pantex 5x10 -8 11.4 g plutonium oxide
  NTS Not applicable Not applicable
2. Mechanical release of plutonium on loading dock Pantex 6x10 -4 0.04 g plutonium oxide
  NTS 6x10 -4 0.04 g plutonium oxide
HNUS 1996a.

Pantex Plant. The accident frequency is estimated at 5x10 -8 /yr. The release is estimated to be 11.4 g (0.4 oz) of plutonium oxide.

Nevada Test Site. The vault fire accident is not considered to be a credible scenario because there is no conceivable way to get enough flammable material inside the underground vaults to make this accident possible.

Scenario 2: Mechanical release of plutonium on loading dock

. In this postulated event, a forklift driver attempting to pick up a pallet containing pit storage containers in the shipping and receiving area punctures two of the storage containers. It is assumed that both storage containers contain pits, that the storage containers fall on the floor, and that any loose material in the form of powder is shaken out of the storage container onto the floor.

Pantex Plant. The accident frequency is 6x10 -4 /yr. The release is estimated to be 0.04 g (1.41x10 -3 oz) of plutonium oxide.

Nevada Test Site. This accident is assumed to occur at NTS at a frequency of 6x10 -4 /yr and release 0.04 g (1.41x10 -3 oz) of plutonium oxide.

F.2.6.2 Accident Consequences and Risk

Tables F.2.6.2-1 and F.2.6.2-2 list the set of accidents selected to represent consequences and risks to workers and the public from accidental releases of radioactive materials during operations at Pantex and NTS, respectively. For each accident, the table identifies the frequency of occurrence and the consequences to a hypothetical worker located at 1,000 m (3,281 ft) from the accident, a hypothetical individual located at the nearest site boundary, and the public out to a distance of 80 km (50 mi). The risks of cancer fatality for the worker, the individual at the site boundary, and the public for the composite set of accidents are also shown.

Table F.2.6.2-1.-- Storage of Plutonium Strategic Reserves at Pantex Plant, Impacts of Accidents
  Maximum Worker at 1,000 Meters   Maximum Offsite Individual   Population to 80 Kilometers  
Accident Scenario Dose (rem) Probability of Cancer Fatality33     Dose (rem) Probability of Cancer Fatality33     Dose (person-rem) Cancer Fatalities   Accident Frequency (per year)
1. Fire-induced release of plutonium from storage vaults34 1.6 6.4x10 -4   0.51 2.6x10 -4   59 0.03 5.0x10 -8
2. Mechanical release of plutonium from loading dock 5.6x10 -3 2.3x10 -6   1.8x10 -3 9.0x10 -7   0.21 1.0x10 -4 6.0x10 -4
Impacts for Composite Set of EBAs and BEBAs35
Expected consequences36   2.3x10 -6     9.2x10 -7     1.1x10 -4  
Expected risk (per year)   1.4x10 -9     5.5x10 -10     6.4x10 -8  
Impacts for Composite Set of EBAs
Expected consequences36   2.3x10-6     9.0x10-7     1.0x10 -4  
Expected risk (per year)   1.4x10 -9     5.4x10 -10     6.2x10 -8  
Impacts for Composite Set of BEBAs
Expected consequences36   < 6.4x10-4     2.6x10-4     0.03  
Expected risk (per year)   3.2x10-11     1.3x10-11     1.5x10-9  

Table F.2.6.2-2.-- Storage of Plutonium Strategic Reserves at Nevada Test Site, Impacts of Accidents
  Noninvolved Worker at 1,000 Meters   Maximum Offsite Individual   Population to 80 Kilometers  
Accident Scenario Dose (rem) Probability of Cancer Fatality37     Dose (rem) Probability of Cancer Fatality37     Dose (person-rem) Cancer Fatalities   Accident Frequency (per year)
1. Fire-induced release of plutonium from storage vaults 38 39 39   39 39   39 39 39
2. Mechanical release of plutonium from loading dock 9.6x10 -3 3.8x10 -6   1.8x10 -4 8.9x10 -8   0.013 6.5x10 -6 6.0x10 -4
Impacts for Composite Set of EBAs and BEBAs
Expected consequences40   41     41     41  
Expected risk (per year)   41     41     41  
Impacts for Composite Set of EBAs38
Expected consequences40   3.8x10-6     8.9x10-8     6.5x10 -6  
Expected risk (per year)   2.3x10 -9     5.3x10 -11     3.9x10 -9  
Impacts for Composite Set of BEBAs
Expected consequences40   41     41     41  
Expected risk (per year)   41     41     41  

F.2.7 Storage of Uranium Strategic Reserves

Studies of evaluation basis accidents and beyond evaluation basis accidents have been performed for the storage of uranium strategic reserves. The studies postulated a set of accident scenarios that were representative of the risks and consequences for workers and the public that can be expected from operations. Although not all potential accidents were addressed, those that were postulated have consequences and risks that are expected to envelop the consequences and risks of the relocated operations. In this manner, no other credible accidents with an expected frequency of occurrence larger than 10-7/yr are anticipated that will have consequences and risks larger than those described in this section.

F.2.7.1 Accident Scenarios and Source Terms

A range of hazardous conditions and potential accidents were reviewed as candidates to represent the risks to workers and the public from facility operation. Through a screening process, several evaluation basis accidents and beyond evaluation basis accidents were selected for further definition and analysis. A brief description of each of the five accident scenarios and source terms is presented below. Table F.2.7.1-1 presents a summary of each accident scenario and source term. Further detail can be found in a topical report (HNUS 1996a).

Scenario 1: Criticality

. Criticality accidents were considered for routine handling in storage areas. Hypothetical scenarios were analyzed in the tube vault involving loading and unloading activities that might result in criticality. A facility worker could accidentally overdraw and drop a loaded tube tray, allowing the cans to fall and tumble into a critical pile. A criticality accident could also result from overloading the tube vault (spacing between slots on tube trays physically prevents overloading). A forklift could accidentally crush or jam a sufficient number of cans together to cause a criticality accident (spacing between the slots also makes it physically impossible for a forklift to accidentally crush or jam a sufficient number of cans together to cause a criticality accident).

Oak Ridge Reservation. The probability of a criticality in the vault area is assumed to be in the range of 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4/yr . A single pulse of 1x10 17 fissions is produced before the solid matrix disassembles.

Pantex Plant. The probability of a criticality in the vault area is assumed to be in the range of 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4/yr . A single pulse of 1x10 17 fissions is produced before the solid matrix disassembles.

Nevada Test Site. The probability of a criticality in the vault area is assumed to be in the range of 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 /yr. A single pulse of 1x10 17 fissions is produced before the solid matrix disassembles.

Scenario 2: Fire-induced release of highly enriched uranium from aircraft crash.

An aircraft crash into the vault area, followed by a large fire, bounds the potential consequences associated with the facility. The concern then rises that the multiple barriers of some of the stored HEU could be breached solely because of the crash itself. It is estimated that an engine block penetrating the facility might impact 15 percent of the available containers. Therefore, it is assumed that the impacted 15 percent would be subject to release in the first ten minutes of the fire. Because of the insulated shipping containers, after one hour it is assumed that 1 percent of the total inventory would be available for release. To assume that any impact results in a complete release of the encased materials is a conservative assumption and is used for the purposes of this bounding study.

Table F.2.7.1-1.-- Accident Scenarios for Storage of Uranium Strategic Reserves
Accident Scenario Site Accident Frequency (per year) Total Material Release to Environment  
1. Criticality ORR 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 1x10 17 fissions
Pantex 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 1x10 17 fissions
NTS 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 1x10 17 fissions
2. Fire-induced release of HEU from aircraft crash ORR not applicable  
Pantex 1x10 -7 270 grams of HEU
NTS not applicable  
3. Fire-induced release of lithium hydride from aircraft crash ORR not applicable  
Pantex 1x10 -7 2.5 g/s to 2.8 g/s
NTS not applicable  
4. Fire-induced release of HEU from vault ORR 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 37.64 kg HEU
Pantex 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 37.64 kg HEU
NTS 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 37.64 kg HEU
5. Explosive release of HEU from vault ORR 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 540 grams of HEU
Pantex 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 540 grams of HEU
NTS 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 540 grams of HEU
HNUS 1996a.

Oak Ridge Reservation. This accident is not applicable to ORR because the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility is much less than 10-7/yr.

Pantex Plant. This accident is considered a beyond evaluation basis accident (1x10 -7 /yr). The release for radiological impacts is 270 g (9.5 oz) of HEU. For chemical toxicity impacts, the release is 1.5 g/seconds (s) for 10 minutes then 1.7 g/s for the second hour of the accident.

Nevada Test Site. This accident is not applicable to NTS because the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility is much less than 10-7/yr.

Scenario 3: Fire-induced release of lithium from an aircraft crash.

Of the chemical accident scenarios, no mechanisms were identified that could potentially release a significant amount of lithium hydride or uranium to the environment, other than the potential jet fuel-fed fires following an aircraft crash. A large aircraft crash with significant secondary fuel fire is therefore assumed to be the bounding hazardous chemical accident. The release scenario is similar to scenario 2.

Oak Ridge Reservation. This accident is not applicable to ORR because the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility is much less than 10-7/yr.

Pantex Plant. This accident is considered a beyond evaluation basis accident (1x10 -7 /yr). For chemical toxicity impacts, the release is 2.5 g/s for 10 minutes then 2.8 g/s for the second hour of the accident.

Nevada Test Site. This accident is not applicable to NTS because the probability of an aircraft crash into a facility is much less than 10-7/yr.

Scenario 4: Fire-induced release of highly enriched uranium.

It is assumed that 3,785 L (1,000 gal) of fuel are inserted into the vault area and that a pool 0.64-cm (1/4-in) deep develops. The area covered by that pool will be approximately 595 m 2 (6,400 ft 2). It is assumed that only in the innermost 20 percent of the fire will temperatures be sufficient to ignite uranium, and that only the topmost of the three drums will reach those temperatures, the lower ones being cooled through conduction to the vault base and the fuel. Of the drums reaching those temperatures, half are assumed to fail and, of those, half fail at the bottom, releasing some or all of their contents. The drum density in the new vault areas is approximately one set of three per 0.9 to 1.0 m 2 (10 to 11 ft 2). Thus, 1,920 drums will be within the fire, and 128 of them will reach high enough temperatures to ignite the uranium, of which 32 will fail at the bottom and expel their contents.

Oak Ridge Reservation. The frequency of this accident is assumed to be in the range of 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4/yr . The amount estimated to be released will be 37,640 g (1,328 oz).

Pantex Plant. The frequency of this accident is assumed to be in the range of 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 /yr. The amount estimated to be released will be 37,640 g (1,328 oz).

Nevada Test Site. The frequency of this accident is assumed to be in the range of 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 /yr. The amount estimated to be released will be 37,640 g (1,328 oz).

Scenario 5: Explosion-induced release of highly enriched uranium from vault.

In an explosion, it is assumed that the drums and cans will provide sufficient protection to prevent the uranium from igniting. Consequently, even though there may be significant damage to the drums and/or cans, since the metal contents have not oxidized or vaporized, there is assumed to be no release. For those cans containing powders, the situation is different, in that the powder may spill from the drum and then be released. It is assumed that the storage arrangement will protect all but the "front row" of cans.

Considering a 5x4 arrangement in the pallet, and using the side with five cans, about 25 percent of the cans will feel the blast. Thus, about 250 cans may be damaged. However, it is assumed that only 100 cans, representing the faces of the four closest stacks of pallets, are sufficiently damaged to spill their contents.

Oak Ridge Reservation. Assuming that half the contents of each of the 100 cans spill, 540 g (19 oz) will be released. The estimated probability is in the range of 1x10 -6 to 1x10 -4 /yr.

Pantex Plant. Assuming that half the contents of each of the 100 cans spill, 540 g (19 oz) will be released. The estimated probability is in the range of 1x10-6 to 1x10-4/yr.

Nevada Test Site. Assuming that half the contents of each of the 100 cans spill, 540 g (19 oz) will be released. The estimated probability is in the range of 1x10-6 to 1x10-4/yr.

F.2.7.2 Accident Consequences and Risk

Table F.2.7.2-1 lists the set of accidents selected to represent consequences and risks to workers and the public from accident releases of radioactive materials and other hazardous effects during operations at ORR. For each accident, the table identifies the frequency of occurrence, and the consequences to a hypothetical worker at a specified distance from the accident, a hypothetical individual located at the nearest site boundary, and the public out to a distance of 80 km (50 mi). The risks of cancer fatality for the worker, the individual at the site boundary, and the public for the composite set of accidents are also shown.

Table F.2.7.2-1.-- Storage of Uranium Strategic Reserves at Oak Ridge Reservation, Impacts of Accidents
  Noninvolved Worker at 619 Meters   Maximum Offsite Individual   Population to 80 Kilometers  
Accident Scenario Dose (rem) Probability of Cancer Fatality42     Dose (rem) Probability of Cancer Fatality42     Dose (person-rem) Cancer Fatalities   Accident Frequency (per year)
1. Criticality 5.1x10 -4 2.0x10 -7   5.1x10 -4 2.5x10 -7   0.031 1.5x10 -5 1.0x10 -5
4. Fire-induced release of highly enriched uranium from vault 5.4 2.2x10 -3   5.4 2.7x10 -3   806 0.40 1.0x10 -5
5. Explosive release of highly enriched uranium from vault 0.077 3.1x10 -5   0.077 3.9x10 -5   11.6 5.8x10 -3 1.0x10 -5
Impacts for Composite Set of EBAs and BEBAs43
Expected consequences44   7.3x10 -4     9.1x10 -4     0.14  
Expected risk (per year)   2.2x10 -8     2.7x10 -8     4.1x10 -6  
Impacts for Composite Set of EBAs
Expected consequences44   45     45     45  
Expected risk (per year)   45     45     45  
Impacts for Composite Set of BEBAs
Expected consequences44   46     46     46  
Expected risk (per year)   46     46     46  

F.3 Comparison of the No Action Alternative to Proposed Alternatives at Pantex Plant and Oak Ridge Reservation

F.3.1 Pantex Plant

Existing operations at Pantex that have the potential for risks to workers and the public are weapons A/D and storage of plutonium. Under the No Action alternative storage would continue in Zone 4 and weapons A/D would continue in Zones 4 and 12. The risks of accidents to workers and the public are addressed in applicable SARs and would not be expected to change if they were continued. Under the proposed actions, weapons A/D operations would be entirely relocated to Zone 12.

Through relocation, the A/D operations would be performed in existing, modern facilities resulting in a decrease in the facility footprint in Zone 12 compared to the footprint in Zone 4. Although the risks of accidents due to internal initiators like fires and explosions are not expected to decrease significantly, risks would be reduced through the engineered safety features of a modern facility. More importantly, all Zone 4 operations have a higher probability of an externally initiated accident caused by an aircraft crash because Zone 4 is closer to the nearby commercial airport and traffic patterns than Zone 12. The probability of an aircraft crash into a Zone 12 facility is also decreased as a result of a reduction in the size of the facility compared to the existing facilities in Zone 4.

F.3.2 Oak Ridge Reservation

Existing operations at ORR that have the potential for risks to workers and the public are secondary and case fabrication and storage of HEU. Under the No Action alternative, these operations would continue to be performed in the facilities where they presently exist. The risks of accidents to workers and the public are addressed in applicable SARs and would not be expected to change if they were to be continued.

Under the proposed actions, secondary and case fabrication and HEU storage would be downsized into fewer existing buildings in the same vicinity as buildings associated with the No Action alternative. The risks of accidents to workers and the public from internal causes such as fires and criticality are not expected to change. However, all of the buildings that would perform the downsized operations would be upgraded to meet natural phenomena requirements. These upgrades are expected to reduce risks, which would not happen under the No Action alternative.

F.4 Secondary Impacts of Accidents

The primary impacts of accidents are measured in terms of public and worker exposures to radiation and toxic chemicals. The secondary impacts of accidents include all elements of the environment. For example, if an accident occurred, a radiological release may contaminate farmland, surface and underground water, recreational areas, industrial parks, historical sites, or the habitat of an endangered species. As a result, farm products may have to be destroyed; the supply of drinking water may be lowered; recreational areas may be closed; industrial parks may suffer economic losses during shutdown for decontamination; historical sites may have to be closed to visitors; and the endangered species may move closer to extinction.

This section addresses the secondary impacts of a high consequence EBA and BEBA in the region of a radiological release. The accidents were selected to illustrate the effects of accidents evaluated for each of the technologies. The levels of radioactivity that have a potential for secondary effects are based on analysis using the MACCS computer code with 50 percent meteorology conditions for each site.

The region of secondary effects extends out from the point of release in a pattern formed by dispersion parameters such as meteorology. The level of exposure is generally decreasing with increasing distance from the release point. Figures F.4.1.-1 through F.4.6-2 show the shapes of patterns for each site at a distance at which the level of radioactivity from the accidental release would be higher than the level of radioactivity from natural background at each site.

These results are useful for comparing the environmental sensitivity of sites with respect to the secondary impacts for an accidental radiological release. In reviewing the results, it is useful to note whether the impacted area extends beyond the site boundary where the economic impacts would be larger than if the area were contained within the site boundary. It is also useful to note the size of the contaminated area in which the level of radioactivity exceeds exposures from natural background.

F.4.1 Oak Ridge Reservation

In the region of ORR, the natural background level of radiation (excluding radon) is 95 millirems (mrem)/yr, plus an additional 200 mrem from radon. The results shown in figures F.4.1-1 and F.4.1-2 indicate the radiation levels at various distances from the accident. Section 4.2 describes the land, water, biotic, cultural, paleontological, and socioeconomic resources in the ORR environment that may receive secondary impacts from accidents.

F.4.2 Savannah River Site

In the region of SRS, the natural background level of radiation (excluding radon) is 98 mrem/yr, plus an additional 200 mrem from radon. The results shown in figure F.4.2-1 indicate the radiation levels at various distances from the accident. Section 4.3 describes the land, water, biotic, cultural, paleontological, and socioeconomic resources in the SRS environment that may receive secondary impacts from accidents.

F.4.3 Pantex Plant

In the region of Pantex, the natural background level of radiation (excluding radon) is 134 mrem /yr, plus an additional 200 mrem from radon. The results shown in figures F.4.3-1 and F.4.3-2 indicate the radiation levels at various distances from the accident. Section 4.5 describes the land, water, biotic, cultural, paleontological, and socioeconomic resources in the Pantex environment that may receive secondary impacts from accidents.

F.4.4 Los Alamos National Laboratory

In the region of LANL, the natural background level of radiation (excluding radon) is 140 mrem/yr, plus an additional 200 mrem from radon. The results shown in figures F.4.4-1 and F.4.4-2 indicate the radiation levels at various distances from the accident. Section 4.6 describes the land, water, biotic, cultural, paleontological, and socioeconomic resources in the LANL environment that may receive secondary impacts from accidents.

F.4.5 Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

In the region of LLNL, the natural background level of radiation (excluding radon) is 100 mrem per/yr, plus an additional 200 mrem from radon. The results shown in figure F.4.5-1 indicate the radiation levels at various distances from the accident. Section 4.7 describes the land, water, biotic, cultural, paleontological, and socioeconomic resources in the LLNL environment that may receive secondary impacts from accidents.

F.4.6 Nevada Test Site

In the region of NTS, the natural background level of radiation (excluding radon) is 113 mrem per/yr, plus an additional 200 mrem from radon. The results shown in figures F.4.6-1 and F.4.6-2 indicate the radiation levels at various distances from the accident. Section 4.9 describes the land, water, biotic, cultural, paleontological, and socioeconomic resources in the NTS environment that may receive secondary impacts from accidents.  

33 Probability (increased likelihood) of cancer fatality to a hypothetical member of the public located at the site boundary or a worker located 1,000 m (3,281 ft) from the accident as a result of exposure to the indicated dose if the accident occurred.

34 A beyond evaluation basis accident (BEBA). All other listed accidents are evaluation basis accidents (EBA).

35 For the offsite population of 285,409, the average probability of cancer fatality/risk of cancer fatality (per year) for the composite set of accidents is 3.0x10-10/2.2x10-13.

36 Result of exposure to the indicated dose if the accident occurs. All values are mean values. Model results.

37 Probability (increased likelihood) of cancer fatality to a hypothetical member of the public located at the site boundary or a worker located 1,000 m (3,281 ft) from the accident as a result of exposure to the indicated dose if the accident occurred.

38 For the offsite population of 18,517, the average probability of cancer fatality/risk of cancer fatality (per year) for the composite set of accidents is 3.5x10 -10 /2.1x10 -13 .

39 The accident is not possible at NTS.

40 Result of exposure to the indicated dose if the accident occurs.

41 No beyond evaluation basis accidents were identified for NTS. The impacts for the composite set of EBAs and BEBAs is the same as the impacts for the composite set of EBAs. All values are mean values. Model results.

42 Probability (increased likelihood) of cancer fatality to a hypothetical member of the public located at the site boundary or to a worker located 619 m from the accident as a result of exposure to the indicated dose if the accident occurred.

43 For the offsite population of 1,096,144, the average probability of cancer fatality/risk of cancer fatality (per year) for the composite set of accidents is 1.3x10-7/3.7x10-12.

44 Result of exposure to the indicated dose if the accident occurs.

45 The impacts of evaluation basis accidents (EBA) are identical to the data shown in this table.

46 All accidents are in the frequency range of 10 -6 to 10 -4 per year and are grouped together as EBAs. As a result, there are no impacts shown for beyond evaluation basis accidents (BEBA). All values are mean values. Model results.