Chapter 2 describes the purpose of and need for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. It includes a discussion of national security policy considerations and the technical effects of national security policy on shaping the Program's purpose and need. The proposed action and alternatives are also discussed. The final section summarizes the chapter and introduces the logic flow diagrams that depict the framework of the Program from national policy and stockpile perspectives.
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management gram is broad in scope and technically complex. The Program currently involves the integrated activities of three national laboratories, four industrial plants, and a nuclear test site. Further, the Program must be consistent with, and supportive of, U.S. national security policies, which have changed considerably since the end of the Cold War. Therefore, to better understand the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (PEIS)for Stockpile Stewardship and Management purpose, need, proposed action, and alternatives, it is useful to view the Program from two different perspectives. One perspective (see section 2.2) is from the top level of national security policies for nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation. These policies include ongoing responsibilities, strategies, and directives. The other perspective (see section 2.3) focuses on the relevant technical efforts to maintain a safe and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile. Flow diagrams representing the logic of each perspective are referenced in the chapter summary (see section 2.7) and appear at the end of chapter 2.
There are four principal national security policy overlays and four related treaties that define Program conditions for the reasonably foreseeable future. They are:
Of the above, the START II protocol is the most useful in helping define a specific time period to bound the reasonably foreseeable future.
Beginning in 1991, several Presidential policy decisions, some unilateral and some made in conjunction with international treaties, resulted in DOD conducting the comprehensive NPR, which was approved by the President in 1994. The NPR defines and integrates past and present U.S. policies for nuclear deterrence, arms control, and nonproliferation objectives. The unclassified NPR strategies that pertain to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program were presented at the eight public scoping meetings conducted in the summer of 1995. There was general public interest in understanding this complex issue, especially as it relates to treaties, policies, and stockpile size. A summary of how the post-Cold War treaties relate to the NPR strategies and the stockpile follows.
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks. The NPR assumes that the START I Treaty and START II protocol will be fully implemented. However, since the START I Treaty is not yet fully implemented and the START II protocol is not scheduled to be fully implemented until 2003, the NPR strategy protects the U.S. option to reconstitute the stockpile to START I levels should unfavorable events occur in the former Soviet Union. The treaties only control the number of strategic nuclear weapons that can be loaded on treaty-specified and -verified strategic missiles and bombers. These nuclear weapons are limited to 6,000 by the START I Treaty and 3,500 by the START II protocol. The treaties do not control the total stockpile size or the composition of strategic and nonstrategic nuclear weapons of either side. The U.S. stockpile will be larger than 6,000 under START I and 3,500 under START II since the stockpile also includes weapons retained for nonstrategic nuclear forces, DOD operational spares, and spares to replace weapons attrited by Department of Energy (DOE) surveillance testing. In the START II case, the stockpile may also include weapons retained to reconstitute to the START I level. However, the terms "START I-sized stockpile" and "START II-sized stockpile" are relevant to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS as explained in section 2.2.2 and chapter 3.
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. It is the declared policy of the United States to seek ratification of a "zero yield" CTBT as soon as possible. The United States has been observing a moratorium on nuclear testing since 1992. The NPR strategy reflects this policy and the strategy has a significant effect on shaping the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. As explained in section 2.3.4, it is anticipated that repairs or replacements to an aging U.S. stockpile will be needed. Assessment and certification of the safety and reliability of stockpile repairs or replacements without nuclear testing is a significant challenge to the Program. In declaring the policy to seek a CTBT, the President also declared that the continued safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear stockpile is a "supreme national interest" of the United States.
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Article VI of the NPT obligates the parties "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control." However, the NPT does not provide any time period for achieving this goal. Even relatively simple bilateral treaties, such as START I and START II, require more than 10 years to implement, not counting the years of negotiations. In the words of Ambassador Thomas Graham, "Regrettably, none of us is clairvoyant, and so it is unwise to predict with any degree of precision the future international reality and consequently, the complete arms control agenda.1 For the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, speculation on the terms and conditions of a "zero level" U.S. stockpile with international verification, as some have suggested during the scoping meetings, goes beyond the bounds of the reasonably foreseeable future. For the same reason, DOE has chosen not to speculate on a return of the nuclear arms race requiring a stockpile larger than START I size. However, in keeping with the NPT goals, the NPR strategy does express the U.S. intent to pursue further reductions in nuclear forces beyond START II. Therefore, the implications of further reductions below the START II-sized stockpile are discussed in this PEIS where they are relevant.
Although the NWSM is a classified document, its effect in shaping the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS can be explained in an unclassified context. Without access to the classified NWSM, one might assume that the exact details of the projected stockpile size and composition under START I and START II could have a significant effect on the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. This is not the case for the following reasons:
Over the past few years, there have been several publicly announced PDDs that have shaped the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. In the National Defense Authorization Act of 1994 (Pub. L. 103-160), Congress acted to reinforce many of the same points. A summary of their effect in shaping the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS follows:
This section focuses on the technical effects of national security policy decisions on shaping the purpose, need, proposed actions, and alternatives of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The stockpile is currently judged to be safe and reliable by DOE. National security policy changes will significantly change the characteristics of the future nuclear weapons stockpile and the manner in which it will need to be certified as safe and reliable.
Since the beginning of the Cold War, the United States has maintained a nuclear deterrent force as safe and reliable as the evolution of military requirements and technology development would permit. A safe and reliable U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile has been a cornerstone of maintaining a credible nuclear deterrent. The size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile peaked in the 1960s. In the 1970s, it was significantly reduced due to the easing of Cold War tensions with the former Soviet Union. In the late 1970s and through most of the 1980s, Cold War tensions with the former Soviet Union significantly increased and the U.S. nuclear deterrent force was modernized in response. However, the size of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile remained stable during the 1980s with the production of new-design weapons replacing dismantled weapons nearly one for one.
The beginning of the 1990s brought the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the former Soviet Union and a significant effort to end the Cold War. During the first half of the 1990s, many changes occurred in U.S. policy and planning for its nuclear deterrent force. Much has already been accomplished, including the dismantlement, without replacement, of more than 8,000 U.S. nuclear weapons since the end of the Cold War; however, much more will need to be accomplished with the former Soviet Union over the next 10 years to stay the course. Large uncertainties remain concerning the nuclear weapons stockpile of the former Soviet Union, and it is the policy of the United States to protect its national security options for its nuclear deterrent, including the reconstitution of its nuclear forces. The following excerpt is from the President's national security strategy statement in July 1994:
Until recently there has been no reason to expect that weapons would remain in the stockpile longer than they have in the past. Continuous modernization to improve safety and reliability kept the stockpile young as new-design weapon types replaced old ones. Now, with no new-design weapons being produced, the United States will have a steadily aging stockpile. The average age of the stockpile has never approached the typical lifetime specified in the weapon requirements (approximately 20 years for the most modern U.S. nuclear weapons). The average age of the stockpile is currently about 13 years. The NWSM forecasts the average age will now climb roughly 1 year per year and will reach the 20 year mark by 2005, at which time the oldest weapons will be about 35 years old.
The following paragraphs describe the effects of historical stockpile data in shaping the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. This information was extracted from an unclassified report, Stockpile Surveillance: Past and Future (tri-laboratory report requested by DOE and issued as Sandia Laboratory Report, SAND 95-2751, September 1995), which was co-authored by the three weapons laboratories and is available to the public. The past role of nuclear testing is emphasized because such testing can no longer be relied on to provide unambiguous high confidence in the future safety and reliability of an aging stockpile.
Stockpile Evaluation Program. 3 Continuous evaluation of the safety and reliability of the stockpile has always been a major part of the U.S. nuclear weapons program. Since the introduction of sealed-pit weapons more than 35 years ago, a formal surveillance program of nonnuclear laboratory and flight testing has been in existence. More than 13,800 weapons have been evaluated in this program. The Stockpile Evaluation Program, with its reliance on functional testing, has provided information that can be used in the statistical analysis of nonnuclear component and subsystem reliability. This program has detected about 75 percent of all problems ultimately detected, and has been the principal mechanism for discovering defects and initiating subsequent repairs and replacements. However, not all aspects of a nuclear weapon can be statistically assessed this way. Weapons research and development (R&D) at the three weapons laboratories and nuclear testing have played an important part in assessing the stockpile and in making corrective changes when needed.
Past Role of Nuclear Testing. Nuclear tests have been a critical part of the nuclear weapons program. They have contributed to a broad range of activities from development of new weapons to stockpile confidence tests to tests that either identified a concern or showed that remedial actions were not needed. However, the United States has not conducted a sufficient number of nuclear tests for any one weapon type to provide a statistical basis of reliability assessment for the nuclear explosive package. This is why the word "performance" instead of "reliability" is used when discussing a nuclear explosive package.
Although nuclear tests were never a part of the formal Stockpile Evaluation Program, they played an important role in maintaining the safety and performance of the weapons in the stockpile. Every advantage was taken of developmental nuclear tests to eliminate potential nuclear explosive problems. In some cases, nuclear testing during development of one weapon type uncovered a problem that was pertinent to a previous design already in the stockpile, which then had to be corrected. Nuclear tests identified certain classes of stockpile problems not observable in the surveillance program. Nuclear tests have been used to resolve issues raised by the Stockpile Evaluation Program, such as whether a particular corrosion problem affected the nuclear yield of a weapon. Nuclear tests have also been used to verify the efficacy of design changes. For example, the adequacy of certain mechanical safing techniques was determined through nuclear testing. In the case of a catastrophic defect, tests have been used to certify totally new designs to replace an existing design. Finally, in some cases, nuclear testing proved that a potential problem did not exist.
Beginning in the late 1970s, DOD and DOE agreed to a formal series of underground nuclear tests of weapons withdrawn from the stockpile. These tests were referred to as Stockpile Confidence Tests. They differed from developmental nuclear tests because the weapons were from actual production, had experienced stockpile conditions, and had minimal changes made to either nuclear or nonnuclear components prior to the test. There have been 17 such confidence tests since 1972, including 4 tests in the early 1970s that were not officially designated as Stockpile Confidence Tests. Confidence tests have been conducted for each of the weapon types expected to remain in the stockpile well into the next century.
In addition to the 17 confidence tests, at least 51 additional underground nuclear tests have been conducted since 1972 involving nuclear components from the stockpile, components from the actual weapon production line, or components built according to stockpile design specifications and tested after system deployment. The objectives of these tests included weapon effects, weapons R&D, confirmation of a fix, or investigation of safety or performance concerns. Three of these tests (in addition to one confidence test) revealed or confirmed a problem that required corrective action. Four tests (in addition to three confidence tests) confirmed a fix to an identified problem. Additionally, five tests were performed to investigate safety concerns affecting three different weapon types. These five tests verified that a problem did not exist.
The confidence in the performance of the nuclear explosive package has been based on underground nuclear test data, aboveground experiments, computer simulations, surveillance data, and technical judgment. The directors of the three weapons laboratories must certify the nuclear performance of the weapons designed by their laboratory.
In a future without additional nuclear testing, the core capabilities of the weapons laboratories that were developed to eliminate potential problems in new weapon designs must now be employed to assess stockpile problems. However, in the absence of nuclear testing, the ability to assess nuclear components is more difficult; new methods of assessment, discussed later, will have to be developed to help compensate for this loss.
Stockpile Data Summary. The historical stockpile database includes more than 2,400 findings from more than 45 weapon types. Findings are any abnormal conditions pertaining to stockpile weapons, such as out-of-specification data. Findings are then investigated and assessed as to whether or not they are a problem. Excluding multiple occurrences of the same anomalous condition, table 2.3.3-1 provides a summary of the distinct findings and actionable findings since 1958. Actionable findings are those that require some form of corrective action. All major components and subsystems have had problems that required corrective actions. The number of findings for nonnuclear components is much larger than that for nuclear components largely because there are so many more nonnuclear components in a nuclear weapon that require testing more frequently. However, the ratio of actionable findings to distinct findings is much greater for the nuclear components. Thus, when a finding has occurred for a nuclear component, it has generally been a serious one requiring corrective action. Often these corrective actions to nuclear components have required changes to all of the weapons comprising the weapon type affected.
| Actionable Findings | |||
| Type of Components | Distinct Findings | Findings | Weapon Types |
| Nuclear | |||
| Nonnuclear | |||
Source: SNL 1996a.
For the nuclear explosive package, there were approximately 110 findings on 39 weapon types requiring some remediation either to the entire build of that design or to all weapons produced after the particular finding. In addition to rebuilds and changes in production procedures, other actions included imposing restrictions on the weapon, accepting a performance decrement, and in several cases, conducting a nuclear test to determine that the finding did not require any physical change. There have been other instances not counted as actionable where a material was chemically changing and the weapon was closely monitored to see if further action was necessary or it was an isolated case that did not require remediation.
Based on the age of the planned stockpile over the next 10 years, historical data would project an average of one to two actionable findings per year in the planned stockpile and an average of one to two change proposals approved per year, with one of these resulting in a major change. Even with a START II-sized stockpile, one change can affect thousands of weapons. These projections are most likely minimum numbers. The stockpile they were derived from was, on average, younger than the planned stockpile will be in future years, and the number of components in the weapon types was less than the number of components in weapon types of the planned stockpile. Furthermore, the aging characteristics of some of the materials used in the weapon types remaining in the stockpile are not well understood.
The previous paragraphs describe how problems were identified in stockpile weapons during the period when nuclear testing and active weapons development were being conducted along with the Stockpile Evaluation Program. At the present time, with no anticipated new weapons and no nuclear testing, new approaches are needed to assess weapons for potential problems and anticipate aging concerns, especially in the nuclear explosive package. This is important because the smaller, less diverse U.S. stockpile will be more vulnerable to single-component and common-cause failures (i.e., failures or defects compromising the safety or reliability of, respectively, a single weapon system or several systems sharing a common design feature).
DOE will continue to rely on well-established methods while the weapons laboratories develop new methods of measurement and evaluation to address aging, safety, reliability, and performance issues. As the new methods mature for either nuclear or nonnuclear components, they will be incorporated into the Stockpile Evaluation Program. In the future, for example, DOE will rely on improved experimental capabilities, coupled with an improved computational capability, to address issues associated with the nuclear explosive package. These experimental capabilities, along with enhanced surveillance methods, are now crucial to help assess and predict the state of the stockpile and to provide long lead time information about incipient problems.
Broadly stated, changes to U.S. national security policies for nuclear deterrence now place two significant constraints on the way in which DOE has traditionally accomplished its statutory nuclear weapons mission:
With these constraints, U.S. national security policy directs DOE to:
The NPR, PDDs, and Pub. L. 103-160 all address the need to maintain the core competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons without nuclear testing. The NPR strategy adds the expectation of no new-design weapon production; therefore, the NWSM does not currently direct or forecast such a requirement.
The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program must accomplish these fundamental purposes in a safe, efficient, and environmentally responsible manner. National security policies do not eliminate any of the current or historical core competencies and capabilities of the DOE weapons laboratories, industrial plants, or the Nevada Test Site (NTS). They are basic needs that must be maintained for the foreseeable future. These needs are summarized in a focused discussion of their relationship to the development of the PEIS proposed actions and alternatives. A classified appendix has also been prepared to support this PEIS.
The three weapons laboratories possess most of the core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons. These competencies embody more than 50 years of weapons knowledge and experience that cannot be found anywhere in the United States. Since the end of the Cold War, laboratory staffing in the weapons program has declined significantly due to the effects of policy changes on program and budget. Further significant reductions or consolidations of the weapons laboratories would counter efforts to maintain core competencies and to develop the new technologies necessary to ensure continued high confidence in a safe and reliable stockpile. Current stockpile activities in this regard, such as ongoing retrofits of enduring stockpile weapons and safe dismantlement of weapons no longer required, would also be hampered. For the foreseeable future it would be unreasonable to pursue an alternative course for the weapons laboratories. In addition, because there can be no absolute guarantee of complete success in the development of enhanced experimental and computational capabilities, the United States will maintain the capability to conduct nuclear tests under a "supreme national interest" provision in the anticipated CTBT. DOE will need to maintain the capability for nuclear testing and experimentation at NTS and the necessary technical capabilities at the weapons laboratories to design and conduct such tests.
The science and engineering technology base at the three weapons laboratories controls all DOE technical requirements for a U.S. nuclear weapon. The laboratories perform the basic research, design, system engineering, development testing, reliability assessment, and certification of nuclear performance. In addition, they provide or control all technical specifications that are used by the industrial base for manufacturing and surveillance operations and for maintenance operations conducted by DOD. Data from these operations are provided to the weapons laboratories for assessment and technical resolution of problems.
When stockpile problems develop, all of the core laboratory capabilities may come into play. The cause of the problem is identified and an assessment made of its impact on safety, reliability, or performance. If the problem is to be fixed, alternative solutions are developed. These can range from simple repair of a defective feature to complete redesign of the weapon component or subsystem.
The focus is always on the acquisition of relevant test data to make these judgments. Once a fix is determined, it must be designed, prototyped, and development tested by the laboratories before the design is released for manufacture. This generally includes weapon system-level laboratory and flight tests for nonnuclear features and, in the past, nuclear tests if the changes could affect the weapon's nuclear performance. If the fix is to be manufactured, the laboratories provide the quality assurance test specifications. For nonnuclear components, a significant amount of functional test data is acquired during manufacture and is used to begin building a statistical estimate of component reliability. Subsequent laboratory and flight testing in the surveillance program accumulates additional data that include the effects of aging and exposure to stockpile environments. Thus, over time, high confidence in the safety and statistical reliability of nonnuclear components and subsystems can be established.
The situation is not the same for nuclear components and the assessment of nuclear performance. Nuclear components cannot be functionally tested during manufacture or surveillance. The data acquired during manufacture only show that the component was manufactured as designed. Surveillance data indicate whether the component is changing as a result of aging or exposure to stockpile environments. Manufacturing and surveillance data can identify concerns, but these data do not provide all of the necessary information to assess nuclear performance. Assessment and certification of nuclear performance is a nonstatistical, technical judgment by the weapons laboratories based on scientific theory, experimental data, and computational modeling. The scientific practice of "peer review" has been fundamental to these judgments. Experts from the two nuclear design laboratories review each other's data and conclusions on important issues, thereby providing an independent check and balance.
In the past, nuclear testing filled the gaps in basic understanding of the complex physics phenomena; it provided high confidence in the certification of nuclear safety and performance. Without nuclear testing, science-based stockpile stewardship will focus on obtaining the more accurate scientific and experimental data that will be needed for more accurate computer simulations of nuclear performance. The new experimental data must also be validated against past nuclear test data. Assessment of stockpile problems and certification of repairs or replacements of nuclear components will have to rely on improvements to these tools. The existing tools were used in conjunction with nuclear testing and are inadequate if used alone.
From a broader national security perspective, the core intellectual and technical competencies of the weapons laboratories provide the technical basis for the pursuit of U.S. arms control and nuclear nonproliferation objectives. Their extensive core competencies have provided most of the nuclear weapons arms control technologies developed and employed by the United States. The weapons laboratories will have to continue to provide this essential service in the future. For the same reasons, the weapons laboratories also provide significant technical support for U.S. efforts on nuclear weapons nonproliferation and counter-proliferation programs.
None of the manufacturing and surveillance capabilities of the current industrial base can be eliminated on the basis of the post-Cold War changes in national security policies. The industrial base also possesses core competencies, such as manufacturing product, process, and quality control know-how. However, with a smaller stockpile and no new-design weapons production, industrial capacity can be reduced to meet anticipated manufacturing requirements for stockpile repair and replacement activities. A summary discussion of each of the major functions needed is provided in this section. A more detailed discussion can be found in section 3.4.
Broadly stated, there are six major manufacturing and surveillance functional areas in the weapons industrial base:
As explained in chapter 1, tritium supply and recycling was evaluated in a separate PEIS.
Weapons Assembly/Disassembly. The Pantex Plant (Pantex) is the only DOE site currently authorized to assemble or disassemble stockpile weapons. Special facilities built to explosives safety criteria are required; in addition, some facilities are designed to limit nuclear material dispersal in case of an HE accident. These facilities exist in large numbers at Pantex, and because they are relatively discrete structures, downsizing-in-place is a viable alternative. NTS has a much smaller set of these special structures that were constructed for use in assembling nuclear test devices. However, NTS has few of the support facilities required for volume assembly or disassembly of stockpile weapons. A major programmatic consideration is the cost of re-creating facilities that already exist at Pantex. Due to ongoing weapon dismantlement requirements, the alternative to transfer this function to NTS would be slow but achievable within a 10-year period.
Pit Components. These components are designed by Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL) and were formerly produced at the Rocky Flats Plant, which is no longer available for this function. The LLNL facility is not large enough to accommodate both stewardship and management activities; therefore, only LANL is considered to be a reasonable alternative if this function is reestablished at a weapons laboratory. Also, LANL has the more extensive and complete plutonium facility infrastructure. Savannah River Site is also considered a viable alternative for reestablishing this function because it has a plutonium processing infrastructure, although it does not have a precision component manufacturing capability. Other than the synergism with maintaining core competencies at the weapons laboratories, a major program consideration would be the scale of manufacturing capacity required for the foreseeable future.
The preceding discussion applies to new pit fabrication as well as both intrusive and nonintrusive modification pit reuse manufacturing capability and capacity. Intrusive modification pit reuse requires handling and processing of the plutonium internal to the pit. Nonintrusive modification pit reuse involves the external features of the pit and does not require an extensive plutonium infrastructure; the risk of contamination and the generation of radioactive waste is very low for nonintrusive modification activities. Therefore, the weapons A/D Facility is also an alternative for nonintrusive modification pit reuse.
Secondary and Case Components. The Y-12 Plant (Y-12) at the Oak Ridge Reservation produces the secondary and case components. These components are designed by LANL and LLNL; therefore, each of those facilities would be reasonable alternative sites if this function is transferred to the weapons laboratories. Both of these laboratories have a uranium technology base and facility infrastructure, although they have only a very limited R&D manufacturing capability. Other than the synergism with maintaining core competencies at the weapons laboratories, a major Program consideration would be the cost of transferring product technologies and the re-creation of capital facilities that already exist at Y-12. Due to the complicated nature of nuclear facilities and plans for retrofit of an enduring stockpile weapon involving these components, a transition to either LANL or LLNL would be slow but achievable within a 10-year period. Downsizing Y-12 is considered to be a reasonable alternative.
High Explosives Components. Pantex currently manufactures HE components in special facilities built to explosives safety criteria. Downsizing the facilities at Pantex is a reasonable alternative. Comparable facilities also exist at both LANL and LLNL, and either laboratory has sufficient capacity to meet estimated future manufacturing requirements. Costs for this function are relatively low in any case. If a decision is made to transfer this function to the weapons laboratories, it could be done more quickly than the transfer of other functions. However, Pantex would have to retain disposition and disposal capability for the HE inventories currently onsite and those expected from near-term weapon dismantlement. A major Program consideration would be the synergism of this function in maintaining the core competencies of the weapons laboratories.
Nonnuclear Components. Kansas City Plant (KCP) currently manufactures the majority of the nonnuclear components. The KCP facilities are not unique in structural design and are amenable to downsizing in place. The manufacturing technologies are complex and varied due to the large number of component types and high reliability requirements. Sandia National Laboratories (SNL) designs most of the components that KCP manufactures; therefore, SNL would become the major nonnuclear component supplier if a decision is made to transfer this function to the weapons laboratories. Other than potential synergism with maintaining core competencies at the weapons laboratories, a major program consideration would be the cost of transferring product technologies and re-creating facilities that already exist at KCP. Requirements for ongoing support of the enduring stockpile would make this a slow transition, but it would be achievable within a 10-year period.
All of the existing basic capabilities of the laboratory and industrial base continue to be needed even though there have been changes in national security policy since the end of the Cold War. These changes do not affect the standards for stockpile safety and reliability. Therefore, the proposed action concentrates on three major issues that result from the national security policies and constraints placed on the Program. The three program elements of the proposed action are:
Reasonable alternatives for the proposed action are briefly discussed below. Chapter 3 describes these alternatives in more detail.
Understanding nuclear weapon performance requires knowledge of the performance of the individual elements: the primary (pit and HE), the secondary, and the functional interaction between the primary and the secondary inside the case. Computer model-based validation and certification will be the key to DOE's ability to determine, with confidence, many of the future safety and performance characteristics of the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This requires two principal elements: advanced computational models and facilities to provide experimental data that can be used to adjust (normalize) the computational models in conjunction with past nuclear test data. DOE is proposing three facilities to complement the existing capabilities to provide these data. Two are new facilities and one is the upgrade of an existing facility.
The National Ignition Facility (NIF) and the Atlas Facility are proposed new facilities. The Atlas Facility would be collocated in TA-35 with the existing Pegasus II Facility at LANL, and the two facilities would use common infrastructures and support facilities. The Contained Firing Facility is a proposed environmental and diagnostic upgrade to the existing Flash X-Ray Facility at LLNL. As described in section 3.3, these three new facilities would perform separate functions and provide different types of experimental data. Thus, they are complementary in nature and are not alternatives to one another. In each case, the alternative to constructing and operating the facility is No Action (i.e., relying on existing facilities to provide data). In addition, site alternatives are evaluated for NIF, since it is not associated with an existing facility. Volume III of this PEIS contains project-specific analyses for each of these facilities.
The stockpile stewardship program is expected to continuously evolve as better information becomes available and technological advancements occur. DOE is in the early planning stages for a number of what can be described as " next generation" stewardship facilities. These facilities are discussed in section 3.3.4. They will build on the knowledge gained from existing and proposed new facilities. Since these facilities are in the conceptual planning stages, they are not sufficiently well defined to be analyzed in this PEIS. When these technologies reach the appropriate level so as to be ripe for decisionmaking, DOE would complete National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) documentation for them.
One of the primary goals of stockpile management is to rightsize functions to provide an effective and efficient manufacturing capability for a smaller stockpile. Such rightsizing must be accomplished in a manner that preserves core competencies in manufacturing and surveillance. This PEIS analyzes two alternative approaches to rightsizing the stockpile management functions described in section 2.4.2: (1) transfer manufacturing and surveillance activities from the industrial sites to the weapons laboratories and NTS and (2) downsize the industrial plants in place. Relocation alternatives were selected on the basis of existing technical and facility infrastructure at the laboratories and NTS. Section 3.4 discusses these alternatives in detail.
Plutonium pit manufacturing is a special case among those stockpile management functions discussed in section 2.4.2. In 1992, DOE ceased plutonium pit manufacturing operations at the Rocky Flats Plant due to concerns about the safety of the plant and national security policy decisions to cease the production of new-design nuclear weapons. Reestablishing pit manufacturing capability and capacity was to be part of the Reconfiguration PEIS discussed in chapter 1. This function is now part of the proposed action in this Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS.
Pit manufacturing capability and capacity, like that of all other major weapons components and subsystems, is essential for protecting national security options with regard to the nuclear deterrent. In addition, repair or replacement of pits for existing stockpile weapons may be required in the future. Reasonable alternative sites for reestablishing this function were selected from sites that already possess some measure of the appropriate technical or facility infrastructure.
On August 11, 1995, the President announced his commitment to seek a "zero yield" CTBT. He also established several safeguards that condition U.S. entry into a CTBT. One of these safeguards is the conduct of science-based stewardship, including the conduct of experimental programs. This safeguard will enable the United States to enter into such a treaty while maintaining a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile consistent with U.S. national security policies.
One benefit of science-based stockpile stewardship is to demonstrate U.S. commitment to NPT goals; however, the U.S. nuclear posture is not the only factor that might affect whether or not other nations might develop nuclear weapons of their own. Some nations that are not declared nuclear states have the ability to develop nuclear weapons. Many of these nations rely on the U.S. nuclear deterrent for security assurance. The loss of confidence in the safety or reliability of the weapons in the U.S. stockpile could result in a corresponding loss of credibility of the U.S. nuclear deterrent and could provide an incentive to other nations to develop their own nuclear weapons programs.
The United States has halted the development and production of new-design nuclear weapons. The experimental testing program will be used to assess the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons in the remaining stockpile. Much of this testing is classified and could not lead to proliferation without a breach of security. Use of classified data from past U.S. nuclear tests is also a vital part of the overall process for validation of new experimental data. Most of the component technology used for the proposed enhanced experimental capability is unclassified and is available in open literature, and many other nations have developed a considerable capability.
Proliferation drivers for other states, such as international competition or the desire to deter conventional armed forces, would remain unchanged regardless of whether DOE implemented the proposed action analyzed in this PEIS. In the NPT, the parties agree not to transfer nuclear weapons or other devices, or control over them, and not to assist, encourage, or induce nonnuclear states to acquire nuclear weapons. However, the treaty does not mandate stockpile reductions by nuclear states, and it does not address actions of nuclear states in maintaining their stockpiles.
National security policies require DOE to maintain the historical nuclear weapon competencies and capabilities of three weapons laboratories, the industrial plants, and NTS. In addition, DOE must maintain an appropriately sized industrial capacity to manufacture repair and replacement components for weapons that remain in the stockpile. The environmental impacts of maintaining these historical capabilities will be established by the No Action characterization of the sites. With this baseline, the proposed actions and alternatives are analyzed incrementally for each relevant site. In this manner, the broad cumulative impact of the Program and the specific impacts of the proposed actions and alternatives can be displayed and discussed.
In preparation for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS public scoping process, DOE published a document entitled The Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program in May 1995. This document supplements this chapter with a broader discussion of Program strategies to address the major issues and policy constraints placed on the Program. There are five strategies discussed:
In developing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS proposed actions, the significant aspects of "enhanced experimental capability" and "effective and efficient production complex" are directly addressed. As explained in chapter 1, the enhanced experimental capability of the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test Facility and tritium production are addressed as related interim actions in separate environmental impact statements. The remaining elements of these strategies are primarily a redirection of R&D efforts at the weapons laboratories away from the design of new weapons toward the development of appropriate technologies to address the needs of a safe, reliable, and smaller, aging stockpile. As such, they are not judged to be significant NEPA issues and do not have broad environmental impacts beyond what is analyzed in this PEIS.
Figure 2.7-1 presents the framework used for discussing the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program from a U.S. national security policy perspective. Figure 2.7-2 presents a view of the complete Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program from a stockpile perspective, integrating all aspects of the proposed action.
1 From a January 1995 speech by Ambassador Graham, Special Representative of the President for Arms Control Non-Proliferation and Disarmament.
2 The effects of radiation on nuclear weapons and military systems are referred to as "weapon effects" throughout this PEIS.
3 Other than in specific discussions, the word surveillance is used generically throughout this document in place of the Stockpile Evaluation Program.
