Chapter 3 provides descriptions of the alternative sites and the program alternatives for meeting the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship and management requirements. The chapter begins with a summary of the development of the alternatives, followed by descriptions of the alternative sites and their current missions. The stockpile stewardship discussion provides a description of the three basic stewardship areas, along with the associated alternatives, including a brief description of concepts for next-generation stewardship facilities. The stockpile management discussion provides a description of the various management functions and their associated alternatives. Brief discussions of emerging technologies that may affect stockpile management facilities and functions in the future and a discussion of a potential next-generation plutonium fabrication facility follow. The chapter concludes with a comparison of the stockpile stewardship and management alternatives and a discussion of the preferred alternatives.
This programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) evaluates the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts associated with the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program alternatives that are summarized in figure 3.1-1. For the various alternatives, this includes evaluating the applicable impacts of new facility construction or existing facility modification. Also assessed are the operational impacts of long-term stewardship and management activities in support of the base case nuclear weapons stockpile, including transportation of materials and components between sites. This PEIS also provides a sensitivity analysis of differences, when applicable, from the base case alternatives for the high and low case stockpile. However, since it is expected that the annual workload may vary above and below the base case capacity assumptions, the base case is analyzed in the greatest detail.
In the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and in this PEIS, the Department of Energy (DOE) will:
As explained in section 1.7, DOE is currently preparing site-wide environmental impact statements (EIS)s covering continued operations for some of the alternative sites evaluated in this PEIS. Some of the existing activities covered by these site-specific, site-wide EISs are similar to those of the No Action alternative of this PEIS. Although the near-term analytical periods for the site-wide EIS analyses are different from those of the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management, which is focused on long-term activities, the preparation of these documents has been closely reviewed and coordinated. As work on these site-wide EISs proceeds, their analyses will continue to be reviewed to ensure consistency. To the extent that the site-wide EIS analyses provide better information, such information has been incorporated, as appropriate. In the preparation of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Final PEIS, any updated information relating to the sites' affected environment was reviewed and appropriate changes were made if new information could potentially change results of the impact analyses.
DOE has developed several planning assumptions as the basis of analyses presented in this PEIS. These considerations are summarized below.
Table 3.1.1.2-1.-- Stockpile Management Facility
Sizing Assumptions
(Annual Activity on Single Operating Shift)
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| Weapons Assembly/Disassembly Rebuilds |
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| (disassemblies) |
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| (assemblies) |
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| Evaluation | |||
| (disassemblies) |
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| (rebuilds) |
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| High Explosives Fabrication |
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| Nonnuclear Fabrication | |||
| Field and factory retrofits |
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|
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| Nuclear Fabrication | |||
| Pit fabrication |
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|
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| Pit reuse (nonintrusive modification) |
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| Secondary and case fabrication |
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|
|
In developing alternatives for pit components, the following additional assumptions were used for new pit fabrication and intrusive modification pit reuse:
In developing alternatives for secondaries and cases, the following additional assumptions were used:
This section of the PEIS has been revised in response to comments received on the Draft PEIS concerning its scope and the alternatives considered. To begin, it is important to review the basic logic used in constructing this PEIS and to restate the nature of the decisions expected to be made based on the contents of the PEIS.
Chapter 2 describes the national security policy framework that defines the purpose and need for DOE's nuclear weapons mission for the foreseeable future. It also describes the development of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives in response to recent changes in national security policy. Chapter 2 also puts those changes in broad technical perspective. Successive levels of technical detail are provided in chapters 3 and 4, and in Volumes II and III. The discussions that follow refer to the appropriate sections of this PEIS to avoid unnecessary repetition.
As stated in the Notice of Intent (60 FR 31291) published on June 14, 1995, DOE intends that the ROD on this PEIS will:
While the terms "stockpile stewardship" and "stockpile management" are relatively new, the Program is not new when considered in terms of its substructure capabilities (section 1.1). What the terms are meant to convey is a change in Program focus away from large-scale development and production of new-design nuclear weapons with nuclear testing, to one that focuses on the safety and reliability of a smaller, aging stockpile without nuclear testing. Even with this change in focus, however, national security policies require DOE to maintain the capabilities of the ongoing Program. The proposed actions flow logically from the mission purpose and need, given the policy constraints placed on the Program. Enhanced experimental capability is proposed because it is the surrogate source of experimental data that are needed to continually assess and certify a safe and reliable stockpile constrained by the absence of nuclear testing. Rightsizing manufacturing capacities is proposed in direct response to the reduced requirements of a smaller, aging stockpile constrained by the absence of new-design weapon production. Reestablishing pit manufacturing capability is proposed because it restores a required capability of the Program that was temporarily lost as a consequence of the closure of the Rocky Flats Plant.
In developing this PEIS, DOE judged the above three proposed actions to be significant at the programmatic level. Some additional strategies of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, such as enhanced computational capability, were judged not to have significance for this PEIS because they did not have the potential for significant environmental impacts relative to the ongoing Program at a site, nor was the mission capability being considered for transfer to another site. The programmatic level environmental impacts of the ongoing Program at each of the eight sites in the Complex are described in chapter 4. Projects and facilities to support the ongoing Program are subject to site-specific NEPA review.
The issue of Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program alternatives is complex because nuclear weapons require a complete integrated set of technical capabilities and an appropriately sized manufacturing capacity. The technical capabilities are generally characterized as research, design, development, and testing; reliability assessment and certification; and manufacturing and surveillance operations (section 2.2 and figure 2.7-2). From a technical point of view, none of these capabilities can be deleted if DOE is to maintain a safe and reliable stockpile (section 2.4). In addition, DOE has been directed to maintain these capabilities by national security policy from the President and Congress (section 2.4).
Commentors questioned the different treatment of stewardship and management alternatives, mainly the lack of stewardship alternatives. Stewardship and management alternatives are treated differently in the PEIS because they address fundamentally different problems. Stockpile stewardship capabilities form the basis of U.S. judgments about the safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear weapons, and in a larger context, U.S. judgments about the nuclear weapons capabilities of others (section 2.4.1). DOE did not consider it reasonable to propose stewardship alternatives that would diminish stewardship capabilities, particularly given the fact that historic confidence in the safety and performance of the stockpile was derived from nuclear testing that is no longer part of the ongoing stewardship program. National security policy requires DOE to maintain, and in some areas enhance, the stewardship capabilities of the three weapons laboratories and NTS (section 2.2). The PEIS also explains the basis for this in a technical context, including the need for two independent nuclear design laboratories (section 2.4.1). Therefore, this PEIS has no proposed actions that transfer ongoing stockpile stewardship missions from one site to another, or that would otherwise diminish ongoing stewardship missions.
National security policy also requires DOE to maintain stockpile management capabilities and appropriate manufacturing capacity for a smaller stockpile. Unlike stockpile stewardship capabilities, the smaller stockpile does permit some reasonable siting alternatives for stockpile management capabilities and capacities to accomplish the mission purpose and need within the current national security policy framework (section 2.4.2).
DOE has considered that there are differing opinions on the technical merit of DOE's proposed actions with regard to enhanced experimental capability. Nuclear weapons design information, including the complex physics of nuclear weapon explosions, is classified for reasons of national security and nonproliferation. Even if this information were unclassified, the physics problems remain daunting; hence, the reason why nuclear testing was so important to the past program. Both the classification of information and technical complexity of the issues form natural barriers to public communication. The technical complexity alone engenders significant debate among qualified experts, especially in the area of high energy density physics. This PEIS attempts to explain the weapon physics issues in an unclassified, comprehensible manner regarding its relation to mission purpose and need (chapter 2), proposed actions and alternatives (section 3.3), and project-specific technical detail (Volume III). In the absence of nuclear testing, there are two basic alternatives: (1) rely on existing facilities as sources of experimental data described by the No Action alternative, and (2) pursue the enhanced capability of the proposed facilities to provide the sources of experimental data needed.
Role of Existing Experimental Facilities. In DOE's technical judgment, the existing facilities described by the No Action alternative are inadequate to meet the challenge of assessing and certifying a safe and reliable stockpile over the longer term. It is also DOE's technical judgment that it is impossible to speculate at this time whether any of the existing facilities could be retired, because they would be obsolete or redundant, as a result of a decision to construct and operate any or all of the three proposed new stewardship facilities. The uncertainties inherent in the R&D nature of the stewardship program would make that kind of exercise essentially guesswork. The development of machines to simulate the intricacies of a nuclear detonation requires a highly sophisticated scientific R&D program. It very likely will take 5 to 10 years to begin obtaining reliable data from the new facilities. Until those facilities are operational, DOE cannot reliably predict how the additional capabilities they provide will mesh with the capabilities of previously existing machines to further the goals of the Program. It is only through incremental advances in the state of the science that decisions can eventually be made regarding the retirement of obsolete or redundant facilities.
DOE is committed to making maximum efficient use of the stewardship capabilities at its disposal. However, it is not reasonable to speculate at this time about how future stewardship requirements might affect existing facilities and capabilities.
Next Generation Experimental Facilities. Commentors suggested that potential next generation experimental facilities be analyzed as part of the proposed action. This PEIS includes a discussion of potential next-generation experimental facilities and the reasons why they are not proposed actions or alternatives (sections 2.5 and 3.3.4). These facilities, while contemplated on the basis of anticipated technical need, have not reached the stage of design maturity through R&D for DOE to include a decisionmaking analysis at this time. However, this PEIS does broadly describe, in general terms or by reference, what is known today about their potential environmental impacts. The environmental impacts from these facilities as contemplated today would not be significantly different from existing "similar" facilities. By characterizing the potential impacts in this way, the decisionmaker will be aware of the potential program-level cumulative impacts of the next-generation facilities when deciding whether to pursue a program of enhanced experimental capability. If DOE proposes to construct and operate such facilities in the future, appropriate NEPA review will be performed.
New Weapon Design. Commentors have suggested that the proposal for enhanced experimental capabilities is directed more at the capability to design new weapons in the absence of nuclear testing than at maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile and that stewardship alternatives could be different if the facilities were directed only at maintaining the existing stockpile. This PEIS explains why these capabilities are needed to maintain the safety and reliability of a smaller, aging stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing (chapter 2). The existing U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons is highly engineered and technically sophisticated in its design for safety, reliability, and performance. The stewardship capabilities required to make technical judgments about the existing stockpile are likewise technically sophisticated; therefore, it would be unreasonable to say that these stewardship capabilities could not be applied to the design of new weapons, albeit with less confidence than if new weapons could be nuclear tested.
However, the development of new weapon designs requires integrated nuclear testing such as occurs in nuclear explosive tests. Short of nuclear testing, no single stockpile stewardship activity, nor any combination of activities, could confirm that a new-design weapon would work. In fact, a key effect of a "zero-yield" CTBT would be to prevent the confident development of new-design weapons. National security policy requires DOE to maintain the capability to design and develop new weapons, and it will be a national security policy decision to use or not use that capability. Choosing not to use enhanced experimental capability for new weapons designs would not change the technical issues for the existing stockpile and, therefore, the stewardship alternatives would not change.
The issue of new-design weapons is separate from DOE's need to perform modifications to existing weapons that require research, design, development, and testing. The phrase used in this PEIS, "without the development and production of new-design weapons," is meant to convey the fact that the historical continuous cycle of large scale development and production of new weapons designs replacing older weapon designs has been halted. For example, during the 1980s, about a dozen new-design weapons were in full-scale development or production. Over the decade, production of new-design weapons replaced dismantled weapons nearly one for one. Today, only modifications to parts of existing weapons are being performed or planned; dismantlement has continued. This results in a smaller, aging stockpile that must be assessed and certified without nuclear testing. This is now the primary focus of the stewardship program.
Nonproliferation. Commentors have suggested that enhanced experimental capability is a proliferation risk. The national security policy framework discussed in this PEIS seeks a new balance between U.S. arms control and nonproliferation objectives and U.S. national security requirements for nuclear deterrence while pursuing these objectives (section 2.2). In addition, a discussion is provided on some of the more difficult issues that must be considered in determining the balance, including a discussion of experimental capability (section 2.6). In particular, the issue of nonproliferation and the proposed NIF was studied in detail. The study, prepared by the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, has been the subject of extensive public involvement, interagency review, and review by outside experts. The study concluded that the technical proliferation concerns of NIF are manageable and can therefore be made acceptable and that NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals (appendix section I.2.1 of Volume III). NIF is a proliferation concern because of its broader scientific applications and expected frequent use by researchers worldwide, and, like the other proposed enhanced experimental facilities because of its possible relevance to the development of new weapon designs. However, the development of new weapon designs requires integrated testing. None of the proposed facilities, either alone or together, could perform such integrated testing of new concepts, and therefore cannot replace nuclear testing for the development of new weapon designs. The role of these facilities will be to help assess and certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons remaining in the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. The national security policy framework and the technical issues that drive the proposed action for enhanced experimental capability remain the same.
Subcritical Experiments. With regard to the treatment of ongoing stewardship activities or enhanced experimental capability, subcritical experiments are an example of how changes in terminology have caused some confusion about what is evaluated in this PEIS under the No Action alternative. Subcritical experiments have been conducted at NTS over many years. Historically, operations at NTS have included tests or experiments that included both HE and special nuclear materials that were intended to produce no nuclear yield or negligible nuclear energy releases. These experiments frequently remained subcritical (i.e., they did not achieve self-sustaining fission chain reactions). The term "subcritical experiments" does not define a new form of activity or mission. It is intended to underscore the fact that in the future such experiments will be configured to ensure that the condition of criticality cannot be achieved. This issue has been clarified in the NTS Site-Wide EIS.
Some commentors have suggested that nuclear weapon reliability is not important in the post-Cold War era. National security policy as established by the President and Congress requires a safe and reliable stockpile. In order for the nuclear deterrent to be credible within the current national security policy framework, it must be reliable in a militarily effective way. A program designed to ensure the safety but not the reliability of the stockpile would require DOE to speculate on an alternate concept of nuclear deterrence and a national security policy framework to support it. See also the discussion of denuclearization in section 3.1.2.4.
Commentors have also suggested acceptance of lower standards of reliability as an alternative to enhanced stewardship capabilities. This PEIS explains how the assessment and certification of nuclear performance is carried out, and how this process differs from the more conventional statistical methods used for assessing reliability of the nonnuclear portion of the weapon. Assessment and certification of nuclear performance is a technical judgment by the weapons laboratories based on scientific theory, experimental data, and computational modeling (sections 2.4.1 and 2.3). The question is not whether to accept a lower standard of nuclear performance (less nuclear explosive yield), but whether or not there is a technical basis to confidently know how well the weapon will perform at all. Enhanced stewardship capability is focused on the technical ability to confidently judge nuclear safety and performance in the absence of nuclear testing.
Aside from being inconsistent with national security policy, attempting to separate weapon safety and reliability is more technically complex than it sounds. A modern nuclear weapon is highly integrated in its design for safety, reliability, and performance. It contains electrical energy sources and many explosive energy sources in addition to the main charge HE. The principal safety concern is accidental detonation of the HE causing dispersal of radioactive materials (plutonium and uranium). Modern weapons are designed and system-engineered to provide a predictable response in accident environments (e.g., fire, crush, or drop). However, because of the technical complexity of potential accident scenarios (i.e., combined environments) and the fact that complete nuclear weapons cannot be used for experimental data, assessment of the design and the effect of changes that might be occurring due to stockpile environments must rely on other sources of experimental data and complex computer modeling. Enhanced experimental capability specifically related to the weapon secondary is a nuclear performance concern. Enhanced computational capability in general, and enhanced experimental capability related to the weapon primary in particular, are both nuclear safety and performance concerns.
Commentors have suggested that DOE consider alternative forms of stewardship. While their comments are responded to in Volume IV, this section discusses DOE's consideration of the broad range of views on this issue. The Congressional Research Service report, Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship: Alternatives for Congress, December 14, 1995, provides a reasonable description of the various viewpoints on alternatives and a framework for discussion. (The report uses the term stockpile stewardship generically to describe the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.) The following discussion of alternative approaches is taken from the summary of that report.
Denuclearizers would eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide in the foreseeable future, perhaps one to two decades. Until then, they would have a minimal U.S. stewardship program whose personnel, as curators of weapons knowledge, would monitor weapons. Restorers would maintain nuclear weapons with the only proven method, an ongoing program of research, development, design, testing, and production, downsized to meet post-Cold War needs. Three intermediate positions seek to maintain weapons indefinitely without nuclear testing. Remanufacturers believe that since current weapons have been tested and certified as meeting military requirements, this Nation can maintain them indefinitely by "remanufacturing"--reproducing them to the exact specifications of the originals. Remanufacturers would go to great lengths to do so in order to avoid risks that even slight changes to warheads might introduce. Enhancers, who take the Administration's position on stewardship, see identical remanufacture as impossible. They believe some changes in design, process, and materials are unavoidable and others are desirable. A robust science program, they hold, is the best that can be done without testing to monitor warheads, anticipate problems, modify warheads when problems arise, and revalidate stockpile effectiveness on an ongoing basis. They would have a small manufacturing program. Maintainers fall between remanufacturers and enhancers. They focus on how to maintain warheads. They prefer to avoid changes to warheads but would not go to great lengths to do so. They view a strong science program as essential, but only to the extent that its elements connect directly to maintaining weapons. They emphasize manufacturing as the ultimate guarantor of U.S. ability to solve warhead problems. They, along with enhancers, favor some link to testing if confidence cannot be maintained in any other way.
Beyond the broad overview of alternative approaches to stockpile stewardship and management, the main text of the report discusses variations within each of the five points of view. Given the political and technical complexity of the Program, many approaches can appear to be distinct or reasonable alternatives for detailed study. In fact, while the enhancer's viewpoint as described above most closely resembles the Program described in this PEIS, the Program actually embraces elements of all five viewpoints. The following discussion illustrates this point and focuses on the main issue(s) that, in DOE's view, eliminate the other approaches as distinct or reasonable alternatives for this PEIS.
Denuclearization. This approach is reflected in this PEIS to the extent that national security policy is pointed toward the goals of denuclearization. Since the end of the Cold War, more than 8,000 U.S. nuclear weapons have been dismantled, no new-design weapons are being produced, three former nuclear weapons industrial plants have been closed, and the United States is observing a nuclear test moratorium and seeking a "zero-yield" CTBT. Maintenance of a safe and reliable stockpile is not inconsistent with working toward the NPT goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide at some unspecified time in the future. However, denuclearization is not a reasonable alternative for this PEIS because it is not feasible based on current national security policy.
The main issue discussed in this section is consideration of an alternative with a very small (10s or 100s) or zero stockpile. Two of the stockpile sizes analyzed in this PEIS, a START I Treaty- and START II protocol-sized stockpile, are the only ones currently defined and directed by national security policy. The PEIS also analyzes a hypothetical 1,000 weapon stockpile for the purpose of a sensitivity analysis for manufacturing capacity decisions. The NWSM specifies the types of weapons and quantities of each weapon type by year (section 1.1). The NWSM is developed based on DOD force structure requirements necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence and comply with existing arms control treaties while pursuing further arms control reductions. This PEIS explains the complexity of this process and why DOE does not believe it reasonable to speculate using a large number of arbitrary assumptions (section 2.2). DOE has considered that a future national security policy framework could define a path to a smaller stockpile. However, DOE has the following perspective on this issue.
Stockpile stewardship capabilities are currently viewed by the United States as a means to further U.S. nonproliferation objectives in seeking a "zero-yield" CTBT. Likewise, it would be reasonable to assume that U.S. confidence in its stewardship capabilities would remain as important, if not more important, in future arms control negotiations to reduce its stockpile further. The path to a very small (10s or 100s) or zero stockpile would require the negotiation of complex international treaties, most likely with provisions that require intrusive international verification inspections of nuclear weapons related facilities. Therefore, DOE believes it reasonable to assume that complex treaty negotiations, when coupled with complex implementation provisions, would likely stretch over several decades. On a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile size alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, and alternatives in this PEIS as they relate to stewardship capabilities. The issues of maintaining the core competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, and the technical problems of a smaller, aging stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing, remain the same.
On a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, this PEIS evaluates reasonable approaches to stockpile management capability and capacity. At some point on this path, further downsizing of existing industrial plants or the alternative of consolidating manufacturing functions at stewardship sites would become more attractive as manufacturing capacity becomes a less important consideration. However, in the near term, the preferred alternative of downsizing the existing industrial plants would still be a reasonable action because the projected downsizing investment pays back within a few years through reduced operating expense; in addition, the downsizing actions are consistent with potential future decisions regarding plant closures. In regard to the proposed action of reestablishing pit manufacturing capability, DOE does not propose to establish higher manufacturing capacities than are inherent in the reestablishment of the basic manufacturing capability. In developing the criteria for reasonable stockpile management alternatives, DOE was careful not to propose the introduction of significant new types of environmental hazards to any prospective site. On a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile size alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, and alternatives in this PEIS with regard to stockpile management capabilities and capacities.
To achieve eventual denuclearization, some commentors have asserted that DOE should adopt a passive curatorship approach to maintaining the declining nuclear weapons stockpile. The concept of curatorship is already being implemented at the existing sites in the form of knowledge preservation programs. While not necessary in an era of continuous development and production of new-design weapons and nuclear testing, knowledge preservation is now part of DOE's overall effort to maintain core competency in the weapons complex. However, as an inherently imperfect reconstruction, this effort can never ensure completeness of information nor relevance to future stockpile problems. More importantly, knowledge preservation does not address the fundamental issue of confidence in future technical judgments about issues that are yet to arise regarding the safety and performance of the stockpile. In highly technical matters, confidence arises from having appropriate data to support conclusions. In the absence of nuclear testing, the science-based approach to stockpile stewardship is focused on achieving the capability to acquire appropriate data.
From an environmental impact point of view, this PEIS displays the environmental impacts of each site's ongoing Program operations on an annual basis. The impacts of alternatives for proposed actions are displayed individually on the same basis. If one assumes that denuclearization leads to eventual site closure, then this PEIS, together with the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS, presents the environmental impacts of closing the four remaining industrial plants. While this PEIS does not directly consider the closure of the weapons laboratories and NTS, it is not at all clear what nuclear weapons capabilities the U.S. would retain even if it decided on a zero stockpile. However, the environmental impacts of the ongoing Program (No Action alternative) are essentially what would be phased out, with or without the proposed actions. DOE does not believe that speculative combinations of this data on speculative time lines provides any useful information for decisionmaking.
Restoration. The restorer's point of view is reflected in this PEIS to the extent that current national security policy requires DOE to maintain all the historical capabilities of the Program, including the capability for new-design weapons and nuclear testing. However, restoration is not a reasonable alternative for this PEIS because it requires a national security policy decision to reverse the constraints placed on the Program, namely, by resuming nuclear testing and new-design weapons production.
The environmental impacts of the restoration approach would be the same as those described in this PEIS to the extent that such a decision did not require manufacturing capacities higher than analyzed in this PEIS. In addition, this PEIS includes a brief description of the environmental impacts of nuclear testing (section 4.12); the Site-Wide EIS for NTS contains detailed information.
Remanufacturing . The remanufacturer's point of view is reflected in this PEIS by the fact that remanufacturing to specification will be attempted when possible and when appropriate to the problem being solved. With more than a half dozen different weapon types projected to remain in the stockpile, and with each weapon type containing thousands of parts, remanufacturing will undoubtedly occur for a significant number of repair and replacement activities. However, remanufacturing is not reasonable as a distinct exclusive alternative to the ongoing stockpile stewardship program or the proposed action of enhanced experimental capability for the technical reasons discussed below. In addition, it would not be a reasonable alternative because it does not fully support national security policies that require the conduct of a science-based stockpile stewardship and maintenance of the capability to design and produce new weapons.
Remanufacturing weapon components to their original specification, or maintaining weapons to their original design specifications, would superficially appear to be a reasonable approach to maintaining the safety and reliability of the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. Precise replication, however, is often not possible. Subtle changes in materials, processing, and fabrication techniques are an ever-present problem. In some cases, specialty materials and components become unavailable for commercial or environmental reasons. Implicit in the remanufacturing assumption is that the design blueprint, manufacturing process, and the materials used are specified in exact detail in every way. However, there is an unwritten element of "know how" that knowledgeable and experienced personnel contribute to any complicated manufacturing process (for this reason, controlling the acquisition of "know-how" is a major nuclear weapons nonproliferation objective). Materials and processes are not always specified in important ways because, at the time, they were not known to be important. The problem is illustrated by the following hypothetical example:
A material produced for a critical weld has a specification for a trace impurity; the manufacturing process consistently produced the material with a trace impurity less than the maximum allowed and the welds were satisfactory; the manufacturing process is changed for some reason, such as cost or environmental concerns; the material is now being produced with less trace impurity than before the process was changed; the material is still within specification; however, the welds are no longer satisfactory; it was unknown at the time that the higher level of the trace impurity was necessary to produce a satisfactory weld.
While remanufacturing sounds simple in principle, it is likely in fact to present complex issues of design, manufacturing process, and material variables. A simplified view of remanufacturing cannot serve as a "stand alone" manufacturing approach, let alone an alternative approach to enhanced stewardship capability. In the absence of underground nuclear testing, nuclear components (pits and secondaries) cannot be functionally tested. Stewardship capabilities provide the analytical tools (experimental and computational) to assess the significance of a problem observed during surveillance and to decide if the problem should be fixed; and if fixed, to certify that the fix will work (section 2.4.1). In the past, the decision to fix or not fix an observed problem could be made with nuclear testing (section 2.3). Stockpile stewardship strategies focus on the basic material science and the enhanced experimental and computational tools necessary to better predict age-related defects and to make sound technical judgments on nuclear safety and performance in the absence of nuclear testing.
The DARHT EIS (DOE/EIS-0228, section 2.3.2) provides an additional discussion of the limitations of a remanufacturing-to-specification approach. It discusses, as an example, the actions taken to evaluate and resolve unanticipated deterioration of HE in the now-retired W68 warhead for a submarine-launched ballistic missile. In that case it was necessary to replace the HE with a more chemically stable formulation. In addition, some other materials were no longer commercially available, requiring changes in the rebuilt weapons. Nuclear testing was ultimately used to verify that the necessary changes were acceptable. DOE does not consider it feasible to maintain all potentially obsolescent commercial sources and processes used for materials in existing weapons; aging would still occur in stored reserves of such materials.
With regard to stockpile management, remanufacturing without enhanced stewardship capability would also have notable drawbacks. DOE plans to maintain the capability to produce secondaries, and proposes to reestablish the capability to produce pits, by producing small quantities (10s) of each annually to maintain capability. This capacity should be sufficient to replace components attrited from the stockpile by surveillance testing. Remanufacturing these components, without the enhanced stewardship analytical capability to determine if and when replacement is necessary, is likely to require higher levels of production than DOE believes necessary to maintain production capability. Also, remanufacturing a nuclear component to the original specifications will not prevent age-related problems related to those specifications from recurring. Since these components use plutonium and uranium, radiation exposure to personnel and generation of radioactive waste would also be higher than necessary. If repeated remanufacturing were required, further unnecessary risks would result from additional weapon assembly/disassembly (A/D) operations and additional transport of nuclear components between sites.
From an environmental impact point of view, the remanufacturing concept would have greater impacts for the proposed action of reestablishing pit capability because DOE proposes to use a cleaner, less waste-generating process than was used at the Rocky Flats Plant. All other environmental impacts would not be distinguishable from those described in this PEIS because existing manufacturing processes form the Program baseline.
Maintenance . The maintainer's point of view is reflected in this PEIS to the extent that it is consistent with the No Action alternative. Under this approach, weapons maintenance would be the focus of stockpile stewardship. This approach would rely on enhanced surveillance and dual revalidation, whereby the weapons laboratories would conduct independent technical examinations of weapons to validate their safety and reliability. Any problems that arose would be solved through either remanufacture or "fixes" proposed by the weapons laboratories. These attributes are all part of the ongoing Program that will continue into the future. The principal difference between the Program as presented in this PEIS and this point of view is differing judgment on how much enhanced experimental capability would be needed to assess and certify a safe and reliable stockpile over the long term. The maintainers believe that less (or no) additional experimental capability would be required if DOE placed more emphasis on enhanced surveillance and dual revalidation.
DOE believes that this approach would not provide a sufficient basis for assessing and certifying the safety and reliability of the stockpile. Although enhanced surveillance will play an important role in the future of the Program, it serves a limited purpose. Surveillance activities identify stockpile problems through the examination and analysis of weapons sampled from the stockpile. An enhanced surveillance program would serve to identify problems with greater confidence and increased warning time. However, it would not provide a sole basis for assessing the significance of the problem or determining its solution. The ability of the laboratories to validate that the problem has been corrected, in the absence of nuclear testing, depends on their experimental and computational capabilities. In DOE's judgment, as explained in section 2.4, those capabilities are inadequate. Therefore, to the extent that maintenance would not provide sufficient enhanced experimental capability, it is not a reasonable alternative.
From an environmental impact point of view, the maintenance concept is not distinguishable from the impacts of the No Action alternative for stockpile stewardship and the proposed actions for stockpile management.
The last underground nuclear test conducted by the United States was in 1992. Since then, the United States has observed a moratorium on underground nuclear testing while pursuing a CTBT. On August 11, 1995, the President announced that, "one of my Administration's highest priorities is to negotiate a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to reduce the danger posed by nuclear weapons proliferation." In this announcement, the President also stated that he would seek a "zero yield" CTBT, which would "ban any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion immediately upon entry into force." The President declared his commitment "to do everything possible to conclude the ComprehensiveTest Ban Treaty negotiations as soon as possible so that a treaty can be signed next year."
As part of this announcement, the President also stated that he had been assured "that we can meet the challenge of maintaining our nuclear deterrent under a Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty through a science-based stockpile stewardship program without nuclear testing." However, the President cautioned that "while I am optimistic that the stockpile stewardship program will be successful, as President, I cannot dismiss the possibility, however unlikely, that the program will fall short of its objectives." The President went on to say further: "In the event that I were informed by the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of Energy ... that a high level of confidence in the safety or reliability of a nuclear weapons type which the Secretaries consider to be critical to our nuclear deterrent could no longer be certified, I would be prepared, in consultation with Congress, to exercise our `supreme national interests' rights under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty in order to conduct whatever testing might be required."
One of the primary purposes of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS is to evaluate ways of maintaining a continued safe and reliable nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing. Thus, the proposal described in this PEIS does not include nuclear testing. However, because it is possible--although not probable--that the United States might one day exercise its "supreme national interests" rights and conduct underground nuclear testing to certify the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons, this PEIS and the NTS Site-Wide EIS include an analysis of the environmental impacts of underground nuclear testing at NTS.
Under the No Action alternative, DOE would not take the actions proposed in this PEIS. Activities associated with stockpile stewardship and management would continue at the Complex sites using existing facilities, and no significant changes would occur.
With regards to stockpile stewardship, under the No Action alternative, activities at the three weapons laboratories (LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and NTS would continue using existing experimental facilities, but the proposed new experimental facilities would not be constructed. The major No Action facilities for the various stockpile stewardship functions include: the DARHT Facility and the Pulsed High Energy Machine Emitting X-Rays (PHERMEX) Facility at LANL, the Flash X-Ray (FXR) Facility at LLNL, and the Big Explosives Experimental Facility (BEEF) at NTS for studying the physics of the weapons primary; the Nova Facility at LLNL and the Pegasus II Facility at LANL for studying physics of the weapons secondary; and the Saturn and Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator (PBFA) Facilities at SNL for studying weapon effects. These facilities are more fully described in section 3.3, while the major activities at sites involved with stockpile stewardship are described in section 3.2.
Under the No Action alternative, stockpile management functions would remain at their current locations, no further rightsizing or consolidation beyond currently planned initiatives would take place, and pit manufacturing capability would not be reestablished. The major No Action facilities for the various stockpile management functions include: A/D and HE fabrication at Pantex; secondary and case fabrication at Y-12; nonnuclear fabrication facilities primarily at Kansas City Plant (KCP), with smaller capabilities at LANL and SNL; R&D plutonium fabrication capabilities at LANL and LLNL; and tritium supply and recycling facilities at SRS per the decisions in the Tritium Supply and Recycling ROD. These facilities are more fully described in section 3.4, while the major activities at sites involved with stockpile management are described in section 3.2.
From a programmatic perspective, the No Action alternative would not ensure DOE's ability to maintain core U.S. competencies in nuclear weapons in the long term while also maintaining a safe and reliable, smaller, aging U.S. stockpile. Because this is not acceptable, the No Action alternative is not considered to be reasonable. However, in accordance with the CEQ regulations, the No Action alternative is presented and assessed in this PEIS.
Eight locations (ORR, SRS, KCP, Pantex, LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS) are being considered as alternative sites for stockpile stewardship and management missions. All of these sites are currently performing DOE Office of the Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs (DP) activities.
One important strategy of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is to maximize the use of existing infrastructure and facilities as the Complex transitions to be smaller and more efficient in the 21st century. Consequently, only those sites with existing infrastructure or facilities capable of supporting a given stockpile stewardship or stockpile management mission are considered reasonable site alternatives for detailed study in this PEIS. Sites without a technical infrastructure or facilities for a given mission would require significant new construction that would be costly and would create excessive technical risk compared to sites with existing infrastructure and facilities.
For stockpile stewardship, the three existing weapons laboratories and NTS are being considered for new or upgraded stockpile stewardship facilities. This is because the weapons testing mission and stockpile stewardship have always been primary responsibilities of the weapons laboratories and NTS, and existing facilities and capabilities can be built upon to meet the stewardship mission.
For stockpile management, all of the eight current Complex sites could be considered for one or more stockpile management functions. The three weapons laboratories and NTS have various production and manufacturing capabilities and infrastructure that could be improved upon to meet the stockpile management missions. As an example, for the A/D mission there are two reasonable site alternatives: Pantex, which currently performs this mission and has facilities that could be downsized for the future A/D mission; and NTS, which has a relatively new facility known as the Device Assembly Facility that could be upgraded and expanded to perform the A/D mission. Other sites, such as SRS or ORR, that do not have existing facilities or experience necessary to perform the A/D mission, are unreasonable options relative to the sites that have existing A/D facilities. This same logic is similarly applied for the other stockpile management missions.
ORR covers approximately 13,980 hectares (ha) (34,545 acres) in Oak Ridge, TN. ORR contains the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL), Y-12, and the < k-25 site (k-25). the primary focus of ornl is on conducting basic and applied scientific research and technology development. y-12 engages in national security activities, which are included in this peis. the oak ridge gaseous diffusion plant, which has been shut down, is located at k-25. k-25 now serves as an operations center for environmental restoration and waste management programs.
Table 3.2.2-1.-- Current Major Missions at Oak Ridge Reservation
| Mission | Description | Sponsor |
| Weapon Components | Maintain capability to fabricate uranium and lithium components and parts for nuclear weapons | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Stockpile Surveillance | Evaluation of components and subsystems returned from the stockpile | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Uranium and Lithium Storage | Store enriched uranium, depleted uranium, and lithium materials and parts | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Dismantlement | Dismantle nuclear weapon secondaries returned from the stockpile | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Special Nuclear Material | Process uranium | Defense Programs (DP); Nuclear Energy (NE) |
| Test Devices | Provide support to weapons laboratories | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Environmental Restoration and Waste Management | Waste management and decontamination and decommissioning activities at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and K-25 | Environmental Management (EM) |
| Research and Development | Oak Ridge National Laboratory basic research and development in energy, health, and environment | Energy Research (ER); Environment, Safety, and Health (EH); Nuclear Energy (NE) |
| Isotope Production | Oak Ridge National Laboratory produces radioactive and stable isotopes not available elsewhere | Nuclear Energy (NE) |
Y-12 receives, processes, and provides interim storage for unirradiated enriched uranium returned from dismantled weapons and DOE sites as described in the Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact, Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum Historical Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/EA-0929). The capacity of existing processing and storage facilities is sufficient to accommodate all of the forecasted amounts of enriched uranium that would be placed in interim storage. The current missions and functions are described in table 3.2.2-1.
Defense Program Activities. The ORR DP assignments are performed at Y-12 and include maintaining the capability to produce secondaries and cases for nuclear weapons, storing and processing uranium and lithium materials and parts, dismantling nuclear weapons secondaries returned from the stockpile, and providing special production support to DOE weapons laboratories and to other DOE programs. To accomplish its storage mission, some processing of special nuclear materials may be required to recover materials from the returned secondaries. In addition, Y-12 performs stockpile surveillance activities on the components it produces.
SRS, located on approximately 80,130 ha (198,000 acres) near Aiken, SC, was established in 1950. The major nuclear facilities at SRS have included fuel and target fabrication facilities, nuclear material production reactors, chemical separation plants used for recovery of plutonium and uranium isotopes, a uranium fuel processing area, and the Savannah River Technology Center, which provides process support. Historically, DOE has produced tritium at SRS; however, DOE has not produced new tritium since 1988. Plutonium and spent nuclear fuel processing to produce material for nuclear weapons at SRS, have been terminated. DOE is currently preparing a separate EIS to explore the use of these facilities to stabilize existing quantities of plutonium residues as well as other nuclear materials. Tritium recycling operations will continue at SRS with the Replacement Tritium Facility conducting the majority of these operations. Tritium decays and must be replaced periodically to meet weapons specifications. Tritium recycling facilities empty tritium from weapons reservoirs, purify it to eliminate the helium decay product, and fill replacement reservoirs with specification tritium for nuclear stockpile weapons. Filled reservoirs are delivered to Pantex for weapons assembly and directly to the Department of Defense as replacements for weapons reservoirs. As part of the previous nonnuclear consolidation, SRS is also in the process of receiving some of the tritium processing and reservoir surveillance functions previously performed at the Mound Plant in Miamisburg, OH. The current missions at SRS are shown in table 3.2.3-1.
Defense Program Activities. In the past, the SRS complex for the production of nuclear materials consisted of five reactors (the C-, K-, L-, P-, and R-Reactors) in addition to a fuel and target fabrication plant, two target and spent nuclear fuel chemical separation plants, a tritium-target processing facility, a heavy water rework facility, and waste management facilities.
The K-Reactor, the last operational reactor, was put into cold standby status in 1992 with no planned provision for restart. SRS is now conducting tritium-recycling operations in support of stockpile requirements using dismantled weapons as the tritium supply source.
KCP is situated on approximately 57 ha (141 acres) of the 121-ha (300-acre) Bannister Federal Complex, which is located within incorporated city limits 19 km (12 mi) south of the downtown center of Kansas City, MO. The plant shares the Bannister Federal Complex site with other Federal agencies: the General Services Administration, the U.S. Marine Corps, the Federal Aviation Administration, the National Archives, and the Internal Revenue Service, among others.
KCP produces and procures nonnuclear electrical, electronic, electromechanical, mechanical, plastic, and nonfissionable metal components for the nuclear weapons program. Current missions at KCP are shown in table 3.2.4-1.
Defense Program Activities. KCP is currently the principal nonnuclear fabrication facility within the Complex. As such, KCP produces a variety of nonnuclear components and provides surveillance testing and repair services for these components.
Pantex is located about 27 km (17 mi) northeast of Amarillo, TX, on approximately 4,119 ha (10,177 acres) of DOE-owned land. Pantex missions are the fabrication of chemical HE for nuclear weapons, assembly, disassembly, maintenance, and surveillance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile, dismantlement of nuclear weapons being retired from the stockpile, and interim storage of plutonium components from dismantled weapons. Weapons activities involve the handling (but not processing) of uranium, plutonium, and tritium components, as well as a variety of nonradioactive hazardous or toxic chemicals. The current Pantex missions and functions are listed in table 3.2.5-1.
In the near term, weapons dismantlement and plutonium pit storage activities will dominate activities at Pantex. Although analysis in the Environmental Assessment for Interim Storage of Plutonium Components (DOE/EA-0812) found that Pantex has a sufficient number of storage magazines to safely accommodate 20,000 pits, Pantex only has authority to provide interim storage for up to 12,000 pits as described in a Finding of No Significant Impact (59 FR 3674) on January 26, 1994. Decisions regarding additional pit storage beyond 12,000 pits are being considered in the Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components (DOE/EIS-0225).
Defense Program Activities. The main mission of Pantex is the A/D of nuclear weapons. Other than HE, virtually all other components of the weapons come from other DOE or DOD sites. Modification, maintenance, and repair activity at Pantex involves the disassembly of nuclear weapons so that one or more of the components can be repaired, replaced, or modified. After replacing components, the weapons are reassembled and returned to the stockpile. Pantex surveillance activities involve weapon disassembly, laboratory testing of various components, and rebuilding weapons for shipment back to the stockpile. Production of HE components includes processing and machining main charge subassemblies and fabrication of mock components for use in weapon test assemblies, manufacturing small HE components, producing a variety of explosive materials from chemical reactants and commercially produced explosives, and evaluating explosive materials and components through a variety of analytical, mechanical, and explosive tests. Retired weapon dismantlement is the predominant current activity at Pantex. Weapons are returned from DOD, disassembled, and components are either destroyed, reclaimed, or returned to the original manufacturer. The exception is plutonium pits, which are stored onsite on an interim basis.
|
Mission |
Description |
Sponsor |
|---|---|---|
| Weapons Assembly/Disassembly | Assemble and disassemble nuclear weapons as necessary |
Defense Programs (DP) |
| Weapons Dismantlement | Dismantle nuclear weapons no longer required | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Weapons Maintenance | Retrofit, maintain, and repair stockpile weapons | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Stockpile Surveillance | Disassembly and inspection | Defense Programs (DP) |
| High Explosive Components | Manufacture for use in nuclear weapons | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Plutonium Storage | Provide interim storage of pits | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Test/training Programs | Assemble nuclear explosive-like assemblies for training or flight test |
Defense Programs (DP) |
| Waste Management | Provide waste management and decontamination and decommissioning activities | Environmental Management (EM) |
LANL was established as a nuclear weapons design laboratory in 1943 and was formerly known as the Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory. Its facilities are located on about 11,300 ha (28,000 acres) about 40 km (25 mi) northwest of Santa Fe, NM.
LANL is a multidisiciplinary research facility engaged in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies. Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and related emergency response, arms control, and nonproliferation and environmental activities. It conducts R&D activities in the basic sciences, mathematics, and computing with applications to these mission areas and to a broad range of programs including: nonnuclear defense; nuclear and nonnuclear energy; atmospheric, space, and geosciences; bioscience and biotechnology; and the environment. Table 3.2.6-1 illustrates current missions at LANL. A more detailed discussion of the complete spectrum of laboratory activities can be found in the current LANL Institutional Plan, which is unclassified and available to the public.
In regard to nuclear weapons, LANL is responsible for the design of the nuclear explosive package in certain U.S. weapons (LLNL has this responsibility for other weapons.) LANL maintains research, design, development, testing (including nuclear testing), surveillance, assessment, and certification capabilities in support of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, LANL now conducts the pit surveillance program and some manufacturing of nonnuclear components due to termination of the nuclear weapons mission at the Mound, Pinellas, and Rocky Flats Plants.
LLNL was established as a nuclear weapons design laboratory in 1952 and was formerly known as the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory. Its facilities are located on about 332 ha (821 acres) in Livermore, CA. A 2,800-ha (7,000-acre) auxiliary testing range known as Site 300 is located about 29 km (18 mi) east of the Livermore Site. Site 300 is used primarily for HE testing and other experimentation, such as particle beam research.
LLNL is a multidisiciplinary research facility engaged in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies. Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons stewardship program and related emergency response, arms control, and nonproliferation activities. It conducts research and development activities in the basic sciences, mathematics, and computing, with applications to these mission areas and to a broad range of programs including: nonnuclear defense; nuclear and nonnuclear energy; atmospheric, space, and geosciences; bioscience and biotechnology; and the environment. Table 3.2.7-1 illustrates current missions at LLNL. A more detailed discussion of the complete spectrum of laboratory activities can be found in the current LLNL Institutional Plan which is unclassified and available to the public. In regard to nuclear weapons, LLNL is responsible for the design of the nuclear explosive package in certain U.S. weapons (LANL has this responsibility for other weapons). LLNL maintains research, design, development, testing (including nuclear testing), surveillance, assessment, and certification capabilities in support of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.
Note: AVLIS - Atomic Vapor Laser Isotope Separation.
SNL was established as a nuclear weapons design laboratory in 1945. Its facilities are in three locations in the continental United States: Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, CA; and Tonopah, NV. The facilities discussed in this document refer only to the main Albuquerque site, which is located on about 1,150 ha (2,842 acres) of DOE property on Kirtland Air Force Base and an additional 6,072 ha (15,003 acres) provided to DOE through ingrant land from Kirtland Air Force Base, the State of New Mexico, and Isleta Pueblo.
SNL is a multidisiciplinary research and engineering facility engaged in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies. Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons Stewardship and Management Program and related emergency, arms control, and nonproliferation activities. In addition, it conducts R&D activities in advanced manufacturing, electronics, information, pulsed power, energy, environment, transportation, and biomedical technologies. Table 3.2.8-1 illustrates current missions at SNL. A more detailed discussion of the complete spectrum of laboratory activities can be found in the current SNL Institutional Plan, which is unclassified and available to the public.
In regard to nuclear weapons, SNL is responsible for the design of nonnuclear components and related system engineering. It maintains research, design, development, testing (including nuclear testing), surveillance, assessment, and certification capabilities in support of the Program. In addition, because of the end of the Cold War, SNL now performs some nonnuclear manufacturing functions due to termination of the nuclear weapons mission at the Mound and Pinellas Plants.
|
Mission |
Description |
Primary Sponsor |
|---|---|---|
| Nuclear Weapons | Stockpile stewardship; nonnuclear component production | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Arms Control and Nonproliferation | Intelligence support; policy analysis; verification and control | Nonproliferation and National Security (NN) |
| Energy Research, Science and Technology |
Electric, geothermal, solar, wind and photovoltaics; coal, gas and petroleum; fusion; basic energy sciences | Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (EE); Fossil Energy (FE); Energy Research (ER) |
| Environmental | Environmentally conscious manufacturing; environmental restoration; waste management; HazMat transport | Environmental Management (EM) |
| Work for Others | Satellites; arming, fuzing, and firing systems; probabilistic risk assessment; transport packaging | DOD and various other agencies |
NTS occupies approximately 351,000 ha (867,000 acres) in the southeastern part of Nye County in southern Nevada. NTS is located about 104 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas. It is a remote, secure facility that maintains the capability for conducting underground testing of nuclear weapons and evaluating the effects of nuclear weapons on military communications systems, electronics, satellites, sensors, and other materials. The first nuclear test at NTS was conducted in January 1951. Since the signing of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty in 1974, it has been the only U.S. site used for nuclear weapons testing. Approximately one-third of the land (located in the eastern and northwestern portions of the site) has been used for nuclear weapons testing, one-third (located in the western portion of the site) has been reserved for future missions, and one-third has been reserved for R&D and other facility requirements. Facilities include nuclear device assembly, diagnostic canister assembly, hazardous liquid spill, and the radioactive waste management site. In addition, Yucca Mountain, an area on the southwestern boundary of the site, is being evaluated by DOE for siting of a spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste (HLW) repository. While the primary purpose of Yucca Mountain is for commercial HLW, it is also slated to receive some defense HLW.
Activities at NTS are concentrated in several general areas. Most of the onsite work is related to DP activities, although there are DOE Office of Environmental Management (EM), other DOE, and non-DOE activities as well. NTS is a unique facility because it is a large open area into which access is tightly controlled, it has a substantial infrastructure, and it has the capability to handle and run tests with hazardous or radioactive materials. Because of these factors, activities other than nuclear testing, such as mobile missile transporter tests and nuclear rocket tests, have been carried out for other Federal departments and agencies. The current missions and functions of NTS are shown in table 3.2.9-1.
Defense Program Activities. The primary DP mission at NTS is to help ensure the safety and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. This stewardship program includes maintaining the readiness and capability to conduct underground nuclear weapons tests and conducting such tests if so directed by the President. Other aspects of stockpile stewardship also include conventional HE tests, dynamic experiments, and hydrodynamic testing. The Nuclear Emergency Search Team based at NTS maintains the readiness to respond to any type of nuclear emergency, including search and identification for lost or stolen weapons, and training exercises related to nuclear bomb and radiation dispersal threats.
|
Mission |
Description |
Sponsor |
|---|---|---|
| Defense Program | Stockpile stewardship activities, including maintenance of readiness to conduct underground nuclear tests, if directed | Defense Programs (DP) |
| Waste Management | Safe and permanent disposal of waste through disposal on NTS or to offsite commercial waste treatment or disposal facilities | Environmental Management (EM) |
| Environmental Restoration | Identification and cleanup of contaminated areas | Environmental Management (EM) |
| Nondefense Research and Development | Original research efforts by DOE, other Federal agencies, and universities | Environmental Management (EM); Energy Research (ER); and others |
| Work for Others | Provides for the use of NTS areas and facilities by other groups and agencies for activities such as military training exercises | DOD and various other agencies |
NTS has also been a key site for past efforts in the areas of nuclear nonproliferation and verification of international treaties. This work was exemplified recently by the Joint Treaty Verification Project, a cooperative effort between the United States and the former Soviet Union.
North Las Vegas Facility . Located on a 32-ha (80-acre) site in the city of North Las Vegas, NV, the North Las Vegas Facility supports the DOE Nevada Operations Office and LLNL, LANL, and SNL weapons test programs and is considered an adjunct to NTS. The facility supports test prestaging activities and fabrication, assembly, and testing of field diagnostic systems that collect data from NTS weapons testing activities. This facility is being considered as an alternative location for NIF and is described more fully in appendix I.
Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous high confidence in the safety and reliability of weapons in the stockpile. Without additional underground nuclear testing, DOE must rely on experimental and computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to predict the consequences of the complex problems that are likely to occur in an aging stockpile. Without these enhanced capabilities, DOE will lack the ability to adequately evaluate some safety and reliability issues, which could significantly affect the Nation's confidence in the stockpile. It is also possible that, without these enhanced capabilities, DOE could not certify the acceptability of certain weapons components repaired or modified to address future safety or reliability issues.
The physical principles involved in nuclear weapons call for a range of experimental capabilities to provide data. These capabilities differ in time and energy density (related to temperature and pressure), and they are complementary rather than duplicative, because they serve different needs. These aboveground sources of experimental data can be categorized most easily by time; that is, by the duration of the output pulse of the data. Thermonuclear processes vary in time down to the nanosecond range. 2 For example, powerful lasers do the best job of producing experimental data at the highest temperatures (millions of degrees) in the laboratory, but only for very short time intervals. Multi-nanosecond pulsed-power sources do the best job of producing very energetic pulses of x radiation in that time period, but at moderate temperatures. And microsecond pulsed-power sources and HE do the best job of providing an energetic but controlled hydrodynamic "push" in that time period for simulation and study of complex hydrodynamic phenomena. 3 The three weapons laboratories are also complementary in providing these technologies. The powerful laser capability is centered at LLNL, the nanosecond pulsed-power capability is centered at SNL, and the microsecond pulsed-power capability is centered at LANL.
As discussed in chapter 2, the historical stockpile data indicate that problems are likely to develop in the aging stockpile that will require certified repairs or replacements without nuclear testing. Thus, U.S. national security policy in pursuit of a "zero yield" CTBT calls for the aggressive pursuit of enhanced experimental capabilities to help ensure a safe and reliable stockpile without additional nuclear testing. Therefore, DOE has included the detailed project-specific analyses for the proposed facilities (NIF, CFF, and Atlas) in this PEIS. Enhanced experimental facilities considered in this PEIS are those that either require or may require budget "line item" authorization from Congress. Next generation facilities are discussed in section 3.3.4. Within the next several years, it is expected that the weapons laboratories may request DOE authorization to begin the formal Congressional budget "line item" process for these facilities. NEPA documentation would be completed as a normal part of this process.
The nuclear weapons phenomena involved in enhanced experimental capability can be broadly grouped into three categories: physics of nuclear weapons primaries, physics of nuclear weapons secondaries, and weapons effects. Table 3.3-1 depicts the proposed alternatives and facilities for enhanced experimental capability.
Table 3.3-1.-- Stockpile Stewardship Enhanced Experimental Capability Alternatives
|
Capability |
LANL |
LLNL |
SNL |
NTS |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Physics of Nuclear Weapons Primaries | ||||
| No Action | X | X | X | |
| Contained Firing Facility 4 | X | |||
| Physics of Nuclear Weapons Secondaries 5 | ||||
| No Action | X | X | ||
| National Ignition Facility 5 | X | X | X | X |
| Atlas Facility 5 | X | |||
| Weapons Effects | ||||
| No Action 6 | X |
Primary implosion is initiated by detonating a layer of chemical HE that surrounds the plutonium pit. The HE drives the pit material into a compressed mass at the center of the primary assembly, resulting in a fission reaction. With respect to the physics phenomena from the implosion of the primary, the experimental facilities provide physics validation, material behavior information, improved understanding of the implosion, and the ability to assess age-related defects. LANL and LLNL have been conducting basic work in these areas for many years. However, in the absence of additional nuclear testing, new and improved capabilities are needed. Proposed new facilities and site alternatives under consideration, along with the existing facilities which are part of the No Action alternative, are discussed below.
The principal diagnostic tools DOE currently uses to study nuclear weapons primaries are hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments. Hydrodynamic tests examine interactions among parts of the weapons primary. Dynamic experiments explore broader issues regarding materials science. Under the No Action alternative, DOE would continue to use the hydrodynamic testing facilities currently available at LANL, LLNL, and NTS, and a new facility planned for LANL. The FXR Facility at LLNL Site 300 has been in continuous operation since 1983. The FXR Facility uses linear induction accelerator technology for high-speed radiography. DOE does not perform dynamic experiments with plutonium at LLNL because the necessary infrastructure is not in place at Site 300. The PHERMEX Facility has been in continuous operation at LANL since 1963. The PHERMEX Facility uses a radio-frequency accelerator designed for high-speed radiography at LANL. Because neither the FXR Facility nor the PHERMEX Facility is capable of providing the degree of resolution, intensity, rapid time sequencing, or three-dimensional views that are now needed to provide answers to current questions regarding weapons condition or performance, DOE has decided to construct and operate a new facility (DARHT) at LANL.
The DARHT Facility will consist of a new accelerator building with two accelerator halls to provide two perpendicular lines-of-sight, which will enable two radiographic images to be captured simultaneously or sequentially and will provide a capability to perform three-dimensional diagnostics of a simulated nuclear weapon primary. Most tests and experiments at the DARHT Facility would be conducted inside of modular steel containment vessels. In the future, DOE may perform dynamic experiments with plutonium at the DARHT Facility; these experiments would be conducted in specially designed double-walled containment vessels. DOE has analyzed the environmental impacts of this proposal; the DARHT Facility Final EIS (DOE/EIS-0228) was published in August 1995 and on October 10, 1995, DOE issued its ROD to proceed with the facility. Construction of the facility was enjoined by the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico on January 27, 1995, pending completion of the EIS and ROD. Following the ROD, DOE filed motion for dissolution of the injunction. On April 16, 1996, the U.S. District Court concluded that the purpose of the injunction had been satisfied, and therefore lifted the injunction and dismissed the case.
For the purposes of this PEIS, DOE includes DARHT as an existing facility at LANL because DOE has reached an independent decision to construct and operate the facility. Under all alternatives considered in this PEIS, including the No Action alternative, DOE would complete construction and operate both axes of the DARHT Facility. When DARHT becomes operational, DOE would phase out operation of the PHERMEX Facility. Modular steel containment vessels would be used at the DARHT Facility firing site to contain emissions and debris from selected hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments; any experiments involving plutonium would always be conducted inside a specially designed double-walled steel vessel.
Besides LANL and LLNL, NTS has some hydrodynamic testing facilities in place. In addition to its past underground nuclear testing program, DOE has conducted underground and aboveground hydrodynamic tests at NTS. For example, BEEF is used to study hydrodynamic motion associated with HE detonations; however, BEEF does not include a high resolution radiographic diagnostic capability.
As discussed previously, both LANL and LLNL are considered necessary for the continued development of the science-based stockpile stewardship program. In this regard both laboratories will continue to utilize and improve radiographic hydrodynamic test capability.
Table 3.3.1.2-1.-- Contained Firing Facility Construction Requirements
|
|
|
| Material/Resource | |
| Electrical energy (MWh) | 64 |
| Peak electrical demand (MWe) | 0.1 |
| Concrete (m3) | 3,000 |
| Steel (t) | 1,500 |
| Gasoline, diesel, and lube oil (L) | 56,800 |
| Industrial gases 7 (m3) | 4,300 |
| Water (L) | 3,790,000 |
| Land (ha) | 1.2 |
| Employment | |
| Total employment (worker years) | 60 |
| Peak employment (workers) | 30 |
| Construction period (years) | 2 |
The proposed CFF would augment and upgrade the existing FXR Facility at LLNL's Site 300. The containment enclosure would provide for containment of hydrodynamic tests and reduce the environmental, safety, and health impacts of current outdoor testing. The enclosure will also improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing by better controlling experimental conditions. Tables 3.3.1.2-1 through 3.3.1.2-3 show CFF construction and operating requirements and waste volumes. More detailed information about CFF can be found in appendix section A.2.2 and in the project-specific analysis presented in appendix J.
Table 3.3.1.2-2.-- Contained Firing Facility Annual Operation Requirements
|
|
|
| Resource | |
| Electrical energy (MWh) | 1,600 |
| Peak electrical demand (MWe) | 1.2 |
| Liquid fuel (L) | 2,650 |
| Natural gas 8 (m3) | None |
| Water (L) | 2,300,000 |
| Coal (t) | None |
| Plant Footprint (ha) | 0.4 |
| Employment (Workers) | 6 9 |
Table 3.3.1.2-3.-- Contained Firing Facility Waste Volumes (100 Tests Per Year)
|
|
(m3) |
(m3) |
(m3) |
|
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Low-Level | ||||
| Liquid | None | None | None | |
| Solid | None | 90 10 | 90 11 | |
| Mixed Low-Level | ||||
| Liquid | None | None | None | |
| Solid | None | 10 12 | 10 | |
| Hazardous | ||||
| Liquid | None | 8 13 | 8 | |
| Solid | None | 4 | 4 | |
| Nonhazardous (Sanitary) | ||||
| Liquid | 1,420 | 284 14 | 284 | |
| Solid | 64 | 13 15 | 13 | |
| Nonhazardous (Other) | ||||
| Liquid | None | None | None | |
| Solid | None | None | None | |
The energy released by the fission of the nuclear weapons primary activates the secondary assembly, creating a thermonuclear (fusion) explosion. The physics of nuclear weapons secondaries deals with the interaction of many dynamic physics processes, including hydrodynamics, thermodynamics, fission, and fusion. With respect to the phenomena of the physics from the thermonuclear explosion of the secondary, the experimental facilities provide improved understanding of thermonuclear ignition, secondary physics validation, and material behavior information. LANL and LLNL have been conducting basic work in these areas for many years. However, without additional nuclear testing, new and improved capabilities are needed. The proposed new facilities and site alternatives under consideration are discussed below. Some of the facilities may also be useful for investigating physics phenomena related to nuclear weapons primaries and weapons effects. The capabilities that would be provided by the proposed NIF and the Atlas Facility are independent components needed to improve the understanding of the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries. Each proposed facility responds to a different diagnostic need related to nuclear weapons secondaries and is not competing with other alternatives.
Few methods are currently available to study the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries. The principal facilities currently available are the Nova Facility at LLNL and the Pegasus II Facility at LANL. The Nova Facility and the Pegasus II Facility do not provide conditions sufficiently close to those in a nuclear weapon secondary to improve our understanding of these important concepts and processes. Without improvements to these capabilities, as proposed by NIF and the Atlas Facility, DOE would lack the ability to evaluate some significant nuclear performance issues, which could adversely affect confidence in the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
The proposed NIF would make it possible to study radiation physics in laboratory experiments that would approach certain conditions of a thermonuclear detonation. NIF would achieve higher temperatures and pressures, albeit in a very small volume, than any other existing or proposed stockpile stewardship facility. This facility could be located at either LANL, LLNL,SNL, or NTS. Tables 3.3.2.2-1 through 3.3.2.2-3 show generic NIF construction, operating requirements, and waste volumes. The data in these three tables reflect nonsite-specific estimates developed prior to site-specific analyses. More detailed and site-specific information about NIF can be found in the project-specific analysis presented in appendix I.
Table 3.3.2.2-1.-- National Ignition Facility Construction Requirements
Requirement |
Consumption |
| Material/Resource | |
| Electrical energy (MWh) | 24 |
| Concrete (m3) | 60,000 |
| Steel (t) | 10,000 |
| Liquid fuel and lube oil (L) | 1,500,000 |
| Industrial gases 16 (m3) | 9,000 |
| Water (L) | 14,300,000 17 |
| Land (ha) | 20 |
| Employment | |
| Total employment (worker years) | 1,627 |
| Peak employment (workers) | 470 |
| Construction period (years) | 5 |
Requirement |
Consumption |
|---|---|
| Resource | |
| Electrical energy (MWh) | 58,000 |
| Peak electrical demand (MWe) | 20 |
| Liquid fuel (L) | 5,820 |
| Natural gas 18 (m3) | 1,100,000 19 |
| Water (L) | 152,000,000 |
| Coal (t) | None |
| Plant Footprint (ha) | 20 20 |
| Employment (Workers) | 267 21 |
Category |
Average Annual
|
Annual Volume
|
Annual Volume
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Low-Level | |||
| Liquid | None | 0.6 | None |
| Solid | None | 3 | 3 |
| Mixed Low-Level | |||
| Liquid | None | 2 | 2 |
| Solid | None | 0.3 | 0.3 |
| Hazardous | |||
| Liquid | None | 2.3 | 2.3 |
| Solid | None | 8 | 8 |
| Nonhazardous (Sanitary) | |||
| Liquid | 2,800 | 17,900 22 | 17,800 23 |
| Solid | 100 | 6,000 | 6,050 |
| Nonhazardous (Other) | |||
| Liquid | 180 | Included in sanitary | Included in sanitary |
| Solid | 180 | Included in sanitary | Included in sanitary |
The proposed Atlas Facility at LANL would be used for experiments that would contribute to the development of predictive capabilities related to the aging and performance of secondaries. This facility would build on existing special equipment at LANL, SNL, or NTS. Tables 3.3.2.3-1 through 3.3.2.3-3 show Atlas Facility construction and operating requirements and waste volumes. Although principally considered as a stewardship facility for study of the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries, the proposed Atlas Facility at LANL could also be used for hydrodynamic experiments to resolve issues related to material properties, mixing and other physics aspects of weapons primaries. More detailed information about the Atlas Facility can be found in the project-specific analysis presented in appendix K.
Table 3.3.2.3-1.--Atlas Facility Construction Requirements
|
Requirement |
|
|---|---|
| Material/Resource | |
| Electrical energy (MWh) | 520 |
| Peak electrical demand (MWe) | 0.1 |
| Concrete (m3) | 100 |
| Steel (t) | 10 |
| Liquid fuel and lube oil (L) | 1,000 |
| Industrial gases 24 (m3) | 100 |
| Water (L) | 10,000 |
| Land (ha) | 0.04 |
| Employment | |
| Total employment (worker years) | 53 |
| Peak employment (workers) | 35 |
| Construction period (years) | 4 |
Table 3.3.2.3-2.-- Atlas Facility Annual Operation Requirements
|
|
|
|---|---|
| Resource | |
| Electrical energy (MWh) | 5,360 |
| Peak electrical demand (MWe) | 12 |
| Liquid fuel (L) | None |
| Natural gas 25 (m3) | 45,710 |
| Water (L) | 10,000 |
| Coal (t) | None |
| Plant Footprint (ha) | 0.3 |
| Employment (Workers) | 15 |
Table 3.3.2.3-3.-- Atlas Facility Waste Volumes
|
|
|
|
|
|---|---|---|---|
| Low-Level | |||
| Liquid | None | None 26 | None |
| Solid | None | None26 | None |
| Mixed Low-Level | |||
| Liquid | None | None26 | None |
| Solid | None | None26 | None |
| Hazardous | |||
| Liquid | None | <1 27 | None |
| Solid | None | <1b | None |
| Nonhazardous (Sanitary) | |||
| Liquid | 1,120 28 | 710 29 | 708 30 |
| Solid | 15.3 | 7 | 9 |
| Nonhazardous (Other) | |||
| Liquid | None | Included in sanitary | Included in sanitary |
| Solid | None | Included in sanitary | Included in sanitary |
One of the reasons for past underground nuclear testing has been to determine the effects of nuclear weapon radiation outputs of x rays, gamma rays, and neutrons on nuclear weapon subsystems and components. Of particular importance is the ability to certify that crucial nuclear weapons components meet military requirements to withstand radiation. Additionally, underground nuclear testing has been used to establish, with high confidence, adherence to military requirements for nonweapons systems such as satellites. Existing facilities at SNL, such as the Saturn Facility or the PBFA Facility, provide a limited capability to investigate these effects, and would continue to operate under the No Action alternative. No alternatives for new facilities designed principally for weapons effects testing are being proposed in this PEIS.
The science-based stockpile stewardship program will build upon existing information and capabilities and the program is expected to continuously evolve as better information becomes available and technological advancements occur. Today, because of limitations on data and technology, only the first steps to a fully capable science-based stockpile stewardship program can be taken. Thus, DOE is only in a position to propose NIF, CFF, and Atlas Facility for decisionmaking analysis in this PEIS. These three facilities are described in detail in appendixes I, J, and K, respectively. The goal is to provide a sufficiently detailed analysis for these three facilities in this PEIS to allow for their construction and operation if the decision is made to do so.
While these three proposed facilities would provide improvements over existing capabilities, and are expected to be important components of science-based stewardship, they do not represent the entire science-based stewardship program that is envisioned for all time. The next generation of potential stockpile stewardship facilities cannot be defined to the degree necessary to perform detailed environmental impact analysis. However, these next generation facilities can be described in general terms such that a consideration of cumulative impacts that might be related to the ultimate science-based stockpile stewardship program can be qualitatively assessed. Next generation facilities anticipated for science-based stockpile stewardship are the Advanced Hydrotest Facility (AHF), the High Explosive Pulsed Power Facility (HEPPF), the Advanced Radiation Source (ARS [X-1]), and the Jupiter Facility. The following sections provide a broad description of what these three facilities might look like. Section 4.11 describes the general impacts of constructing and operating these types of facilities.
AHF would be the next generation hydrodynamic test facility following the DARHT Facility at LANL. AHF would be an improved radiographic facility that would provide for imaging on more than two axes, each with multiple time frames, though the number of axes and time frames is still subject to requirements definition and design evolution. The facility would be used to better reveal the evolution of weapon primary implosion symmetry and boost-cavity shape under normal conditions and in accident scenarios. Due to the nature of the dynamic experiments and hydrodynamic testing to be conducted with the facility, AHF would probably be considered for location at NTS and LANL only.
At this point, the feasibility and definition of an AHF is still insufficiently determined for DOE to propose such a facility. For example: performance requirements and specifications for such a facility (i.e., determination of what capabilities should be required of an AHF for assessment of stockpile aging and related effects, beyond those of the DARHT Facility) have not been fully
