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Chapter 1 begins with an overview of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and the Department of Energy's roles and responsibilities. This chapter also includes a discussion of the background of the Program, a brief description of the organization of the document, and the Department of Energy's National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 strategy for stockpile stewardship and management. Chapter 1 concludes with a discussion of related National Environmental Policy Act actions and other programmatic, project-specific, and site-wide reviews that are currently being prepared. |
The Department of Energy (DOE) is the Federal agency responsible for providing the Nation with nuclear weapons and ensuring that those weapons remain safe and reliable. This programmatic environmental impact statement (PEIS) analyzes the potential consequences to the environment if certain changes to the Nuclear Weapons Complex (Complex) are implemented to support DOE's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.
Stockpile stewardship and stockpile management describe DOE's management of the nuclear weapons program. While these terms are not new, DOE has recently redefined them in light of its current roles and responsibilities. Stockpile stewardship comprises the activities associated with research, design, development, and testing of nuclear weapons, and the assessment and certification of their safety and reliability. These activities have been performed at the three DOE weapons laboratories and the Nevada Test Site (NTS). Stockpile management comprises operations associated with producing, maintaining, refurbishing, surveilling, and dismantling the nuclear weapons stockpile. These activities have been performed at the DOE nuclear weapons industrial facilities.
Since the inception of nuclear weapons in the 1940s, DOE and its predecessor agencies have been responsible for stewardship and management of the Nation's stockpile. In response to the end of the Cold War and changes in the world's political regimes, the emphasis of the U.S. nuclear weapons program has shifted dramatically over the past few years from developing and producing new weapons to dismantlement and maintenance of a smaller, enduring stockpile. Accordingly, the nuclear weapons stockpile is being significantly reduced, the United States is no longer manufacturing new-design nuclear weapons, and DOE has closed or consolidated some of its former weapons industrial facilities. Additionally, in 1992 the United States declared a moratorium on underground nuclear testing, and in 1995 President Clinton extended the moratorium and decided to pursue a "zero yield" Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Even with these significant changes, DOE's responsibilities for the nuclear weapons stockpile continue, and the President and Congress have directed DOE to continue to maintain the safety and reliability of the enduring nuclear weapons stockpile.
In response to direction from the President and Congress, DOE has developed its Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program to provide a single, highly integrated technical program for maintaining the continued safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile. It has evolved from predecessor programs that served this mission over previous decades. With no underground nuclear testing, and no new-design nuclear weapons production, DOE expects existing weapons to remain in the stockpile well into the next century. This means that the weapons will age beyond original expectations and an alternative to underground nuclear testing must be developed to verify the safety and reliability of weapons. To meet these new challenges, DOE's science-based Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program has been developed to increase understanding of the basic phenomena associated with nuclear weapons, to provide better predictive understanding of the safety and reliability of weapons, and to ensure a strong scientific and technical basis for future U.S. nuclear weapons policy objectives.
The size and composition of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile is determined annually by the President. The Department of Defense prepares the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan (NWSP) based on military requirements and coordinates the development of the plan with DOE concerning its ability to support the plan. The NWSP, which is classified, covers the current year and a 5-year planning period. It specifies the types and quantities of weapons required and sets limits on the size and nature of stockpile changes that can be made without additional approval by the President. The Secretaries of Defense and Energy jointly sign the Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Memorandum (NWSM), which includes the NWSP and a long-range planning assessment. As such, the NWSM is the basis for all DOE stockpile support planning. Figure 1.1-1 depicts the NWSM process.
Chapter 2 discusses the relevant factors, such as treaties, that shape the NWSM. Also explained is the fact that potential variances in stockpile size, such as a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) I Treaty-sized stockpile versus a START II protocol-sized stockpile, affect only the issue of manufacturing capacity required for the foreseeable future. National security policies in the post-Cold War era require that all the historical capabilities of the weapons laboratories, industrial plants, and NTS be maintained. Capability is the practical ability to perform a basic function or activity. Stockpile stewardship and management capabilities are independent of foreseeable future stockpile sizes. Stockpile management manufacturing capacities are examined in this PEIS, including those required to support a hypothetical low case stockpile size below START II. This was done to examine the sensitivity of potential decisions to transfer manufacturing activities to the weapons laboratories and NTS versus downsizing the industrial plants in place.
DOE must maintain a Complex with sufficient capability and capacity to meet current and future weapons requirements. For those activities associated with the ongoing stockpile stewardship program, DOE proposes to add enhanced capabilities to existing stockpile stewardship facilities to fulfill requirements. For those activities associated with the ongoing stockpile management program, DOE does not propose to construct any major new weapons industrial facilities. Rather, DOE proposes to " rightsize" existing facilities or consolidate them to fulfill expected requirements for manufacture of repair or replacement components for an aging U.S. stockpile.
This Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Stockpile Stewardship and Management addresses potential changes to the future missions of the three weapons laboratories, the four weapons industrial plants, and NTS. A No Action alternative is also described and analyzed. Figure 1.1-2 shows the locations of the eight DOE sites comprising the current Complex.
To estimate the potential environmental impacts from modifying/constructing and operating the facilities proposed for stockpile management, DOE assumes that facilities would be sized and operated to support a base case stockpile size consistent with the START II protocol. This PEIS also discusses impacts that would be expected for supporting a larger stockpile based on START I Treaty levels, and a hypothetical stockpile smaller than the START II protocol.
With regard to stockpile management facilities, potential environmental impacts from the base case are analyzed quantitatively in the greatest detail, while impacts from the high and low cases are discussed qualitatively. The facilities proposed for stockpile stewardship are independent of projected stockpile size.
Figure 1.1-1.--Nuclear Weapons Stockpile
memorandum Process.
Figure 1.1-2.--Current
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Sites (Includes Recent Consolidation of
Three Former Sites).
The alternatives analyzed in this PEIS are described in detail in chapter 3 and summarized in this section. Alternatives are analyzed for both stockpile stewardship and stockpile management.
The stockpile stewardship portion of this PEIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of the proposed actions and the reasonable alternatives for carrying out the stockpile stewardship functions. As described in section 3.3, the three independently justified proposed facilities include: the National Ignition Facility (NIF), the Contained Firing Facility (CFF), and the Atlas Facility. Four sites (figure 1.1-2) are potentially affected by the stockpile stewardship alternatives: Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL), Sandia National Laboratories (SNL), and NTS (includes NLVF). This PEIS also assesses the No Action alternative of relying on existing experimental facilities and continuing the missions at these four sites to fulfill the stockpile stewardship mission.
The science-based stockpile stewardship program is expected to continuously evolve as better information becomes available and technological advancements occur. Additional experimental facilities, such as the Advanced Hydrotest Facility, the High Explosives Pulsed Power Facility, the Advanced Radiation Source, and the Jupiter Facility, are considered to be next generation facilities (see section 3.3.4) that may be required in the future to support stockpile stewardship objectives. However, these facilities are not proposed actions in this PEIS because they have not reached the stage of development and definition that is necessary for evaluation and decisionmaking.
The stockpile management portion of this PEIS evaluates the potential environmental impacts of the reasonable alternatives for carrying out the stockpile management functions. As described in section 3.4, alternatives are assessed for nuclear weapons assembly/disassembly (A/D) and for fabricating pit, secondary and case, high explosives (HE), and nonnuclear components. Eight sites (figure 1.1-2) are potentially affected: Oak Ridge Reservation (ORR), Savannah River Site (SRS), Kansas City Plant (KCP), Pantex Plant (Pantex), LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS. This PEIS also assesses the No Action alternative of relying on existing facilities and continuing the missions at the current sites to fulfill the stockpile management mission.
To aid the reader's understanding of this PEIS, background information on the evolution of this PEIS and an unclassified description of a nuclear weapon follow.
Stockpile stewardship and management responsibilities have been ongoing for decades and the Program now reflects the cumulative effects of relatively recent U.S. national security policy changes. This PEIS experienced three general stages of evolution.
The first stage of evolution began in January 1991, when the Secretary of Energy announced that DOE would prepare a PEIS examining alternatives for reconfiguring the Complex. The framework for the Reconfiguration PEIS was described in the January 1991 Nuclear Weapons Complex Reconfiguration Study (DOE/DP-0083), a detailed examination of alternatives for the future Complex. This Reconfiguration Study contemplated large, stand-alone replacement facilities for the plutonium fabrication capability of the Rocky Flats Plant, as well as possible replacement and relocation of other Complex missions.
During the 1992 through 1994 timeframe, the second stage of the evolution reflected changes in DOE's thinking due to the reduction in weapons resulting from the end of the Cold War, unilateral stockpile reductions, and the START II protocol. Because of the planned significant stockpile reductions, the scope of the Reconfiguration Study changed to reflect a smaller and more integrated Complex than previously envisioned. Additionally, DOE placed increased importance on the stewardship of special nuclear materials that were determined to be in excess of the Nation's weapons needs.
DOE concluded in October 1994 that the framework described in the Reconfiguration Study no longer fit current circumstances or supported any realistic proposal for reconfiguring the Complex. Contributing factors to that conclusion included public comments from Reconfiguration Study scoping meetings, the fact that production of new-design nuclear weapons was not required for the foreseeable future, and DOE's decision to prepare a separate Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0229-D, draft published in February 1996).
As a result of these changed circumstances, the third stage evolved, whereby DOE separated the previously planned Reconfiguration PEIS into two new PEISs: the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Tritium Supply and Recycling and this Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. As explained in section 1.6, the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS has been completed and this Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS has been revised to better reflect current and expected Program requirements.
A general understanding of nuclear weapons, including the components that make up a weapon and the physical processes involved, helps one understand the scope of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and what is to be accomplished by the Program. Figure 1.3.2-1 presents a simplified diagram of a modern nuclear weapon. An actual nuclear weapon produced in the United States is much more complicated, consisting of many thousands of parts.
The nuclear weapon primary is composed of a central core called a pit, which is usually made of plutonium-239 and/or highly enriched uranium (HEU). This is surrounded by a layer of HE, which when detonated, compresses the pit, initiating a nuclear reaction. This reaction is generally thought of as the nuclear fission "trigger," which activates the secondary assembly component to produce a thermonuclear fusion reaction. The remaining nonnuclear components consist of everything from arming and firing systems to batteries and parachutes. The production and assembly of many of these components is accomplished at dedicated industrial facilities. The A/D of nuclear weapons is done only at Pantex.
Figure 1.3.2-1.--Nuclear Weaponse Design.
This PEIS consists of four volumes. Volume I contains the main text; Volume II contains technical appendixes that support the analyses in Volume I and additional project information; and Volume III contains the project-specific environmental analyses for the proposed NIF, CFF, and Atlas Facility. Volume IV contains the comments received on the Draft PEIS during the public review period and the DOE responses. The Summary is a separate publication.
Volume I contains 10 chapters, which include the following information:
Chapter 1--Introduction. Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program background and the environmental analysis process.
Chapter 2--Purpose and Need. Reasons why DOE needs to take action and the objectives DOE proposes to achieve.
Chapter 3--Proposed Action and Alternatives. How DOE proposes to meet the specified need and achieve the objectives. This chapter also includes a summary comparison of the potential environmental impacts of the PEIS alternatives.
Chapter 4--Affected Environment and Environmental Impacts. Aspects of the environment (i.e., natural, built, and social) that might be affected by the PEIS alternatives and analyses of the potential impacts on the environment. Impacts are compared to the projected environmental conditions that would be expected to support the base case if no action were taken (the No Action alternative).
Chapter 5--Regulatory Requirements. Environmental, safety, and health regulations that would apply to the PEIS alternatives and agencies consulted for their expertise.
Chapters 6 through 10. A list of references; a list of preparers; a list of agencies, organizations, and persons to whom copies of this PEIS were sent; a glossary; and an index.
Volume II contains eight appendixes of technical information supporting the environmental analyses presented in Volume I. These appendixes contain the following information: Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program facilities; air quality; threatened, endangered, and special status species; socioeconomics; human health; facility accidents; intersite transportation; and environmental management.
Volume III contains three appendixes that comprise the project-specific environmental analyses for the NIF, CFF, and Atlas Facility proposed actions.
Volume IV (Comment Response Document) contains a description of the public hearing process, information on the document's organization and instructions for its use, a brief summary of changes to the Draft PEIS, and all comments received and DOE responses.
This PEIS has been prepared in accordance with Section 102(2)(c) of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.), and implemented by regulations promulgated by the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) (40 CFR 1500-1508) and DOE regulations (10 CFR 1021). Under NEPA, Federal agencies, such as DOE, that propose major actions that could significantly affect the quality of the human environment are required to prepare an environmental impact statement (EIS) to ensure that environmental information is available to public officials and citizens before decisions are made and before actions are taken. For broad actions, such as the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, a PEIS is prepared.
DOE's NEPA compliance strategy for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program consists of two phases. The first phase includes the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and subsequent Record(s) of Decision (ROD). Decisions will be based on relevant factors including economic and technical considerations, DOE statutory mission requirements, policy considerations, and environmental impacts. In addition to the analyses in this PEIS, engineering studies, cost, schedule, and technical feasibility analyses will be considered in the ROD. The ROD is expected to identify the effects of U.S. national security policy changes on Program missions and determine the configuration (facility locations) necessary to accomplish the Program missions.
During the second phase of the NEPA strategy, which would follow this PEIS ROD, DOE would prepare any necessary project-specific NEPA documents to implement any programmatic decision. However, as explained below, this PEIS also includes project-specific environmental analyses for the experimental facilities proposed for stockpile stewardship.
For the three facilities in the proposed action for stockpile stewardship--NIF, CFF, and the Atlas Facility--the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS is intended to include sufficient project-specific analyses to complete NEPA requirements for siting, construction, and operation, and thus, satisfy both phases of the NEPA compliance strategy. This PEIS supports the programmatic decisions on whether to proceed with the facility and, if so, where to site the facility. The project-specific analysis describes the detailed construction and operational impacts for each facility at the alternate sites. Each proposed facility's project-specific analysis can be found in Volume III of this PEIS.
Two other actions that DOE has already evaluated in separate EISs, in accordance with CEQ regulations for interim actions (40 CFR 1506.1), are within the scope of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. These are the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS and the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) Facility Environmental Impact Statement. These two actions, and their relationship to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, are described below.
The Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS evaluated the potential environmental impacts associated with alternatives for siting, constructing, and operating tritium supply and recycling facilities. The purpose of the Tritium Supply and Recycling Program is to provide long-term, assured tritium supply and recycling to support the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. The Tritium Supply and Recycling Draft PEIS (DOE/EIS-0161) was issued in March 1995 and was followed by public hearings in April 1995. A Final PEIS was issued in October 1995, followed by the ROD, published in the Federal Register (60 FR 63878), on December 12, 1995.
In the ROD, DOE announced that it will embark on a dual track strategy for acquiring a new tritium production capability that involves the use of existing commercial light water reactors via the purchase of a reactor or purchase of irradiation services (with the option to purchase the reactor), and the development of a linear accelerator. DOE will seek to fully prove the feasibility of both approaches over the next 3 years, then implement the most promising approach, while completing the design and necessary procedures (e.g., regulatory approval) for the other path to allow it to serve as a backup to the preferred path. If an accelerator is built, it will be located at SRS.
Tritium, a radioactive gas that decays at a rate of more than 5 percent per year, is a necessary component of every nuclear weapon in the existing stockpile and must be replenished periodically in order for the weapons to operate as designed. No new tritium has been produced since 1988, when the last of the DOE's tritium production reactors at SRS was shut down. Currently, tritium recycled from weapons retired from the stockpile is used to meet stockpile requirements. However, based on a START II protocol stockpile size, even with tritium recycling, new tritium will be needed by 2011. Because it could take up to 15 years for a tritium source, once selected, to begin producing tritium, it was necessary for DOE to make a decision on tritium supply in advance of this Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. The decision resulting from the Tritium Supply and Recycling PEIS is accounted for in the No Action alternative of this PEIS.
The DARHT Facility EIS analyzed the environmental consequences of alternative ways to accomplish enhanced high-resolution radiography for the purposes of performing hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments. These tests are used to obtain diagnostic information on the behavior of nuclear weapons primaries and to evaluate the effects of aging on nuclear weapons. The DARHT Facility's construction was about 34 percent complete when construction was halted under a U.S. District Court preliminary injunction issued on January 27, 1995, pending completion of the DARHT Facility EIS and issuance of the ROD. The DARHT Facility EIS evaluated the potential environmental impacts of six alternatives; the preferred approach entailed completing and operating the proposed DARHT Facility at LANL and implementing a phased enhanced containment strategy for testing at the DARHT Facility, so that most tests would be conducted inside steel vessels. The DARHT Facility Draft EIS (DOE/EIS-0228) was issued in May 1995 and was followed by public hearings in May and June 1995. A Final PEIS was issued in August 1995, followed by the ROD, published in the Federal Register (60 FR 53588) on October 16, 1995.
In the ROD, DOE announced that it will complete and operate the DARHT Facility at LANL while implementing a program to conduct most tests inside steel vessels, with containment to be phased in over 10 years. Following the ROD, DOE filed a motion for dissolution of the injunction. On April 16, 1996, the U.S. District Court concluded that the purpose of the injunction has been satisfied, and therefore lifted the injunction and dismissed the case.
DOE will rely on hydrodynamic testing in the absence of underground nuclear testing to ensure the stockpile's safety and reliability. Under any course of action analyzed in this Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, DOE will still need to continue hydrodynamic testing and acquire near-term enhanced radiographic capability such as that provided by the DARHT Facility. DOE determined that implementing the DARHT Facility ROD will not prejudice any decisions in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. The impacts of the DARHT Facility for each resource area are addressed in the No Action impact discussions for LANL in section 4.6.3.
In addition to the two interim actions identified above, DOE is currently preparing other programmatic, project-specific, and site-wide NEPA documents. These documents, and their relationship to the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, are discussed below.
Alternatives for managing radioactive, hazardous, and mixed (radioactive and hazardous) wastes are analyzed in the Waste Management Programmatic Draft Environmental Impact Statement for Managing Treatment, Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (DOE/EIS-0200-D), issued in August 1995. When completed, the Waste Management PEIS will support DOE decisions on the management of, and facilities for, the treatment, storage, and/or disposal of radioactive, hazardous, and mixed wastes.
Wastes would be generated by the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. Although there may be changes from site to site, for the Complex as a whole, the wastes will be similar in form and quantity to wastes currently generated by DOE facilities and analyzed in the Waste Management PEIS. Wastes generated by the Program would be managed in accordance with decisions made as a result of the Waste Management PEIS. Nonetheless, for the purposes of thoroughly analyzing the impacts of the proposed action, the treatment, storage, and/or disposal of these wastes in existing facilities is analyzed in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS.
Both the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and the Waste Management PEIS consider national strategies. The Waste Management PEIS considers alternatives that include local, regional, and/or consolidated waste management facilities. This Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS addresses alternatives that could result in the relocation of current missions and/or closure of existing sites. These two strategies are mutually consistent; however, the RODs will require coordination.
The Storage and Disposition PEIS will analyze alternatives for the long-term storage of all weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily HEU and plutonium, and the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials, primarily plutonium the President has declared to be surplus to national defense needs. The Implementation Plan for the Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement was issued in March 1995, and the Draft PEIS was issued in February 1996.
Both this Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and the Storage and Disposition PEIS analyze reasonable alternatives for the long-term storage of strategic reserves of plutonium and HEU. Because the overall scope of each PEIS is significantly different, different long-term strategic reserve storage alternatives are reasonable for each PEIS. For example, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS evaluates alternatives for strategic reserve storage (in the form of pits and secondaries) at the weapons A/D Facility, which is where these strategic reserves might be first used. The Storage and Disposition PEIS has a relatively broader scope regarding fissile material storage, which will include the storage of all surplus material, naval reactor fuel, and naval reactor fuel feed stock, as well as nonweapons research and development materials. It analyzes alternatives, among others, that would collocate strategic reserves with surplus fissile materials.
Preparation of these two PEISs is being closely coordinated to ensure that all reasonable alternatives for long-term strategic reserve storage are assessed. Decisions on strategic storage will not be made in the upcoming ROD for the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program. Storage decisions are not expected to be made until both the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Final PEIS and the Storage and Disposition Final PEIS are completed.
The Draft Environmental Impact Statement for the Continued Operation of the Pantex Plant and Associated Storage of Nuclear Weapon Components (Pantex Site-Wide EIS) (DOE/EIS-0225D), which was issued in March 1996, analyzes the alternatives and environmental impacts associated with conducting nuclear weapons operations at Pantex for approximately the next 5 to 10 years. Included in the Pantex Site-Wide Draft EIS is an analysis of a plan to increase the interim storage of plutonium pits from 12,000 to 20,000 pits. The EIS also analyzes alternative locations to Pantex for interim pit storage operations.
In May 1994, when DOE announced its intention to prepare the Pantex Site-Wide EIS, DOE believed that the Pantex Site-Wide EIS ROD would precede decisionmaking on the long-term storage of pits by at least several years. Accordingly, the Pantex Site-Wide Draft EIS was scoped to address alternative locations for interim pit storage (i.e., until the long-term decisions were made and implemented).
Since May 1994, DOE has initiated two additional NEPA documents that address the storage of pits. This Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS will support decisions on the long-term storage of pits that will be needed for national security requirements (strategic reserve pits). As discussed above, the Storage and Disposition PEIS will support decisions on the long-term storage of all pits (strategic reserve and surplus) and the approach for dispositioning pits that are surplus to national security requirements.
Both of these PEISs have progressed to the point where they are scheduled to have their RODs issued by the fall of 1996, at or about the same time as the ROD for the Pantex Site-Wide EIS, which is scheduled for November 1996. Therefore, DOE is proposing that as long as the RODs of both PEISs and the Pantex Site-Wide EIS occur within a short period of time of one another, decisions on the long-term storage of pits would be made in the RODs of the PEISs. A decision relating to the interim storage of pits at Pantex would be made in the ROD of the Pantex Site-Wide EIS pending implementation of the selected long-term storage option.
However, if there is a significant delay in the RODs for either of the PEISs, or if DOE does not make a decision on the long-term storage of pits in those RODs, then there would be a need to make a decision on the location of interim storage of pits uninformed by a decision on long-term storage. In any event, the Pantex Site-Wide EIS will be completed with the analysis of interim storage alternatives, including addressing the issues and comments received from the public on that EIS, to support a decision relating to the storage of pits until a long-term storage decision has been made and implemented.
This PEIS includes Pantex as an alternative site for the following stockpile management missions: HE fabrication, weapons A/D, and strategic reserve storage. Programmatic decisions on these alternatives will be identified in the ROD for this PEIS; however, a decision on storage may occur later than decisions on the other two missions.
The LANL Site-Wide Draft EIS is currently being prepared and analyzes alternatives for LANL's operation over the next 5 to 10 years. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS includes LANL as an alternative site for two stockpile stewardship facilities (NIF and Atlas) and the following stockpile management missions: pit fabrication, secondary and case fabrication, HE fabrication, and nonnuclear fabrication. Programmatic decisions on these alternatives will be identified in the ROD for this PEIS.
The NTS Site-Wide EIS (DOE/EIS 0243), analyzes alternatives for NTS's operation over the next 5 to 10 years. The Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS includes NTS as an alternative site for both a stockpile stewardship facility (NIF) and two stockpile management missions: weapons A/D and strategic reserve storage. Programmatic decisions on these alternatives will be identified in the ROD for this PEIS; however, a decision on storage may occur later than a decision on weapons A/D.
Public participation for the PEIS consisted of two primary activities: the scoping process and the public comment process. CEQ regulations require "an early and open process for determining the scope of issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues to be addressed and for identifying the significant issues related to a Proposed Action (40 CFR 1501.7)." This is usually called the public scoping process. Section 4.1 of the Implementation Plan Stockpile Stewardship and Management Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (DOE-EIS-0236IP, December 1995) describes the scoping process. The following sections describe the public comment process on the Draft PEIS.
In February 1996, DOE published the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Draft PEIS that evaluated the siting, construction, and operation of the proposed stockpile stewardship facilities and the modification/construction and operation of facilities proposed for stockpile management at eight alternative sites within the Complex. The 60-day public comment period for the Draft PEIS began on March 8, 1996, and ended on May 7, 1996. However, late comments were considered to the extent practical.
During the comment period, public hearings were held in Los Alamos, NM; Albuquerque, NM; Las Vegas, NV; Oak Ridge, TN; Kansas City, MO; Livermore, CA; Washington, DC; Amarillo, TX; Santa Fe, NM; and North Augusta, SC. Five of the public hearings were joint meetings to obtain comments on both the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS and the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Two of the joint meetings (Pantex and SRS) also included the Pantex Site-Wide EIS. In addition, the public was encouraged to provide comments via mail, fax, electronic bulletin board (Internet), and telephone (toll-free 800 number). Figure 1.8.1-1 shows the dates and locations of the hearings.
The public hearings held for the Draft PEIS were conducted using an interactive workshop-type format. The format chosen allowed for a two-way interaction between DOE and the public and encouraged informed public input and comments on the document. Neutral facilitators were present at the hearings to direct and clarify discussions and comments. Court reporters were also present to provide a verbatim transcript of the proceedings and record any formal comments.
All public hearing comment summaries were combined with comments received by mail, fax, Internet, or telephone during the public comment period. Volume IV of this PEIS, the Comment Response Document, describes the public comment process in detail, presents comment summaries and responses, and provides copies of all comments received.
Figure 1.8.1-1.--Public Hearing Locations and Dates, 1996.
A large number of the comments received on the Draft PEIS related to concerns that the analysis of particular alternatives and/or alternative sites did not adequately consider such factors as cost and technical feasibility. Although these concerns made up the majority of the comments, many other comments related to the resources analyzed, NEPA and regulatory issues, and DOE and Federal policies as they related to this PEIS. The major issues identified by commentors include the following:
All of the issues identified above are summarized and responded to in detail in chapter 3 of Volume IV. Substantial revisions to this PEIS resulting from public comments are discussed below.
Revisions in the Final PEIS include additional discussion and analysis in the following areas: alternatives considered but eliminated (section 3.1.2); the No Action alternative (appendix A, Stockpile Stewardship and Management Facilities, sections A.1.5, A.1.6, A.1.7, and A.1.8); socioeconomics at ORR, Pantex, and KCP; accident impacts at Pantex; normal operation impacts for radiological and chemical sections; cumulative impacts (section 4.13); and minor changes to LANL water resources section (section 4.6.2.4). A new section was also added to appendix F (section F.4, Secondary Impacts of Accidents). Each of these areas is discussed in more detail in the following section.
In response to comments submitted after issuance of the Draft PEIS and due to additional technical details not available at the time of issuance of the Draft, Volumes I, II, and III of the Final PEIS contain revisions and changes. The revisions and changes made since the issuance of the Draft PEIS are indicated by a double underline for minor word changes or by a sidebar in the margin for paragraph or larger changes. In addition, Volume I and each appendix in Volume III provide a unique reference list to enable the reader to further review and research selected topics. Volume IV (Comment Response Document ) of the PEIS contains the comments received during public review of the Draft PEIS and the DOE responses to those comments. DOE has public reading rooms near each affected site and in Washington, DC, where these referenced documents may be reviewed or obtained for review. A brief discussion of the more significant changes is provided in the following paragraphs.
No Action Alternative. Several commentors did not think that the No Action alternative was clearly explained in the Draft PEIS. More specifically, they were not sure which existing facilities at LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS were part of the ongoing stockpile stewardship program. As a result, the description of No Action was modified in appendix A to include a listing of major DOE Office of Defense Programs function facilities at LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS. Additionally, the discussion of impacts of No Action at LANL (section 4.6.3) was revised as appropriate to include the effects of the DARHT Facility.
Socioeconomics at Oak Ridge Reservation, Kansas City Plant, and Pantex Plant. Based on public comments and revised workforce size estimates, the socioeconomic impact sections for the downsizing alternatives at ORR (section 4.2.3.8), KCP (section 4.4.3.8), and Pantex (section 4.5.3.8) have been revised. The analyses were also expanded to cover the base case single-shift option in greater detail. At these three sites, downsizing of existing facilities is the preferred alternative. For such downsizing, the base case single-shift scenario represents the bounding analysis for the workforce. The change in worker estimates did not cause any of the major indicators in the socioeconomic analysis to change in any significant manner.
Accident Impacts at Pantex Plant. The analyses of impacts due to an aircraft impact and resulting release of plutonium by a fire or an explosion were modified to include more updated data on probability and source terms developed for the Pantex Site-Wide EIS. Section 4.5.3.9 and appendix sections F.2.1.1 and F.2.1.2 were revised to incorporate the new analytical results. Based on the updated data, the potential impacts and risks to the public from the composite accident presented in this PEIS would be less than previously reported in the Draft PEIS. This change was not significant.
Normal Operation Radiological/Chemical Impacts. The discussion of the normal operation radiological affected environment for LANL, section 4.6.2.9, has been updated to include the latest data from Environmental Surveillance at Los Alamos During 1993 (LA-12973-ENV, October 1995). The normal operation radiological impact sections 4.2.3.9, 4.3.3.9, and 4.6.3.9 have also been revised to include the contribution of recent facilities at ORR, SRS, and the new environmental surveillance data for LANL. The chemical health effects, section 4.6.3.9 for LANL and section 4.7.3.9 for LLNL, were revised based on new analyses using updated dispersion rates. Tables in appendix section E.3.4 supporting these sections were also updated. The majority of these changes affected the No Action alternative analyses. None of the changes to these sections significantly changed the analysis of impacts for the "action" alternatives.
Cumulative impacts. The cumulative impact section, 4.13, has been modified to incorporate a discussion of normal operation radiological impacts and other changes based on more recent data from NEPA documents and RODs. The changes to this section did not have a meaningful effect on the analysis/comparative evaluation of alternatives.
Los Alamos National Laboratory Water Resources. Changes were incorporated in section 4.6.2.4 (Water Resources) for LANL based on more recent water use and water quality data. The Draft PEIS had erroneously stated that the LANL water allotment would be fully used by about 2000. The Final PEIS correctly reports that this allotment would be fully used by about 2052. This change did not have a meaningful effect on the analysis/comparative evaluation of alternatives. Minor revisions reflecting the baseline changes were also made to the LANL water resources impact section, 4.6.3.4.
Health Effects Studies. Appendix section E.4, which outlines epidemiological studies at the alternative sites, was rewritten to provide more detail and incorporate more recent and other applicable studies. Although these epidemiology sections do not affect the environmental analysis of future stockpile stewardship and management missions, they do provide relevant information regarding potential health effects from past actions. These changes did not have a meaningful effect on the analysis/comparative evaluation of alternatives.
New Section. A new section has also been added to the Final PEIS (appendix section F.4, Secondary Impacts of Accidents). This section evaluates the secondary impacts of accidents that affect elements of the environment other than humans (e.g., farmland). The section was added because of public comments. The results of this analysis show that secondary impacts from accidents would generally not extend beyond site boundaries, except at Pantex and LLNL, where it is possible that some surface contamination could occur. This new analysis did not have a meaningful effect on the analysis/comparative evaluation of alternatives.
