This PEIS evaluates the direct, indirect, and cumulative impacts associated with the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program alternatives which are summarized in figure S.3.1-1. For the various alternatives, this includes evaluating the applicable impacts of new facility construction or existing facility modification. Also assessed are the operational impacts of long-term stewardship and management activities in support of the base case nuclear weapons stockpile, including transportation of materials and components between sites. This PEIS also provides a sensitivity analysis of differences, when applicable, from the base case alternatives for the high and low case stockpile. However, since it is expected that the annual workload may vary above and below the base case capacity assumptions, the base case is analyzed in the greatest detail.
Planning Assumptions and Basis for Analysis
In the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and in this PEIS, DOE will:
DOE is currently preparing site-wide EISs covering continued operations for some of the alternative sites evaluated in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. Some of the existing activities covered by these site-specific, site-wide EISs are similar to those of the No Action alternative of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS. Although the near-term analytical periods for these site-wide EIS analyses are different from that of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS, which is focused on long-term activities, the preparation of these documents has been closely reviewed and coordinated. As work on these site-wide EISs proceeds, their analyses will continue to be reviewed to ensure consistency. To the extent that the site-wide EIS analyses provide better information, such information has been incorporated. In the preparation of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Final PEIS, any updated information relating to the sites' affected environment was reviewed and appropriate changes were made if new information could potentially change results of the impact analyses.
DOE has developed several planning assumptions as the basis of analyses presented in this PEIS. These considerations are summarized below.
No Action Alternative Assumptions
Stockpile Management Assumptions
Stockpile Stewardship Assumptions
Eight locations (ORR, SRS, KCP, Pantex, LANL, LLNL, SNL, and NTS) are being considered as alternative sites for stockpile stewardship and management missions. All of these sites are currently performing DP activities.
Site Selection
One important strategy of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program is to maximize the use of existing infrastructure and facilities as the Complex transitions to be smaller and more efficient in the 21st century. Consequently, only those sites with existing infrastructure or facilities capable of supporting a given stockpile stewardship or stockpile management mission are considered reasonable site alternatives for detailed study in this PEIS. Sites without a technical infrastructure or facilities for a given mission would require significant new construction that would be costly and impractical compared to sites with existing infrastructure and facilities.
For stockpile stewardship, the three existing weapons laboratories (LANL, LLNL, and SNL) and NTS are being considered for new or upgraded stockpile stewardship facilities. This is because the weapons testing mission and stockpile stewardship have always been primary responsibilities of the weapons laboratories and NTS, and existing facilities and capabilities can be built upon to meet the stewardship mission.
Oak Ridge Reservation
ORR, located in Oak Ridge, TN, contains the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Y-12, and the K-25 Site. DP assignments at ORR are performed at Y-12 and include maintaining the capability to produce secondaries and cases for nuclear weapons, storing and processing uranium and lithium materials and parts, dismantling nuclear weapon secondaries returned from the stockpile, and providing special production support to the DOE weapons laboratories and to other DOE programs.
Savannah River Site
SRS, located near Aiken, SC, contains fuel and target fabrication facilities, nuclear material production reactors, chemical separation plants used for recovery of plutonium and uranium isotopes, a uranium fuel processing area, and the Savannah River Technology Center. SRS is now conducting tritium-recycling operations in support of stockpile requirements using dismantled weapons as the tritium supply source.
Kansas City Plant
KCP, situated on the Bannister Federal Complex in Kansas City, MO, produces and procures nonnuclear electrical, electronic, electromechanical, mechanical, plastic, and nonfissionable metal components for the nuclear weapons program. KCP is currently the principal nonnuclear fabrication facility within the Complex.
Pantex Plant
Pantex, located northeast of Amarillo, TX, fabricates chemical HE for nuclear weapons, assembles and performs maintenance and surveillance of nuclear weapons in the stockpile, disassembles nuclear weapons being retired from the stockpile, and provides interim storage of plutonium components from dismantled weapons.
Los Alamos National Laboratory
LANL, located at Los Alamos, NM, is a multidisciplinary research facility engaged in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies. Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and related emergency response, arms control, and nonproliferation and environmental activities. It conducts R&D activities including the basic sciences, mathematics and computing with applications to these mission areas and to a broad range of programs including: nonnuclear defense; nuclear and nonnuclear energy; atmospheric, space, and geosciences; bioscience and biotechnology; and the environment.
In regard to nuclear weapons, LANL is responsible for the design of the nuclear explosive package in certain U.S. weapons. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, LANL now conducts the pit surveillance program and some manufacturing of nonnuclear components due to termination of the nuclear weapons missions at the Mound, Pinellas, and Rocky Flats Plants.
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
LLNL, located at Livermore, CA, is a multidisciplinary research facility engaged in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies. Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons stewardship program and related emergency response, arms control, and nonproliferation activities. It conducts R&D activities in the basic sciences, mathematics, and computing with applications to these mission areas and to a broad range of programs including: nonnuclear defense; nuclear and nonnuclear energy; atmospheric, space, and geosciences; bioscience and biotechnology; and the environment. In regard to nuclear weapons, LLNL is responsible for the design of the nuclear explosive package in certain U.S. weapons.
Sandia National Laboratories
SNL maintains facilities in three locations in the United States: Albuquerque, NM; Livermore, CA; and Tonopah, NV. The facilities discussed in this document refer only to the Albuquerque location which is located adjacent to the city of Albuquerque, NM. SNL is a multidisciplinary research and engineering facility engaged in a variety of programs for DOE and other Government agencies. Its primary mission is the nuclear weapons Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program and related emergency response, arms control, and nonproliferation activities. In addition, it conducts R&D activities in advanced manufacturing, electronics, information, pulsed power, energy, environment, transportation, and biomedical technologies.
In regard to nuclear weapons, SNL is responsible for the design of nonnuclear components and related system engineering. In addition, since the end of the Cold War, SNL now performs some nonnuclear manufacturing functions due to termination of the nuclear weapons mission at the Mound and Pinellas Plants.
Nevada Test Site
NTS occupies approximately 351,000 hectares (ha) (867,000 acres) in the southeastern part of Nye County in southern Nevada. NTS, located about 104 km (65 mi) northwest of Las Vegas, is a remote, secure facility that maintains the capability for conducting underground testing of nuclear weapons and evaluating the effects of nuclear weapons on military communications systems, electronics, satellites, sensors, and other materials.
North Las Vegas Facility . The North Las Vegas Facility (NLVF), located in the city of North Las Vegas, NV, supports DOE Nevada Operations Office and LANL, LLNL, and SNL weapons test programs, and is considered an adjunct to NTS.
Historically, nuclear testing has provided unambiguous high confidence in the safety and reliability of weapons in the stockpile. Without additional underground nuclear testing, DOE must rely on experimental and computational capabilities, especially in weapons physics, to predict the consequences of the complex problems that are likely to occur in an aging stockpile. Without these enhanced capabilities, DOE will lack the ability to evaluate some safety and reliability issues, which could significantly affect the stockpile. It is also possible that, without these enhanced capabilities, DOE could not certify the acceptability of weapons components repaired or modified to address future safety or reliability issues. The nuclear weapons phenomena involved in enhanced experimental capability can be broadly grouped into three categories: physics of nuclear weapons primaries, physics of nuclear weapons secondaries, and weapons effects. Each of these categories are described below, as well as alternatives that are assessed in this PEIS. Table S.3.2-1 depicts the proposed alternatives and facilities under consideration for stockpile stewardship.
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Physics of Nuclear Weapons Primaries |
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No Action | X | X |
| X |
Contained Firing Facility 4 |
| X |
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Physics of Nuclear Weapons Secondaries 5 |
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No Action | X | X |
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National Ignition Facility4 | X | X | X | X |
Atlas Facility 4 | X |
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Weapons Effects |
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| No Action6 |
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| X |
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Physics of Nuclear Weapons Primaries
With respect to the physics phenomena from the implosion of the primary, the experimental facilities provide physics validation, material behavior information, improved understanding of the implosion and the ability to assess age related defects. Proposed new facilities and site alternatives under consideration, along with the existing facilities which are part of the No Action alternative, are discussed below.
No Action. The principal diagnostic tools DOE currently uses to study nuclear weapons primaries are hydrodynamic tests and dynamic experiments. Under the No Action alternative, DOE would continue to use the hydrodynamic testing facilities currently available at LANL, LLNL, and NTS, and a new facility planned for LANL. The FXR Facility at LLNL Site 300 uses linear induction accelerator technology for high-speed radiography. The Pulsed High-Energy Radiation Machine Emitting X-Rays Facility has been in continuous operation at LANL since 1963, and uses a radio-frequency accelerator designed for high-speed radiography.
The DARHT Facility at LANL will consist of a new accelerator building with two accelerator halls to provide two perpendicular lines-of-sight which will enable two radiographic images to be captured simultaneously or sequentially and will provide a capability to perform three dimensional diagnostics of a simulated nuclear weapon primary. For the purposes of this PEIS, DOE includes the DARHT Facility in No Action as an existing facility at LANL because DOE has reached an independent decision to construct and operate the facility.
Besides LANL and LLNL, NTS has some hydrodynamic testing facilities in place (e.g., Big Explosive Experimental Facility [BEEF]). BEEF is used to study hydrodynamic motion associated with HE detonations.
Proposed Contained Firing Facility. Both LANL and LLNL are considered necessary for the continued development of a science-based stockpile stewardship program. In this regard, both laboratories will continue to utilize and improve radiographic hydrodynamic testing capability. The proposed CFF would augment and be collocated with the existing FXR Facility at LLNL Site 300. The containment enclosure would provide for containment of hydrodynamic tests and reduce the environmental, safety, and health impacts of current outdoor testing. The enclosure will also improve the quality of diagnostics data derived from testing by better controlling experimental conditions.
Physics of Nuclear Weapons Secondaries
The energy released by the fission of the nuclear weapons primary activates the secondary assembly, creating a thermonuclear (fusion) explosion. With respect to the phenomena of the physics from the thermonuclear explosion of the secondary, the experimental facilities provide improved understanding of thermonuclear ignition, secondary physics validation, and material behavior information. The proposed physics facilities and site alternatives under consideration are discussed below. Some of the facilities may also be useful for investigating physics phenomena related to nuclear weapons primaries and weapon effects. The capabilities that would be provided by the proposed NIF and the Atlas Facility are independent components needed to improve the understanding of the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries. Each proposed facility responds to a different diagnostic need related to nuclear weapons secondaries and they are not competing alternatives.
No Action. Few methods are currently available to study the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries. The principal facilities currently available are the Nova Facility at LLNL and the Pegasus II Facility at LANL. Without improvements to these capabilities, as proposed by the NIF and the Atlas Facility, DOE would lack the ability to evaluate some significant nuclear performance issues, which could adversely affect confidence in the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
Proposed National Ignition Facility. The proposed NIF would make it possible to study radiation physics in the laboratory close to the conditions which would approach that of a thermonuclear detonation. NIF would achieve higher temperatures and pressures, albeit in a very small volume, than any other existing or proposed stockpile stewardship facility. This facility could be located at either LANL, LLNL, SNL, or NTS.
Proposed Atlas Facility. The proposed Atlas Facility at LANL would be used for experiments that would contribute to the development of predictive capabilities related to the aging and performance of secondaries. This facility would build on existing special equipment at LANL.
Weapons Effects
One of the reasons for past underground nuclear testing has been to determine the effects of nuclear weapon radiation outputs of x rays, gamma rays, and neutrons on nuclear weapon subsystems and components. Existing facilities at SNL, such as the Saturn Facility or the Particle Beam Fusion Accelerator Facility, provide a limited capability to investigate these effects, and would continue to operate under No Action. No alternatives for new facilities designed principally for weapons effects testing are being proposed in this PEIS.
Next Generation Stockpile Stewardship Facilities
The science-based stockpile stewardship program will build upon existing information and capabilities. Thus, the program is expected to continuously evolve as better information becomes available and technological advancements occur. In fact, evolution is expected to be an integral part of the science-based stockpile stewardship program. While the proposed NIF, CFF, and Atlas Facility would provide improvements over existing capabilities, and are expected to be important components of science-based stewardship, they do not represent the entire science-based stewardship program that is envisioned for all time.
The next generation of stockpile stewardship facilities have not been defined to the degree necessary for decisionmaking. These anticipated facilities are AHF, HEPPF, ARS (X-1), and the Jupiter Facility. AHF would be a next generation radiographic hydrodynamic test facility featuring multiple pulse and multiple view diagnostic capability. HEPPF would provide experimental capabilities for studying secondary physics at shock pressures and velocities approaching those of actual weapons conditions. ARS (X-1) and Jupiter Facilities would be advanced pulsed-power x-ray sources that would provide enhanced experimental capabilities in the areas of weapons physics and weapons effects.
To aid the reader in understanding the differences in environmental impacts among the various PEIS stewardship alternatives, this section presents comparisons of the alternatives, concentrating on the major resources assessed in this PEIS.
Proposed National Ignition Facility
The following comparisons have been summarized from the more-detailed comparisons for the NIF alternatives found in Volume III, appendix section I.3.5. The NIF project-specific analysis addresses the impacts of constructing and operating NIF at four alternative sites: LLNL (preferred), LANL, SNL, and NTS (includes NLVF). A No Action alternative is also assessed.
Under No Action, DOE would rely on existing aboveground experimental facilities, predominantly the Nova Facility at LLNL, to study the physics of nuclear weapons secondaries. No construction impacts are associated with the No Action alternative and the operational impacts of the Nova Facility have been accounted for in the overall environmental baseline presented for LLNL.
For the action alternative, the analysis indicates that there would be few significant differences in environmental impacts at the candidate sites. The maximum 24-hour concentration of particulate matter 10 microns or smaller (PM 10 ) in the air during site clearing would exceed applicable standards at LLNL and NLVF. However, the ambient air quality impacts would be localized and of short duration. Uncommitted land requirements would be greatest at NTS ha acres]), although this acreage is less than 1 percent of the uncommitted land at NTS. Conversely, the least amount of uncommitted land that would be required for NIF would be 3.2 ha (7.9 acres) at NLVF. However, this acreage represents the largest percentage of uncommitted land at a candidate site (56 percent). Of greater significance would be the quality of the habitat of the uncommitted land that would be affected by NIF construction. The highest-quality habitats that would be affected would be forest (4.0 ha [9.9 acres]) at LANL or desert ha acres]) at NTS. At the other candidate sites, habitat disturbance would occur to grassland (LLNL and SNL) or to an area of sparse vegetation (NLVF). No significant biotic or cultural impacts are expected at any of the NIF alternative sites.
At each NIF alternative site, beneficial socioeconomic impacts associated with construction and operation would occur. During construction, 270 to 470 direct new jobs would be created in the peak year of activity. These direct jobs would create indirect jobs such that the total jobs during the peak year would be: 2,870 at LLNL; 1,130 at LANL; 1,640 at NTS; and 1,770 at SNL. Once operations begin, NIF would employ 330 direct workers. The total number of jobs (direct plus indirect) during operation would be 890 at LLNL, 600 at LANL, 620 at NTS, and 670 at SNL.
Over the 30-year operational life of NIF, the public would be exposed to a very small dose of radiation. No cancer fatalities would be expected to occur from exposures associated with routine NIF operations under either the Conceptual Design or Enhanced options. A radiological accident at NIF would not cause any cancer fatalities to the public except possibly at NLVF and SNL. Under postulated accident conditions, radiological impacts to the public and workers would be minor. The highest calculated radiation dose is 4,900 person-rem. At most, two cancer fatalities could occur if an accidental release occurred. Because of the extremely low accidental release frequency (2x10 -8 /yr), the risk of radiation-caused cancer fatalities from the postulated accident at any site is essentially zero. The cancer fatality risk associated with radiological exposure from an accident involving the transport of NIF tritium targets would range from 1x10 -8 to 8x10 -10 fatalities per year, whereas the nonradiological fatality risks associated with vehicular emissions and accidents would be in the range of 10-3 to 10-4 fatalities per year.
Although each candidate site would implement waste minimization practices, the generation of additional wastes would be unavoidable. All candidate sites have current or planned capacity to handle wastes associated with construction and operation of NIF; however, this would entail offsite shipment of some of the wastes for all sites except LANL.
NIF would comply with all applicable Federal, state, and local environmental regulatory requirements, including the California Environmental Quality Act if NIF is sited in the state of California. Such compliance functions as a general form of mitigation. The candidate sites have also established several mitigative measures for construction actions that would also be applicable to NIF construction. While each of these mitigative measures may be minor, in combination they could significantly reduce impacts to the environmental resources of the selected site.
With regard to unavoidable impacts, land clearing and construction activities for NIF would eliminate habitat and destroy or displace wildlife. Construction of new facilities could result in short-term disturbances of previously undisturbed biological habitats. These disturbances could cause long-term reductions in the biological productivity of an area. Construction of NIF would replace natural habitat with areas of pavement and buildings. Depending upon the candidate site selected, this conversion could extend the influence of urbanized/industrial habitats into natural areas, increase fragmentation of natural habitat, and cause minor loss of habitat used by rare species. However, no critical habitat for Federal threatened or endangered species would be affected.
Radiological doses to the general public from NIF operation would be no more than percent of the dose from all other candidate site operations and no more than one-millionth of the dose to the population from normal background radiation. NIF would be considered a low-hazard, radiological facility. Such a facility uses radionuclides (for nonreactor purposes) and has other hazards (such as chemicals needed at the facility). Low hazard implies that there are minor onsite and negligible offsite consequences.
Cumulative impacts would result from the addition of the incremental effects of the construction and operation of NIF to the effects of other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions at the selected site. Fugitive dust emissions from construction of NIF would be an incremental addition to the already existing environmental impact of dust emissions to the atmosphere. Minor changes in stormwater runoff are expected due to removal of grass cover during NIF construction and increased runoff from pavement during facility operation.
Proposed Contained Firing Facility
The following comparisons have been summarized from the more-detailed information for CFF found in Volume III, appendix J.
Under No Action, DOE would rely on existing aboveground experimental facilities, predominantly the existing hydrotest facilities at LLNL, LANL, and NTS to study the physics of nuclear weapons primaries. No construction impacts are associated with those existing facilities, and the operational impacts of those facilities have been accounted for in the overall environmental baseline presented for LLNL, LANL, and NTS.
Because the proposal for CFF involves modification to the existing FXR Facility, construction impacts are expected to be small. Very little land would be disturbed and the construction activities would largely involve internal modifications to the existing facility. Wastes and socioeconomic impacts from construction would be negligible.
Impacts associated with operation would also be negligible. CFF would not utilize any significant quantities of resources, would not cause any significant socioeconomic changes at LLNL, and would not generate large quantities of hazardous or low-level wastes. LLNL has adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes that would be generated by CFF. Impacts to human health from CFF operation are expected to be extremely small and within regulatory limits.
Proposed Atlas Facility
The following comparisons have been summarized from the more-detailed information for the Atlas Facility found in Volume III, appendix K.
Under No Action, DOE would rely on existing aboveground experimental facilities, predominantly the Pegasus Facility at TA-35 at LANL, to study the physics of nuclear weapon secondaries. No construction impacts are associated with that facility, and the operational impacts from Pegasus have been accounted for in the overall environmental baseline presented for LANL.
Because the proposal for the Atlas Facility involves modification to the existing facilities within TA-35, construction impacts are expected to be small. Very little land would be disturbed and the construction activities would largely involve internal modifications to the existing facility. Wastes and socioeconomic impacts from modification activities would be negligible.
Impacts associated with operations would also be negligible. The Atlas Facility would not utilize any significant quantities of resources, would not cause any significant socioeconomic changes at LANL, and would not generate large quantities of hazardous or low-level wastes. LANL has adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes that would be generated by the Atlas Facility. Impacts to human health from Atlas Facility operations are expected to be small and within regulatory limits.
One of the primary purposes of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management PEIS is to evaluate ways of maintaining a continued safe and reliable nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing. Thus, the proposal described in this PEIS does not include nuclear testing. However, because it is possible--although not probable--that the United States might one day exercise its "supreme national interests" rights and conduct underground nuclear testing to certify the safety and reliability of its nuclear weapons, this PEIS and the NTS Site-Wide EIS include an analysis of the environmental impacts of underground nuclear testing at NTS.
Stockpile management comprises operations associated with producing, maintaining, refurbishing, surveilling, and dismantling the nuclear weapons stockpile. The individual stockpile management functions can be grouped into five major categories: weapons A/D, nonnuclear components fabrication, pit fabrication, secondary and case fabrication, and HE fabrication. Specific alternatives that would enable DOE to maintain its stockpile management responsibilities are shown in table S.3.4-1 and are discussed below.
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Weapons Assembly/Disassembly8 |
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No Action |
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| X |
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Downsize existing capability |
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| X |
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Relocate capability |
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| X |
Nonnuclear Fabrication |
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No Action |
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| X |
| X |
| X |
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Downsize existing capability |
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| X |
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Relocate capability |
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| X 9 | X 9 | X 9 |
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Pit Fabrication and Intrusive Modification Pit Reuse 10 |
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No Action 11 |
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| X | X |
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Reestablish capability |
| X |
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| X |
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Secondary and Case Fabrication10 |
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No Action | X 12 |
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Downsize existing capability | X12 |
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Relocate capability |
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| X | X |
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High Explosives Fabrication |
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No Action |
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| X |
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Downsize existing capability |
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| X |
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Relocate capability |
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| X | X |
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Weapons Assembly/Disassembly Alternatives
Weapons A/D provides the capability to dismantle retired weapons, assemble nuclear and nonnuclear components into nuclear weapons, and perform weapons surveillance. In addition, the capability to conduct nonintrusive modification pit reuse would be a mission of the weapons A/D Facility. This alternative also includes an option to store strategic reserves of nuclear components (pits and secondaries).
The alternatives for A/D are: 1) to continue in current facilities at Pantex with only those changes that are currently scheduled and budgeted (No Action), 2) to downsize and consolidate facilities and operations at Pantex, or 3) to relocate operations to NTS.
No Action. The No Action alternative for these activities, except nonintrusive modification pit reuse, is presently located at Pantex. Current plutonium R&D facilities at LANL and LLNL have limited capability and capacity to perform nonintrusive modification pit reuse.
Downsize at Pantex Plant. This alternative would downsize and consolidate facilities and operations including strategic reserve storage at Pantex. Downsizing of the A/D operation at Pantex could consist of an in-place decrease in facility footprint and relocation into modern, existing facilities, mostly within Zone 12. No new construction would be required at Pantex; however, relocation and reinstallation of equipment would be required.
Relocate to Nevada Test Site. This alternative is based on the use of the current Device Assembly Facility and balance of plant infrastructure available and required to maintain the capability for underground nuclear testing. Additional new construction would be required and would be designed and sized to meet the specific needs of the reduced program.
Nonnuclear Fabrication
Nonnuclear fabrication consists of the following general functions:
The alternatives considered for nonnuclear fabrication include the No Action alternative of continuing in current facilities, downsizing and consolidating existing facilities at KCP, or closing KCP and sharing nonnuclear fabrication functions among LANL, SNL, and/or LLNL.
No Action. The No Action alternative for these activities is presently located at KCP, SNL, and LANL. KCP manufactures nonnuclear weapon components and conducts surveillance testing on and makes repairs to nonnuclear weapons components. SNL conducts system engineering of nuclear weapons, designs and develops nonnuclear components, conducts field and laboratory nonnuclear testing, manufactures some nonnuclear weapons components, and provides safety and reliability assesuments of the stockpile. LANL also manufactures a few nonnuclear weapons components and conducts surveillance on certain nonnuclear weapons components.
Downsize at Kansas City Plant. The downsized nonnuclear fabrication alternative consists of three major factory segments designed around electronics, mechanical, and engineered materials product lines, procuring some components from outside sources, and reducing the KCP footprint for DP activities about 45 percent. This alternative consists of downsizing and consolidating existing facilities and would require facility modification but no new construction.
Relocate to Los Alamos National Laboratory. The basis for this alternative would be to use the existing infrastructure at LANL to provide for production requirements of the Complex. Nonnuclear fabrication missions considered for transfer to LANL include plastics, which might also be transferred to LLNL; detonator inert components and pilot plant; and reservoirs and valves, which might also be transferred to SNL.
Relocate to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This alternative calls for LLNL to provide support for nuclear system plastic components that might also go to LANL. This alternative would build on LLNL's established plastics fabrication mission with no new facility construction required.
Relocate to Sandia National Laboratories. This alternative would transfer the majority of current KCP missions to the Albuquerque, NM facility of SNL, except for nuclear system plastic components which would go to either LANL or LLNL and high energy detonator inert components, which would go to LANL. In addition, there is the option of moving the reservoir mission to either LANL or SNL. This alternative would require construction of a new stand-alone production site at SNL, directly east of Technical Area I consisting of six new buildings and renovations or minor modifications to some existing buildings.
Pit Fabrication and Intrusive Modification Pit Reuse Alternatives
This capability, hereafter referred to as pit fabrication, includes all activities necessary to fabricate new pits, to modify the internal features of existing pits (intrusive modification), and to recertify or requalify pits. There are two alternative sites for pit fabrication: SRS and LANL. Nonintrusive modification pit reuse, which is an inherent capability of the Pit Fabrication Facility, includes the processes and systems necessary to make modifications to the external features of a pit, if necessary, and to recertify the pit for reuse in a weapon.
No Action. Under the No Action alternative, DOE would continue to use existing R&D capabilities at LANL and LLNL. LANL maintains a limited capability to fabricate plutonium components using its plutonium R&D facility and performs surveillance operations on plutonium components returned from the stockpile. In addition, less extensive capabilities would continue at LLNL to support material and process technology development.
Reestablish at Los Alamos National Laboratory. This alternative would reconfigure the Plutonium Facility at LANL to fulfill the pit fabrication mission and the intrusive modification pit reuse mission. This alternative would locate pit manufacturing in existing facilities within five technical areas. Existing equipment would be retained as much as possible, but some equipment would be upgraded.
Reestablish at Savannah River Site. This alternative would establish a pit fabrication and reuse facility at SRS within existing hardened facilities, but with new equipment and systems. Facilities are available at the SRS separation areas, F- and H-Area, which could house all the process functions required for the manufacture of plutonium pits. Pit fabrication would be located in Building 232-H and plutonium processing would be located in the F-Canyon facilities. New equipment and systems would be required for the Pit Fabrication Facility.
Secondary and Case Fabrication
The secondary and case fabrication mission includes all activities to support fabrication, surveillance, inspection, and testing of secondaries and components. Functional capabilities for these services include operations to physically and chemically process, machine, inspect, assemble, and disassemble secondary and case materials. Materials include depleted uranium, enriched uranium, uranium alloys, isotopically enriched lithium hydride and lithium deuteride, and other materials. Alternative sites considered for stockpile management secondary activities are ORR, LANL, and LLNL.
No Action. Under No Action, ORR would continue secondary and case fabrication. Y-12 maintains the capability to produce and assemble secondaries, cases, and related nonnuclear weapon components.
Downsize at Oak Ridge Reservation. This alternative would be based on downsizing the existing secondary and case fabrication facilities at Y-12 on ORR. The downsized facilities would only require approximately 14 percent of the existing Y-12 floor space and there would be no new facility construction at Y-12 to support the secondary and case fabrication mission. Modifications to the existing buildings would be required for implementation of the alternative secondary and case fabrication mission and to upgrade the buildings to meet natural phenomena requirements.
Relocate to Los Alamos National Laboratory. This alternative would establish a secondary and case fabrication capability using the processes proven at Y-12 and would use facilities in 11 existing buildings. Modifications to the LANL facilities would be required to perform the stockpile management secondary and case fabrication mission.
Relocate to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This alternative would establish a secondary and case fabrication capability using the processes proven at Y-12, and would use facilities in existing buildings. The secondary and case fabrication facilities at LLNL would principally involve minor modifications to six buildings at the Livermore Site.
High Explosives Fabrication
The HE fabrication mission is described in two functional areas: HE main charge fabrication and small HE component fabrication. The HE fabrication mission includes activities needed to provide HE, binders, main charge formulations, initiation HE, and mock HE formulations.
The HE fabrication mission supports the production aspect of stockpile management and also supports HE surveillance and some stockpile stewardship activities.
No Action. Under No Action, Pantex would continue fabrication and surveillance of HE components for nuclear weapons. LANL and LLNL would continue to perform weapons HE R&D, surveillance, and HE safety studies.
Downsize at Pantex Plant. The Pantex HE fabrication alternative would downsize and consolidate current HE operations and facilities. Only minor modifications to existing facilities within Zones 11 and 12 would be required. This alternative would be considered only in conjunction with maintaining the weapons A/D mission at Pantex.
Relocate to Los Alamos National Laboratory. This alternative would transfer HE operations from Pantex to LANL. This alternative would use existing LANL R&D facilities, which have sufficient capacity for stockpile management requirements. There would be no new building construction and no significant modifications required.
Relocate to Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. The LLNL HE fabrication alternative would transition HE fabrication activities from Pantex. The LLNL HE fabrication alternative would require construction of 1 new facility for storage of HE and would use 23 existing buildings, 66 existing magazines, and various utilities and services at Site 300.
Relocate to both Los Alamos National Laboratory and Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. This option would involve splitting the mission between the two laboratories. Since its impact is bounded by the previous two options, this option is not analyzed further.
To aid the reader in understanding the differences in environmental impacts among the various PEIS management alternatives, this section presents comparisons of the alternatives, concentrating on the major resources assessed in this PEIS.
Assembly/Disassembly
In addition to the No Action alternative, two alternatives are being considered that would meet the needs of the Program: (1) downsizing the existing A/D facilities at Pantex and (2) transferring the A/D mission to NTS by expanding the Device Assembly Facility. Under No Action, the A/D mission would remain at Pantex. No downsizing or modification of facilities would occur, and there would be no construction impacts. Downsizing existing facilities at Pantex would involve internal modifications to the existing facility. Transferring the A/D mission to NTS would entail upgrading and expanding the Device Assembly Facility.
Socioeconomic Impacts. Because of the reduced workload associated with completing the weapon dismantlement backlog, significant employment reductions will occur at Pantex for all alternatives. There would be a decrease from the current total of 3,437 workers to about 1,644 workers. Of the current workforce, 3,002 are associated with A/D operations. Under No Action only 915 A/D workers would be required. The downsized Pantex facility would be optimally configured for the reduced future workload, and would operate more efficiently than the No Action Pantex facility. The downsized Pantex facility would require 800 workers for single-shift operation. To perform operations in the downsized Pantex facility in a three-shift mode, 1,266 workers would be required.
If the A/D mission were transferred to NTS, 1,093 direct jobs (based on three-shift operation) would be created at that site, along with 1,160 indirect jobs. The 2,253 total new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease by approximately 0.1 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. If the A/D mission were transferred to NTS, there would be socioeconomic impacts associated with phasing out the A/D mission at Pantex. The phaseout would result in 1,644 direct jobs lost at the Pantex site, and another 1,905 indirect jobs would be lost in the regional economic area. The loss of 3,549 total jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to increase from 4.8 to 6.2 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent.
Socioeconomic impacts at NTS associated with a peak construction workforce of 662 would produce small positive economic benefits. The 662 direct workers would also generate 622 indirect jobs. The 1,284 total new jobs during peak construction would cause no change in the regional economic area unemployment rate. Housing rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent.
Resource Impacts. Due to the reduced workload expected in the future at Pantex, impacts from operations are expected to be less than current impacts. Air quality would remain within regulatory limits, and water requirements would be met without increased aquifer drawdowns. In addition, downsizing existing facilities at Pantex would involve internal modifications to the existing facility. No land would be disturbed.
Transferring the A/D mission to NTS would entail upgrading and expanding the Device Assembly Facility, with associated increases in land disturbance. An estimated 7.5 ha (18.5 acres) of additional land would be disturbed, which is less than 1 percent of the land available at NTS for development. This land disturbance would increase the potential to impact cultural and biotic resources; however, the impact to cultural resources is not expected to be significant because the proposed A/D site has been previously disturbed during construction activities associated with the Device Assembly Facility. Impacts to biotic resources are expected to be minor; however, the presence of the desert tortoise at NTS would require a site survey to determine any impacts. With mitigation measures already in place at NTS to minimize impacts to the Federal-listed desert tortoise, significant impacts due to the proposed project are not expected.
Because both alternatives would utilize similar facilities, procedures, resources, and numbers of workers during operation, both alternatives would produce similar operational environmental impacts for most resource areas. Impacts to air quality were modeled, and results indicate minimal impacts for both alternatives. Water use for the NTS alternative is projected to be less than for the Pantex alternative because continued operations at Pantex would rely on existing, older, site-wide infrastructure. At both sites, water requirements could be adequately met without substantial aquifer drawdown. At Pantex, downsizing would reduce groundwater withdrawals by 21 percent compared to No Action. At NTS, water requirements to support the A/D mission would be approximately 4 percent more than projected usage. Groundwater withdrawals at NTS would be less than the recharge rates for the aquifer.
Radiation and Waste Management Impacts. The average radiological dose to workers at Pantex would not be expected to change, although the total worker dose would change due to the reduced number of workers associated with a reduction in workload. Worker exposure to radiation is expected to be about equal (approximately 10 mrem/year) for both alternatives and well within regulatory limits. Because of the small difference in the workforce for this mission at the two sites, this would result in a total worker dose of 3.0 person-rem/year at Pantex and 2.6 person-rem/year at NTS. The added risk to the workforce due to these levels of radiation exposure is extremely small.
Radiation exposure to the public from normal operation would be well within regulatory limits at both sites. At Pantex, the incremental dose to the population within 80 km (50 mi) would be 4.0x10-4 person-rem/year. At NTS, the incremental dose to the public within 80 km (50 mi) resulting from operation of the A/D Facility would be 3.1x10-6 person-rem/year. The added risk to the public due to these levels of radiation exposure is extremely small.
Both sites have adequate waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes from the A/D mission, although LLW at Pantex would continue to be shipped offsite to NTS. The impacts of transporting LLW are similar to the impacts of transporting nonradiological materials, which are small. Transferring the A/D mission to NTS would eliminate the need to ship LLW from Pantex to NTS. Transferring the A/D mission to NTS by expanding the Device Assembly Facility would also increase the overall amount of eventual decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) activities and wastes.
Accident Impacts. Potential impacts from accidents would not be expected to change significantly due to reduced workload. Accident impacts were determined using computer modeling. For the composite accident, less than one fatal cancer would be expected for the surrounding 80-km (50-mi) population at either Pantex or NTS. Based on a weighted averaging of the postulated accidents, at Pantex there would be a statistical risk that one fatal cancer to a member of the public would result approximately every 43,000 years from accidents. At NTS, there would be a statistical risk that one fatal cancer to a member of the public would result approximately every 500,000 years from accidents.
Other. The A/D mission also includes an option to store strategic reserves of plutonium and/or uranium. At Pantex, which presently stores both strategic reserves and surplus quantities of plutonium, no additional facilities would be needed, and no significant new environmental impacts or risks would result. Storing the strategic reserve would not produce any additional air emissions, require any additional water withdrawals, generate any wastes, or require additional workers. At NTS, however, the Device Assembly Facility would be further expanded to accomplish the strategic reserve storage. The additional construction would have smaller impacts (less than 10 percent) than the construction associated with the Device Assembly Facility upgrade for the A/D mission. Radiation exposure to the public in the event of an accident would be significantly less than for the A/D mission for either alternative.
Pit Fabrication
For pit fabrication, a capability that no longer exists due to the closure of the Rocky Flats Plant, two alternatives are being considered that would reestablish this mission and meet the needs of the Program: (1) upgrading the existing plutonium R&D fabrication capability at LANL and (2) upgrading existing H-Area and F-Canyon facilities at SRS. Both alternatives involve relatively minor (though costly) upgrades to existing facilities. Under the No Action alternative, DOE would not reestablish this mission, but would rely on the existing R&D capabilities at LANL and LLNL.
Socioeconomic Impacts. During operation, both alternatives would have small positive socioeconomic impacts. Based on the socioeconomic modeling, impacts would be higher at SRS because of the indirect jobs that would be created due to this mission. Modeling results indicate no indirect jobs for this mission at LANL. At SRS, up to 813 direct jobs would be created for surge operations, along with 1,594 indirect jobs. These 2,407 total new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease from 6.7 to 6.0 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. At LANL, up to 260 new direct jobs would be created for surge operations, but no indirect jobs would be created. The 260 total new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease from 6.2 to 6.0 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. Because the SRS alternative has less of an infrastructure in place for plutonium fabrication, the SRS alternative would require more direct workers (288 versus 138) during construction. At both sites, however, the socioeconomic impacts during construction would not cause any socioeconomic indicator to change by more than 1 percent.
Resource Impacts. Construction activities would involve internal modifications to existing facilities, no land would be disturbed, and thus, no impacts to cultural and biotic resources would result. Because both alternatives would utilize similar facilities, procedures, resources, and numbers of workers during operation, both alternatives would result in similar operational environmental impacts for most resource areas. Impacts to air quality were modeled, and results indicate minimal impacts to air quality for both alternatives. Water requirements at SRS would be provided from surface water, which is plentiful, and no adverse impacts would be expected. At LANL, groundwater would be used. Water requirements for this mission, which would be less than 1 percent of projected No Action uses, could be adequately met without exceeding the groundwater allotment at LANL.
Radiation and Waste Management Impacts. Worker exposure to radiation is expected to be about equal for both alternatives and well within regulatory limits. At either SRS or LANL, the average workforce dose from this mission would be approximately 380 mrem/year. Because of a difference in workforce for this mission at the two sites, this would result in a total worker dose of 156 person-rem/year at SRS and 55 person-rem/year at LANL. Statistically, this would equate to one fatal cancer every 16 years at SRS, and every 45 years at LANL, from operation of the Pit Fabrication Facility. Radiation exposure to the public from normal operation would be well within regulatory limits at both sites. At SRS and LANL, the incremental dose to the public within 80 km (50 mi) would be 5.9x10-4 person-rem/year and 8.6x10-5 person-rem/year, respectively. The added risk to the public due to these levels of radiation exposure is extremely small. Both site alternatives have adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes that would be generated by this mission.
Accident Impacts. Potential impacts from accidents were determined using computer modeling. For the composite accident, less than one fatal cancer would be expected for the surrounding 80-km (50-mi) population at both SRS and LANL. Based on a weighted averaging of the postulated accidents, at SRS there would be a statistical risk that one fatal cancer to a member of the public would result approximately every 360,000 years from accidents. At LANL, there would be a statistical risk that one fatal cancer to a member of the public would result approximately every 160,000 years from accidents.
Secondary and Case Fabrication
In addition to the No Action alternative, three alternatives being considered would meet the needs of the Program: (1) downsizing facilities that presently perform this mission at ORR, (2) transferring the secondary and case fabrication mission to LANL by upgrading the existing R&D secondary and case fabrication capabilities of LANL, and (3) transferring the secondary and case fabrication mission to LLNL by upgrading the existing R&D secondary and case fabrication capabilities of LLNL. Under No Action, the secondary and case fabrication mission would remain at Y-12 at ORR, and no downsizing or modification of facilities would occur.
Socioeconomic Impacts. Under No Action, there would be a decrease in the number of workers at Y-12 from the current total of 5,152 workers to 4,721 workers. Of the 5,152 workers, 3,126 workers are currently associated with the core stockpile management mission. Under No Action, only 2,741 core stockpile management workers would be required. The downsized Y-12 would be optimally configured for the reduced future workload, operate more efficiently, and require 784 workers for single-shift operation, a reduction of 1,957 workers. To perform operations in the downsized Y-12 in a three-shift mode, 1,376 core stockpile management workers would be required, a reduction of 1,365 workers. A reduction of 1,365 direct jobs represents approximately 9 percent of the projected No Action workforce at the entire ORR site, and less than 1 percent of the regional economic area. Another 3,490 indirect jobs would also be lost.
Mitigating the workforce reductions would be the fact that downsizing would require 1,152 new jobs associated with landlord activities in preparation for D&D activities. Another 1,600 indirect jobs would be created by these D&D jobs. The net effect for the three-shift mode of operation would be a loss of a total of 213 direct jobs at Y-12, which would represent less than 1 percent of the projected No Action workforce at ORR.
Transferring the secondary and case fabrication mission to either LANL or LLNL would have small positive socioeconomic impacts at those sites, and negative socioeconomic impacts at ORR due to the phaseout of this mission. At LANL, 321 direct jobs (based on three-shift operation) would be created, but no indirect jobs would be created for this industry. The 321 new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease from 6.2 to 6.0 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. At LLNL, 290 new direct jobs (based on three-shift operation) would be created, along with 722 indirect jobs. The 1,012 new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease by less than 1 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent.
Transferring the secondary and case fabrication mission from ORR to either LANL or LLNL would result in the loss of 3,336 jobs projected for this mission under No Action at Y-12, and the closure and D&D of the Y-12 facilities previously involved in this mission. Another 10,134 indirect jobs could also be lost. It is expected that 1,385 new jobs would be created by a direct transfer of responsibilities from DP to the DOE Office of Environmental Management. Additionally, because the D&D of facilities at ORR would be a relatively long-term process, any initial negative socioeconomic impacts resulting from the transfer of the secondary and case fabrication mission to LANL or LLNL would be minimized by the additional workforce associated with D&D activities at ORR. These 1,385 new D&D jobs would also create 1,937 new indirect jobs. The net effect would be a loss of a total of 13,470 total jobs (direct plus indirect) in the ORR regional economic area. This would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to increase from 4.9 to 7.4 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent.
During construction activities, socioeconomic impacts would result, but would be small. The number of peak workers would be 14 at ORR, 55 at LANL, and 130 at LLNL, which has the least extensive existing infrastructure for secondary and case fabrication. At all three sites, the socioeconomic impacts during construction would not cause any socioeconomic indicator to change by more than 1 percent.
Resource Impacts. Impacts from continued operation at Y-12 are expected to be similar to current impacts. Air quality would remain within regulatory limits and water requirements would be adequately met by surface water withdrawals. For the three "action" alternatives, no previously undisturbed land would be disturbed, and thus, no impacts to biotic resources would result. Minimal impacts to cultural resources may result from building modifications to facilities eligible for the National Register of Historic Places. Because each of the alternatives would utilize similar facilities, procedures, resources, and numbers of workers during operation, each of the alternatives would produce similar operational environmental impacts for most resource areas. Impacts to air quality were modeled for each alternative and results indicate minimal impacts to air quality for each of the alternatives. Water requirements at ORR would be met from surface water, which is plentiful, and no adverse impacts would be expected. At LANL, groundwater would be used. Groundwater withdrawals would increase by less than 1 percent over projected No Action water requirements, and LANL's groundwater allotment would not be exceeded. At LLNL, public water supply would be used, and usage would be approximately 20-percent higher than projected No Action water requirements. No adverse impacts to water resources are expected.
Radiation and Waste Management Impacts. Radiation worker exposure to radiation is expected to be about equal for all three alternatives and well within regulatory limits. At each of the three sites, the average workforce dose from this mission would be approximately 2.2 mrem/year. Because of differences in projected workforces, this would result in a total worker dose of 0.38 person-rem/year at ORR, 0.33 person-rem/year at LANL, and 0.55 person-rem/year at LLNL. The added risk to the workforce due to these levels of radiation exposure is extremely small. Radiation exposure to the public from normal operation would be well within regulatory limits at these sites. At ORR, the incremental dose to the population within 80 km (50 mi) would be 0.6 person rem/year. The probability of a member of the public dying from cancer would be 3x10-4/year. At LANL, the incremental dose to the population within 80 km (50 mi) would be 0.5 person-rem/year. The probability of a member of the public dying from cancer would be 2.5x10-4/year. At LLNL, the incremental dose to the population within 80 km (50 mi) would be 0.84 person-rem/year. The probability of a member of the public dying from cancer would be 4.2x10-4/year. The added risk to the public due to these levels of radiation exposure is extremely small. All three site alternatives have adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes that would be generated by this mission.
Accident Impacts. Potential impacts from accidents were determined using computer modeling. For all postulated accidents, less than one fatal cancer would be expected for the surrounding 80-km (50-mi) population at each of the sites. Based on a weighted averaging of the postulated accidents, at ORR and LANL there would be a statistical risk that one fatal cancer to a member of the public would result approximately every 830,000 years from accidents. At LLNL, there would be a statistical risk that one fatal cancer to a member of the public would result approximately every 260,000 years from accidents.
Other. If the secondary and case fabrication mission were transferred from ORR, storage of the strategic reserves of HEU would be transferred to the A/D Facility (or a consolidated storage facility being assessed in the Storage and Disposition PEIS). The potential impacts associated with the one-time transfer of the strategic reserves of HEU to the A/D Facility are expected to be minor, even in the event of an accident, due to the robust shipping containers.
High Explosives Fabrication
In addition to the No Action alternative, three alternatives are being considered that would meet the needs of the Program: (1) downsizing facilities that presently perform this mission at Pantex, (2) transferring the HE fabrication mission to LANL by upgrading the existing R&D HE fabrication capabilities of LANL, and/or (3) transferring the HE fabrication mission to LLNL by upgrading the existing R&D HE fabrication capabilities of LLNL. Transferring the HE fabrication from Pantex to LANL and/or LLNL would result in the closure and D&D of Pantex facilities previously involved in this activity. Under No Action, the HE fabrication mission would remain at Pantex. No downsizing or modification of facilities would occur.
Socioeconomic Impacts. Downsizing the HE fabrication mission at Pantex would reduce the number of direct workers associated with this mission to 37, compared to 105 for No Action. Transferring the HE fabrication mission to either LANL or LLNL would create small positive socioeconomic impacts at either of those sites, and small negative socioeconomic impacts at Pantex, due to the phaseout of this mission. For surge operations at LANL, 67 new direct jobs would be created, but no indirect jobs would be created by this industry. The 67 new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease from 6.2 to 6.1 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. For surge operations at LLNL, 100 new direct jobs would be created, along with 155 indirect jobs. The 255 total new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease by less than 1 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. Phasing out the HE fabrication mission at Pantex would cause the loss of 105 direct jobs, which would be approximately 3 percent of the projected No Action workforce at Pantex. The direct plus indirect jobs lost would cause no observable change to the Pantex regional economic area unemployment rate, housing/rental vacancies, and public finance expenditures/revenues.
During construction activities, socioeconomic impacts would result, but they would be small. The number of peak workers would be 29 at Pantex, 46 at LANL, and 19 at LLNL. At all three sites, the socioeconomic impacts during construction would not cause any socioeconomic indicator to change by more than 1 percent.
Resource Impacts. For the three "action" alternatives, construction impacts are expected to be minor and would involve internal modifications to existing facilities. No land would be disturbed at Pantex or LANL, and thus, no impacts to cultural or biotic resources would result. At LLNL, a small area of land (less than 1 ha) would be disturbed to construct an HE and parts storage building, but impacts to biotic and cultural resources are not expected.
Because each of the alternatives would utilize similar facilities, procedures, resources, and numbers of workers during operation, each of the alternatives would result in similar operational environmental impacts for most resource areas. Impacts to air quality were modeled for each alternative, and results indicate minimal impacts to air quality for each of the alternatives. At all sites, water requirements would be met from groundwater. At Pantex, this alternative applies only in conjunction with the downsize A/D alternative at Pantex discussed earlier. Downsizing both missions would reduce groundwater withdrawals by 16 percent compared to No Action. At LANL, groundwater withdrawals would increase by less than 1 percent over projected No Action water requirements, and LANL's groundwater allotment would not be exceeded. At LLNL, groundwater and/or the public water supply could be used to support the HE fabrication mission. If public water were used, it would require approximately 21 percent of the design capacity of the public water tap line. If groundwater were used, withdrawals would increase by approximately 65 percent from No Action, but they would not have any adverse impacts to aquifer levels.
Radiation and Waste Management Impacts. There are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated with the HE fabrication mission and no adverse impacts associated with normal operation. All three site alternatives have adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes that would be generated by this mission.
Accident Impacts. Potential impacts from chemical accidents or explosions were determined using modeling. Impacts from these types of accidents could include death or bodily damage. Due to proximity, workers would be most susceptible to any potential impacts. For all postulated accidents, impacts to the public were much less than to workers. In the event of an accident involving HE fabrication, due to the higher population surrounding LLNL, public impacts could be higher at LLNL compared to LANL and Pantex. Transferring the HE fabrication mission from Pantex to LANL and/or LLNL would require HE components to be shipped from the fabrication site to the A/D Facility. HE is a nonradioactive, hazardous material. There are no impacts associated with the incident-free transportation of HE. In the event of an accident, HE transportation impacts would be no greater than those encountered by the public from industry's transportation of similar explosives. Potential accidents could include both explosive and nonexplosive roadway accidents, with potential impacts of death, lesser bodily injury, and property damage.
Nonnuclear Fabrication
In addition to the No Action alternative, two alternatives are being considered that would meet the needs of the Program: (1) downsizing the facilities that presently perform this mission at KCP and (2) transferring the KCP nonnuclear fabrication mission to LANL, LLNL, and SNL by upgrading existing nonnuclear fabrication capabilities at LANL and LLNL, and constructing new nonnuclear fabrication facilities at SNL. Under No Action, the nonnuclear fabrication mission would remain at current locations; primarily at KCP, with small workloads at LANL and SNL.
Socioeconomic Impacts. At KCP, workforce downsizing consistent with a reduced workload has already taken place; therefore, the projected No Action workforce (3,179 workers) is equal to the current workforce. Of these 3,179 workers, 2,508 workers perform core stockpile management missions. The downsized KCP facility would be optimally configured for the reduced future workload, would operate more efficiently, and would require 1,669 core stockpile management workers for single-shift operation. To perform operations in the downsized KCP facility in a three-shift mode, 2,257 workers would be required. This is 251 workers less than the No Action single-shift number of workers. Another 443 indirect jobs would also be lost. The loss of a total of 694 jobs (direct plus indirect jobs) would not cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to change.
Transferring the nonnuclear fabrication mission to the laboratories would create small positive socioeconomic impacts at both LANL and LLNL, with increases of 240 and 131 total (direct plus indirect) jobs, respectively. At each of these sites, socioeconomic indicators would change by less than 1 percent. At SNL, 1,160 direct jobs would be created, along with 1,350 indirect jobs. The 2,510 new jobs would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to decrease from 5.7 to 5.2 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. Phasing out the nonnuclear fabrication mission from KCP would cause the loss of 3,179 direct jobs and the loss of 5,609 indirect jobs in the regional economic area. The loss of 8,788 total jobs from KCP would cause the regional economic area unemployment rate to increase from 4.9 to 5.6 percent. Housing/rental vacancies and public finance expenditures/revenues would change by less than 1 percent. Some socioeconomic impacts could be mitigated by employing personnel for D&D of the KCP facility, although that is not expected to last more than 5 years.
During construction activities, socioeconomic impacts would result, but would be small. At KCP, 187 direct jobs would be created during downsizing activities, plus another 262 indirect jobs. The 449 total jobs created during construction at KCP would represent less than a 1 percent increase in the regional economic area, and would cause no observable change to the regional economic area unemployment rate, housing/rental vacancies, and public finance expenditures/revenues. If the nonnuclear fabrication mission is transferred to the three laboratories, no observable socioeconomic impacts would occur at LANL or LLNL. At SNL, 379 direct jobs would be created during construction activities, plus another 421 indirect jobs. The 800 total jobs created during construction at SNL would represent less than a 1 percent increase in employment in the regional economic area, and would not cause any socioeconomic indicator to change by more than 1 percent.
Resource Impacts. Due to the reduced workload expected in the future, impacts from operations are expected to be less than current impacts. Air quality would remain within regulatory limits at each of the sites, and water requirements would be adequately met.
For the alternative that would downsize KCP, the construction activities would involve internal modifications to the existing facility. No land would be disturbed. For the alternative that would transfer the KCP mission to the laboratories, construction impacts would involve internal facility modifications at LANL and LLNL. At SNL, approximately 9 ha (22 acres) of land would be disturbed to construct a new facility. This represents approximately 6 percent of the undisturbed land at SNL. Potential impacts to cultural and biotic resources would exist, but they would be mitigated to the extent practicable during follow-on, site-specific studies.
Because each of the alternatives would utilize similar facilities, procedures, resources, and numbers of workers during operation, each of the alternatives would result in similar operational environmental impacts for most resource areas. Impacts to air quality were modeled for each alternative. Modeling results indicate minimal impacts to air quality for each of the alternatives. Water requirements for nonnuclear fabrication are relatively minor at each of the sites. At KCP, water requirements, which are publicly provided, would be reduced by approximately 31 percent compared to No Action. At LANL, groundwater withdrawals would increase by less than 1 percent over projected No Action water requirements, and LANL's groundwater allotment would not be exceeded. At LLNL, there would also be a less than 1 percent increase in water requirements to support nonnuclear fabrication. At SNL, groundwater would be used. Groundwater withdrawals would increase by approximately 64 percent over projected No Action withdrawals, but would still represent only 29 percent of the Kirtland Air Force Base groundwater rights. Thus, no adverse impacts are expected.
Radiation, Waste Management, and Accident Impacts. There are no radiological risks to workers or the public associated with the nonnuclear fabrication mission, and there are no adverse impacts associated with normal operation. Accident profiles at the sites would not change as a result of downsizing KCP or transferring the nonnuclear fabrication mission to the laboratories. Phaseout of the nonnuclear mission from KCP would eliminate any potential accidents at that site. All three site alternatives have adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes that would be generated by this mission.
Stockpile Management Top-Level Comparison
Based upon the reasonable alternatives for the five major missions that make up the stockpile management program, one could construct a matrix with a large number of discrete alternatives for the entire Complex. Analyzing such a large number of alternatives is neither practical nor useful. What is useful, however, is to look at the two extreme configurations for the entire Complex in order to compare environmental impacts for a bounding case analysis. Based on the alternatives that are reasonable for the individual missions, the bounding configurations and environmental impacts for the Complex are a relatively unconsolidated Complex that is downsized/rightsized in place or a relatively consolidated Complex that is rightsized by upsizing the laboratories and NTS.
For the first configuration (referred to as Downsize/Rightsize-in-Place), the Complex would consist of A/D at Pantex, HE fabrication at Pantex, pit fabrication at LANL (or SRS), secondary and case fabrication at ORR, and nonnuclear fabrication at KCP. This is essentially the preferred alternative for stockpile management. For the second configuration (referred to as Maximum Consolidation), the Complex would consist of A/D at NTS, HE fabrication at LANL (or LLNL), pit fabrication at LANL, secondary and case fabrication at LANL (or LLNL), and nonnuclear fabrication at SNL, LANL, and LLNL. Major differences in environmental impacts between these two configurations are presented below.
Socioeconomic Impacts. It is worthy to note that some of the reductions in workforce at the various stockpile management facilities are associated with reduced workloads expected in the future, while additional reductions in workforce could occur due to the physical downsizing of facilities. For the A/D and HE missions at Pantex, under No Action, the core stockpile management workforce would be reduced from the current level of 3,107 workers (3,002 for A/D and 105 for HE) to 1,020 workers (9l5 for A/D and 105 for HE) for single-shift operation. The physical downsizing of the facility would also improve efficiency such that the workforce could be reduced even further, to 831 workers for single-shift operation (800 for A/D and 31 for HE). Three-shift operation of the downsized Pantex facility would require 1,303 core stockpile management workers (1266 for A/D and 37 for HE).
For the secondary and case fabrication mission at ORR, under No Action, the workforce would be reduced from the current level of 3,126 core stockpile management workers to 2,741 workers for single-shift operation. The physical downsizing of Y-12 (essentially an 86-percent reduction in facility size) would also improve efficiency such that the core stockpile management workforce could be reduced even further, to 784 workers for single-shift operation. Three-shift operation of the downsized Y-12 facility would require 1,376 core stockpile management workers. The adverse socioeconomic impacts associated with the Y-12 downsizing would be mitigated by the creation of 1,152 new jobs associated with landlord activities in preparation for the D&D of the facilities no longer needed.
At KCP, workforce reductions consistent with a reduced workload have already taken place; therefore, the projected No Action workforce (2,508 core stockpile management workers) is equal to the current workforce. Downsizing the KCP facility would improve efficiency such that the workforce could be reduced to 1,669 workers for single-shift operation. Three-shift operation of the downsized KCP facility would require 2,257 workers.
Overall, socioeconomic impacts from construction for the Maximum Consolidation configuration would be minimal, except at NTS and SNL. Socioeconomic impacts from construction for the Downsize/Rightsize-in-Place configuration would also be minimal.
Resource Impacts. Construction impacts associated with the Downsize/Rightsize-in-Place configuration would be minimal. All construction activities would be modifications to existing facilities, with no new construction. Consequently, no significant land disturbance at any sites would result, and no potential impacts to biota or cultural resources would occur.
Construction impacts associated with the Maximum Consolidation configuration would be small overall; only the Device Assembly Facility upgrade at NTS and the Nonnuclear Facility at SNL involve any land disturbance greater than 1 ha (2.47 acres). Most construction activities would be modifications to existing facilities, with no significant land disturbance, and no potential impacts to biota or cultural resources.
During operation, because each of the two configurations would utilize similar facilities, procedures, resources, and numbers of workers, each would result in similar operational environmental impacts for most resource areas. For the Maximum Consolidation configuration, the greatest potential for any significant environmental impacts would occur at LANL, which would be the site for pit fabrication, secondary and case fabrication, HE fabrication, and a portion of nonnuclear fabrication. For each of the resources evaluated in this PEIS, no significant impacts are expected from such consolidation. Modeling results for air quality indicate minimal impacts to air quality. Water requirements would increase at LANL by 2.5 percent, but would still be less than the LANL allotment.
Radiation, Waste Management, and Accident Impacts. Cumulative doses to the population from normal operation would be less than regulatory limits. Impacts from accidents are independent of other missions (e.g., accident risks are additive, not multiplicative). Thus, the potential accident would be the sum of the risks from each mission. For maximum consolidation at LANL, there would be a statistical risk that one fatal cancer to a member of the public would result approximately every 135,000 years from accidents. LANL would have adequate existing waste management facilities to treat, store, and/or dispose of wastes that would be generated by these missions.
A difference in the operation of the Downsize/Rightsize-in-Place configuration and the Maximum Consolidation configuration would involve the transportation of nuclear and hazardous materials. The Downsize/Rightsize-in-Place configuration would result in transporting plutonium components between LANL (or SRS) and Pantex, and transporting secondary and case components between ORR and Pantex. Incident-free impacts associated with this transportation are small, while accident impacts are minor. The Maximum Consolidation configuration would also result in transporting plutonium components and secondary and case components. Transportation would occur between LANL and NTS. Relative to the Downsize/Rightsize-in-Place configuration, any transportation impacts would be less due to shorter distances and less populated roadways. The Maximum Consolidation configuration would also result in transporting HE components between LANL and NTS, but no significant impacts are expected.
This section of the PEIS has been revised in response to comments received on the Draft PEIS concerning its scope and the alternatives considered. To begin, it is important to review the basic logic used in constructing this PEIS and to restate the nature of the decisions expected to be made based on the contents of the PEIS.
Section S.2 describes the national security policy framework that defines the purpose and need for DOE's nuclear weapons mission for the foreseeable future. It also describes the development of proposed actions and reasonable alternatives in response to recent changes in national security policy. Section S.2 also puts those changes in broad technical perspective. Successive levels of technical detail are provided in chapters 3 and 4 of Volume I, and in Volumes II and III. The discussions that follow refer to the appropriate sections of this PEIS to avoid unnecessary repetition.
As stated in the Notice of Intent (60 FR 31291) published on June 14, 1995, DOE intends that the ROD on this PEIS will:
While the terms "stockpile stewardship" and "stockpile management" are relatively new, the Program is not new when considered in terms of its substructure capabilities (section S.1). What the terms are meant to convey is a change in Program focus away from large-scale development and production of new-design nuclear weapons with nuclear testing, to one that focuses on the safety and reliability of a smaller, aging stockpile without nuclear testing. Even with this change in focus, however, national security policies require DOE to maintain the capabilities of the ongoing Program. The proposed actions flow logically from the mission purpose and need, given the policy constraints placed on the Program. Enhanced experimental capability is proposed because it is the surrogate source of experimental data that are needed to continually assess and certify a safe and reliable stockpile constrained by the absence of nuclear testing. Rightsizing manufacturing capacities is proposed in direct response to the reduced requirements of a smaller, aging stockpile constrained by the absence of new-design weapon production. Reestablishing pit manufacturing capability is proposed because it restores a required capability of the Program that was temporarily lost as a consequence of the closure of the Rocky Flats Plant.
In developing this PEIS, DOE judged the above three proposed actions to be significant at the programmatic level. Some additional strategies of the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program, such as enhanced computational capability, were judged not to have significance for this PEIS because they did not have the potential for significant environmental impacts relative to the ongoing Program at a site, nor was the mission capability being considered for transfer to another site. The programmatic level environmental impacts of the ongoing Program at each of the eight sites in the Complex are described in chapter 4 of Volume I. Projects and facilities to support the ongoing Program are subject to site-specific NEPA review.
The issue of Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program alternatives is complex because nuclear weapons require a complete integrated set of technical capabilities and an appropriately sized manufacturing capacity. The technical capabilities are generally characterized as research, design, development, and testing; reliability assesument and certification; and manufacturing and surveillance operations (section S.2.1 and figure S.2-2). From a technical point of view, none of these capabilities can be deleted if DOE is to maintain a safe and reliable stockpile (section S.2.3). In addition, DOE has been directed to maintain these capabilities by national security policy from the President and Congress (section S.2.3).
Commentors questioned the different treatment of stewardship and management alternatives, mainly the lack of stewardship alternatives. Stewardship and management alternatives are treated differently in the PEIS because they address fundamentally different problems. Stockpile stewardship capabilities form the basis of U.S. judgments about the safety, reliability, and performance of U.S. nuclear weapons, and in a larger context, U.S. judgments about the nuclear weapons capabilities of others (section S.2.3). DOE did not consider it reasonable to propose stewardship alternatives that would diminish stewardship capabilities, particularly given the fact that historic confidence in the safety and performance of the stockpile was derived from nuclear testing that is no longer part of the ongoing stewardship program. National security policy requires DOE to maintain, and in some areas enhance, the stewardship capabilities of the three weapons laboratories and NTS (section S.2.1). The PEIS also explains the basis for this in a technical context, including the need for two independent nuclear design laboratories (section S.2.3). Therefore, this PEIS has no proposed actions that transfer ongoing stockpile stewardship missions from one site to another, or that would otherwise diminish ongoing stewardship missions.
National security policy also requires DOE to maintain stockpile management capabilities and appropriate manufacturing capacity for a smaller stockpile. Unlike stockpile stewardship capabilities, the smaller stockpile does permit some reasonable siting alternatives for stockpile management capabilities and capacities to accomplish the mission purpose and need within the current national security policy framework (section S.2.3).
DOE has considered that there are differing opinions on the technical merit of DOE's proposed actions with regard to enhanced experimental capability. Nuclear weapons design information, including the complex physics of nuclear weapon explosions, is classified for reasons of national security and nonproliferation. Even if this information were unclassified, the physics problems remain daunting; hence, the reason why nuclear testing was so important to the past program. Both the classification of information and technical complexity of the issues form natural barriers to public communication. The technical complexity alone engenders significant debate among qualified experts, especially in the area of high energy density physics. This PEIS attempts to explain the weapon physics issues in an unclassified, comprehensible manner regarding its relation to mission purpose and need (section S.2), proposed actions and alternatives (section 3.3 of Volume I), and project-specific technical detail (Volume III). In the absence of nuclear testing, there are two basic alternatives: (1) rely on existing facilities as sources of experimental data described by the No Action alternative, and (2) pursue the enhanced capability of the proposed facilities to provide the sources of experimental data needed.
Role of Existing Experimental Facilities. In DOE's technical judgment, the existing facilities described by the No Action alternative are inadequate to meet the challenge of assessing and certifying a safe and reliable stockpile over the longer term. It is also DOE's technical judgment that it is impossible to speculate at this time whether any of the existing facilities could be retired, because they would be obsolete or redundant, as a result of a decision to construct and operate any or all of the three proposed new stewardship facilities. The uncertainties inherent in the R&D nature of the stewardship program would make that kind of exercise essentially guesswork. The development of machines to simulate the intricacies of a nuclear detonation requires a highly sophisticated scientific R&D program. It very likely will take 5 to 10 years to begin obtaining reliable data from the new facilities. Until those facilities are operational, DOE cannot reliably predict how the additional capabilities they provide will mesh with the capabilities of previously existing machines to further the goals of the Program. It is only through incremental advances in the state of the science that decisions can eventually be made regarding the retirement of obsolete or redundant facilities.
DOE is committed to making maximum efficient use of the stewardship capabilities at its disposal. However, it is not reasonable to speculate at this time about how future stewardship requirements might affect existing facilities and capabilities.
Next Generation Experimental Facilities. Commentors suggested that potential next generation experimental facilities be analyzed as part of the proposed action. This PEIS includes a discussion of potential next-generation experimental facilities and the reasons why they are not proposed actions or alternatives (section S.2.4 and section 3.3.4 of Volume I). These facilities, while contemplated on the basis of anticipated technical need, have not reached the stage of design maturity through R&D for DOE to include a decisionmaking analysis at this time. However, this PEIS does broadly describe, in general terms or by reference, what is known today about their potential environmental impacts. The environmental impacts from these facilities as contemplated today would not be significantly different from existing "similar" facilities. By characterizing the potential impacts in this way, the decisionmaker will be aware of the potential program-level cummulative impacts of the next-generation facilities when deciding whether to pursue a program of enhanced experimental capability. If DOE proposes to construct and operate such facilities in the future, appropriate NEPA review will be performed.
New Weapon Design. Commentors have suggested that the proposal for enhanced experimental capabilities is directed more at the capability to design new weapons in the absence of nuclear testing than at maintaining the safety and reliability of the existing stockpile and that stewardship alternatives could be different if the facilities were directed only at maintaining the existing stockpile. This PEIS explains why these capabilities are needed to maintain the safety and reliability of a smaller, aging stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing (section S.2). The existing U.S. stockpile of nuclear weapons is highly engineered and technically sophisticated in its design for safety, reliability, and performance. The stewardship capabilities required to make technical judgments about the existing stockpile are likewise technically sophisticated; therefore, it would be unreasonable to say that these stewardship capabilities could not be applied to the design of new weapons, albeit with less confidence than if new weapons could be nuclear tested.
However, the development of new weapon designs requires integrated nuclear testing such as occurs in nuclear explosive tests. Short of nuclear testing, no single stockpile stewardship activity, nor any combination of activities, could confirm that a new-design weapon would work. In fact, a key effect of a "zero-yield" CTBT would be to prevent the confident development of new-design weapons. National security policy requires DOE to maintain the capability to design and develop new weapons, and it will be a national security policy decision to use or not use that capability. Choosing not to use enhanced experimental capability for new weapons designs would not change the technical issues for the existing stockpile and, therefore, the stewardship alternatives would not change.
The issue of new-design weapons is separate from DOE's need to perform modifications to existing weapons that require research, design, development, and testing. The phrase used in this PEIS, "without the development and production of new-design weapons," is meant to convey the fact that the historical continuous cycle of large scale development and production of new weapons designs replacing older weapon designs has been halted. For example, during the 1980s, about a dozen new-design weapons were in full-scale development or production. Over the decade, production of new-design weapons replaced dismantled weapons nearly one for one. Today, only modifications to parts of existing weapons are being performed or planned; dismantlement has continued. This results in a smaller, aging stockpile that must be assessed and certified without nuclear testing. This is now the primary focus of the stewardship program.
Nonproliferation. Commentors have suggested that enhanced experimental capability is a proliferation risk. The national security policy framework discussed in this PEIS seeks a new balance between U.S. arms control and nonproliferation objectives and U.S. national security requirements for nuclear deterrence while pursuing these objectives (section S.2.1). In addition, a discussion is provided on some of the more difficult issues that must be considered in determining the balance, including a discussion of experimental capability (section S.2.5). In particular, the issue of nonproliferation and the proposed NIF was studied in detail. The study, prepared by the DOE Office of Arms Control and Nonproliferation, has been the subject of extensive public involvement, interagency review, and review by outside experts. The study concluded that the technical proliferation concerns of NIF are manageable and can therefore be made acceptable and that NIF can contribute positively to U.S. arms control and nonproliferation policy goals (appendix section I.2.1 of Volume III). NIF is a proliferation concern because of its broader scientific applications and expected frequent use by researchers worldwide, and, like the other proposed enhanced experimental facilities because of its possible relevance to the development of new weapon designs. However, the development of new weapon designs requires integrated testing. None of the proposed facilities, either alone or together, could perform such integrated testing of new concepts, and therefore cannot replace nuclear testing for the development of new weapon designs. The role of these facilities will be to help assess and certify the safety and reliability of the nuclear weapons remaining in the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. The national security policy framework and the technical issues that drive the proposed action for enhanced experimental capability remain the same.
Subcritical Experiments. With regard to the treatment of ongoing stewardship activities or enhanced experimental capability, subcritical experiments are an example of how changes in terminology have caused some confusion about what is evaluated in this PEIS under the No Action alternative. Subcritical experiments have been conducted at NTS over many years. Historically, operations at NTS have included tests or experiments that included both HE and special nuclear materials that were intended to produce no nuclear yield or negligible nuclear energy releases. These experiments frequently remained subcritical (i.e., they did not achieve self-sustaining fission chain reactions). The term "subcritical experiments" does not define a new form of activity or mission. It is intended to underscore the fact that in the future such experiments will be configured to ensure that the condition of criticality cannot be achieved. This issue has been clarified in the NTS Site-Wide EIS.
Some commentors have suggested that nuclear weapon reliability is not important in the post-Cold War era. National security policy as established by the President and Congress requires a safe and reliable stockpile. In order for the nuclear deterrent to be credible within the current national security policy framework, it must be reliable in a militarily effective way. A program designed to ensure the safety but not the reliability of the stockpile would require DOE to speculate on an alternate concept of nuclear deterrence and a national security policy framework to support it. See also the discussion of denuclearization in section S.3.5.4.
Commentors have also suggested acceptance of lower standards of reliability as an alternative to enhanced stewardship capabilities. This PEIS explains how the assesument and certification of nuclear performance is carried out, and how this process differs from the more conventional statistical methods used for assessing reliability of the nonnuclear portion of the weapon. Assesument and certification of nuclear performance is a technical judgment by the weapons laboratories based on scientific theory, experimental data, and computational modeling (sections S.2.2 and S.2.3). The question is not whether to accept a lower standard of nuclear performance (less nuclear explosive yield), but whether or not there is a technical basis to confidently know how well the weapon will perform at all. Enhanced stewardship capability is focused on the technical ability to confidently judge nuclear safety and performance in the absence of nuclear testing.
Aside from being inconsistent with national security policy, attempting to separate weapon safety and reliability is more technically complex than it sounds. A modern nuclear weapon is highly integrated in its design for safety, reliability, and performance. It contains electrical energy sources and many explosive energy sources in addition to the main charge HE. The principal safety concern is accidental detonation of the HE causing dispersal of radioactive materials (plutonium and uranium). Modern weapons are designed and system-engineered to provide a predictable response in accident environments (e.g., fire, crush, or drop). However, because of the technical complexity of potential accident scenarios (i.e., combined environments) and the fact that complete nuclear weapons cannot be used for experimental data, assesument of the design and the effect of changes that might be occurring due to stockpile environments must rely on other sources of experimental data and complex computer modeling. Enhanced experimental capability specifically related to the weapon secondary is a nuclear performance concern. Enhanced computational capability in general, and enhanced experimental capability related to the weapon primary in particular, are both nuclear safety and performance concerns.
Commentors have suggested that DOE consider alternative forms of stewardship. While their comments are responded to in Volume IV, this section discusses DOE's consideration of the broad range of views on this issue. The Congressional Research Service report, Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Stewardship: Alternatives for Congress, December 14, 1995, provides a reasonable description of the various viewpoints on alternatives and a framework for discussion. (The report uses the term stockpile stewardship generically to describe the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program.) The following discussion of alternative approaches is taken from the summary of that report.
Denuclearizers would eliminate nuclear weapons worldwide in the foreseeable future, perhaps one to two decades. Until then, they would have a minimal U.S. stewardship program whose personnel, as curators of weapons knowledge, would monitor weapons. Restorers would maintain nuclear weapons with the only proven method, an ongoing program of research, development, design, testing, and production, downsized to meet post-Cold War needs. Three intermediate positions seek to maintain weapons indefinitely without nuclear testing. Remanufacturers believe that since current weapons have been tested and certified as meeting military requirements, this Nation can maintain them indefinitely by "remanufacturing"--reproducing them to the exact specifications of the originals. Remanufacturers would go to great lengths to do so in order to avoid risks that even slight changes to warheads might introduce. Enhancers, who take the Administration's position on stewardship, see identical remanufacture as impossible. They believe some changes in design, process, and materials are unavoidable and others are desirable. A robust science program, they hold, is the best that can be done without testing to monitor warheads, anticipate problems, modify warheads when problems arise, and revalidate stockpile effectiveness on an ongoing basis. They would have a small manufacturing program. Maintainers fall between remanufacturers and enhancers. They focus on how to maintain warheads. They prefer to avoid changes to warheads but would not go to great lengths to do so. They view a strong science program as essential, but only to the extent that its elements connect directly to maintaining weapons. They emphasize manufacturing as the ultimate guarantor of U.S. ability to solve warhead problems. They, along with enhancers, favor some link to testing if confidence cannot be maintained in any other way.
Beyond the broad overview of alternative approaches to stockpile stewardship and management, the main text of the report discusses variations within each of the five points of view. Given the political and technical complexity of the Program, many approaches can appear to be distinct or reasonable alternatives for detailed study. In fact, while the enhancer's viewpoint as described above most closely resembles the Program described in this PEIS, the Program actually embraces elements of all five viewpoints. The following discussion illustrates this point and focuses on the main issue(s) that, in DOE's view, eliminate the other approaches as distinct or reasonable alternatives for this PEIS.
Denuclearization. This approach is reflected in this PEIS to the extent that national security policy is pointed toward the goals of denuclearization. Since the end of the Cold War, more than 8,000 U.S. nuclear weapons have been dismantled, no new-design weapons are being produced, three former nuclear weapons industrial plants have been closed, and the United States is observing a nuclear test moratorium and seeking a "zero-yield" CTBT. Maintenance of a safe and reliable stockpile is not inconsistent with working toward the NPT goal of eliminating nuclear weapons worldwide at some unspecified time in the future. However, denuclearization is not a reasonable alternative for this PEIS because it is not feasible based on current national security policy.
The main issue discussed in this section is consideration of an alternative with a very small (10s or 100s) or zero stockpile. Two of the stockpile sizes analyzed in this PEIS, a START I Treaty- and START II protocol-sized stockpile, are the only ones currently defined and directed by national security policy. The PEIS also analyzes a hypothetical 1,000 weapon stockpile for the purpose of a sensitivity analysis for manufacturing capacity decisions. The NWSM specifies the types of weapons and quantities of each weapon type by year (section S.1). The NWSM is developed based on DOD force structure requirements necessary to maintain nuclear deterrence and comply with existing arms control treaties while pursuing further arms control reductions. This PEIS explains the complexity of this process and why DOE does not believe it reasonable to speculate using a large number of arbitrary assumptions (section S.2.1). DOE has considered that a future national security policy framework could define a path to a smaller stockpile. However, DOE has the following perspective on this issue.
Stockpile stewardship capabilities are currently viewed by the United States as a means to further U.S. nonproliferation objectives in seeking a "zero-yield" CTBT. Likewise, it would be reasonable to assume that U.S. confidence in its stewardship capabilities would remain as important, if not more important, in future arms control negotiations to reduce its stockpile further. The path to a very small (10s or 100s) or zero stockpile would require the negotiation of complex international treaties, most likely with provisions that require intrusive international verification inspections of nuclear weapons related facilities. Therefore, DOE believes it reasonable to assume that complex treaty negotiations, when coupled with complex implementation provisions, would likely stretch over several decades. On a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, stockpile size alone would not change the purpose and need, proposed actions, and alternatives in this PEIS as they relate to stewardship capabilities. The issues of maintaining the core competencies of the United States in nuclear weapons, and the technical problems of a smaller, aging stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing, remain the same.
On a gradual path to a very small or zero stockpile, this PEIS evaluates reasonable approaches to stockpile management capability and capacity. At some point on this path, further downsizing of existing industrial plants or the alternative of consolidating manufacturing functions at stewardship sites would become more attractive as manufacturing capacity becomes a less important consideration. However, in the near term, the preferred alternative of downsizing the existing industrial plants would still be a reasonable action because the projected downsizing investment pays back within a few years through reduced operating expense; in addition, the downsizing actions are consistent with potential future decisions regarding plant closures. In regard to the proposed action of reestablishing pit manufacturing capability, DOE does not propose to establish higher manufacturing capacities than are inherent in the reestablishment of the basic manufacturing capability. In developing the criteria for reasonable stockpile management alternatives, DOE was careful not to propose the introduction of significant new types of environmental hazards to any prospective site. On a gradual path to a very small
