COMPLEX TRANSFORMATION

DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAMMATIC

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (SPEIS)

PUBLIC HEARING, PUBLIC COMMENT PORTION

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MR. HOLMES BROWN: It's now time to receive your formal comments on the supplemental PEIS. This is your opportunity to give DOE your views on the draft document. The court reporter is ready to transcribe your statements.

Let me review a few ground rules for the comments. Please step up to the mike over there when your name is called. Introduce yourself, providing an organization affiliation where appropriate. If you have a written version of your statement, please provide a copy to the court reporter after you have completed your remarks. I will call two names at a time. The first is the speaker. The second is the person to follow.

In view of the number of people who have signed up to speak tonight, I believe that if you can you confine your remarks to a five to ten minute period, that should provide sufficient time for folks to complete their statement and also to allow everybody an opportunity to speak. I will let you know when you have a minute remaining. Ted Wyka will be serving as the hearing officer for the Department of Energy during the formal comment period.

So with that, let me call our first speaker. Terry Wallace is first, and Terry will be

followed by Doug Beason.

MR. TERRY WALLACE: Well, my name is Terry Wallace, and I am the principal associate director at Los Alamos for Science, Technology, and Engineering, and I appreciate the opportunity to provide some brief remarks tonight.

Let me begin my stating my personal and professional belief, based on many years of research in national security science, is that the preferred alternative outlined by the department's Complex Transformation PEIS, is the best choice for our nation and our national security interests. I strongly encourage the department to adopt the preferred alternative in the final record of decision.

Let me briefly explain why I believe the preferred alternative should be adopted. First, the department's proposed distributed centers of excellence approach for modernizing the United States' weapons complex makes the most efficient, effective use of the existing natural resources, while it also ensures the evolution necessary to meet national security needs in the 21st century and beyond. For decades, every US president and congress has recognized its support of the need for an

effective nuclear deterrent and our military leaders believe so also.

I will refer to remarks made just last week by the head of the US Military Strategic Command, Air Force General Kevin Chilton, who stated very clearly and simply, that "While nuclear disarmament is a desirable goal, the US will need to maintain an effective supply of nuclear weapons to act as a deterrent from attacks from other nations for the remainder of the 21st century. Given the recognition and the reality, although harsh, we are obligated to maintain and continuously modernize the scientific, the technological, and the production infrastructure that supports our nuclear weapons deterrent capability, while working toward having a minimum number of weapons necessary to maintain a safe and reliable deterrent."

That is precisely what the department has laid out in the Supplemental Programmatic EIS and the plan to both meet our nation's obligations and move us forward. Within the overall weapons complex, Los Alamos National Laboratory has been designated as the preferred alternative for a number of areas. These areas affirm Los Alamos' role in research and development and the importance of science in

maintaining the capability for deterrence.

LANL has been identified as the preferred alternative for work on plutonium research, development, and manufacturing, as well as nuclear weapons design, engineering, and super computing. There is no question in my mind that the laboratory's extensive expertise in the production, handling, and processing of nuclear and non-nuclear materials makes this the best and most logical site for future limited plutonium manufacturing, and this work cannot effectively be done elsewhere.

Key to this capability is replacing several critical facilities at Los Alamos National Laboratory that are outdated and in need of replacement. The replacement facilities will be smaller and more modern and use the 21st century security technology. They will consolidate functions, and they will allow several locations to be collapsed to one. Modernizing the Los Alamos National Laboratory will reduce the overall footprint by approximately 20 percent, and the nuclear operations footprint by over half. This will result in a cost savings through greater workplace efficiency, increased safety through the use of state of the art equipment, and reducing the movement of nuclear materials, and

enhancing the ability to meet the evolving national security challenges. Again, these important changes are exactly what the preferred alternative lays out.

Finally, let me note that maintaining the scientific capability associated with a nuclear deterrent is extremely important. It will be done by supporting a smaller scale of manufacturing of plutonium pits at Los Alamos, and allow us to continue scientific work on this in particular, not only the materials, but all of the effects, for example, on medicine and disease treatment. Alternative energy and other science missions that we have at the laboratory are directly applicable to maintaining our nuclear deterrent. These important activities and the benefits they provide to society cannot and will not exist without a nuclear science capability that is at the heart of Los Alamos' mission.

Let me close with a personal note. As President Lopez noted, I was a graduate from New Mexico Tech nearly 30 years ago, and I am extremely proud of my classmates and the technical expertise that this university brings to bear upon national security problems. At Los Alamos, our single largest source of degrees coming to work at the laboratory is

New Mexico Tech in technical degrees.

Los Alamos National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratory are the single largest source of employers of New Mexico Tech graduates. There is a strong synergy between the science, the technology, and the engineering that comes from this infrastructure and maintaining the national security posture and profile that we need to see in the future.

In closing, I would strongly encourage the department to adopt the preferred alternative, and in the final record of decision, and I thank you very much for your attention tonight.

MR. BROWN: Thank you. Doug Beason is next and Susan Gordon will follow him.

MR. DOUG BEASON: Well, thank you. I am Doug Beason, and I am the associate laboratory director at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and I run the threat reduction activities at Los Alamos. What that means is, I am charged with reducing and eliminating the threats of global weapons of mass destruction. My programs encompass about 25 to 30 percent of the laboratory. It's about a $700 million program, and what we do is we provide the defensive side of the laboratory. That is, we

run the nonproliferation programs, the counter terrorism programs, and the emergency response programs, all set to eliminate the threat of weapons of mass destruction.

What I can say is that all my programs depend upon the weapons complex to be successful in accomplishing my mission. And with that, as professionally and personally, I would like to give my support for the preferred alternative, and I urge that that be reflected in the record of decision.

The way that I came to this conclusion, is that, again, my programs, as they rely completely upon the weapons program. This is not just the weapons themselves, but it's the people, it's the infrastructure, it is the training, it is the equipment that reside at Los Alamos and the future at Los Alamos. We have a saying, that in order to catch a weaponaire, especially one that's on foreign soil, you have to know a weaponaire. And to know a weaponaire, you need to understand the manufacturing process, the materials, the transportation, the signatures that are related to it, the motivations behind the people. And I have five mission elements that illustrate this, and that' to be able to anticipate the threat, to be able to understand it,

to be able to detect the threat, deter it, and respond to it. All of these had their roots in the weapons program. And only by understanding this can I accomplish my mission of being able to eliminate and deter the weapons of mass destruction.

And so with that, I would like to go ahead and conclude and just once again voice my support of the preferred alternative. Again I urge that it be reflected in the record of decision. Thank you.

MR. BROWN: Thank you.

Susan Gordon, and Scott Kovac will follow Susan Gordon.

MS. SUSAN GORDON: Thank you. My name is Susan Gordon, I am the director of the Alliance for Nuclear Accountability, which is a national network of more than 35 organizations that work collaboratively on issues of nuclear weapons production and waste cleanup. Most of our member organizations live next door to the Department of Energy's nuclear weapons complex sites and are uniquely positioned to analyze the Complex Transformation Plan.

I wanted to specifically respond to the reference to Air Force General Kevin Chilton and his vision for nuclear weapons, and contrast that with

the recent editorial that was published in the Wall Street Journal by also eminent people -- George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. This is the second editorial that they have publicized, and they are calling for a nuclear free world. So I'm going to read some sections of their editorial and follow it up with some additional comments.

"The accelerating spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear know-how, and nuclear material has brought us to a nuclear tipping point. We face a very real possibility that the deadliest weapons ever invented could fall into dangerous hands. The steps that we are taking now to address these threats are not adequate to the danger. With nuclear weapons more widely available deterrence is decreasingly effective and increasingly hazardous.

"One year ago in this paper we called for a global effort to reduce reliance on nuclear weapons to prevent their spread into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately to end them as a threat to the world. The interest, momentum, and growing political space that has been created to address these issues over the past year has been extraordinary, with strong positive responses from people all over the

world.

"Mikhail Gorbachev wrote in January 2007 that, as someone who signed the first treaties on real reductions in nuclear weapons, he thought it his duty to support our call for urgent action: 'It is becoming clearer that nuclear weapons are no longer a means of achieving security. In fact, with every passing year, they make our security more precarious.'.

"In June, the United Kingdom's foreign secretary, Margaret Beckett, signaled her government's support, stating, "What we need is both a vision, a scenario for a world free of nuclear weapons, and action, progressive steps to reduce warhead numbers and to limit the role of nuclear weapons in security policy. These two strands are separate, but they are mutually reinforcing. Both are necessary, but at the moment too weak.'"

And their editorial continues, "We have also been encouraged by additional indications of general support for this project from other former US officials with extensive experience as secretaries of state and defense and national security advisers. These include Madeleine Albright, Richard V. Allen, James A. Baker III, Samuel R. Berger" -- I always

fail on this one -- "Zbigniew Brzezinski, Frank Carlucci, Warren Christopher, William Cohen, Lawrence Eagleburger, Melvin Laird, Anthony Lake, Robert McFarlane, Robert McNamara, and Colin Powell."

So they held a meeting in Norway a couple weeks ago to follow up on a conference that had been held at Stanford University's Hoover Institution, and they have made a number of recommendations coming out of that, which I don't have, so I'm going to continue on with their editorial.

"The US and Russia, which possess close to 95 percent of the world's nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, obligation, and experience to demonstrate leadership, but other nations must join."

And parallel with the steps that they line out, the US and Russia, "In parallel with these steps by the US and Russia, the dialogue must broaden on an international scale, including non-nuclear as well as nuclear nations. Key subjects include turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities.

"There should also be an agreement to undertake further substantial reductions in US and

Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the US-Russia Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other nuclear nations would become involved.

"President Reagan's maxim of 'trust but verify' should be reaffirmed. Completing a verifiable treaty to prevent nations from producing nuclear materials for weapons would contribute to a more rigorous system of accounting and security for nuclear materials.

"We should also build an international consensus on ways to deter or, when required, to respond to secret attempts by countries to break out of agreements. Progress must be facilitated by a clear statement of our ultimate goal. Indeed, this is the only way to build the kind of international trust and broad cooperation that will be required to effectively address today's threats. Without the vision of moving towards zero, we will not find the essential cooperation required to stop our downward spiral.

"In some respects the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons is like the top of a very tall mountain. From the vantage point of our troubled world today, we can't even see the top of the

mountain, and it is tempting and easy to say we can't get there from here. But the risk from continuing to go down the mountain or standing pat are too real to ignore. We must chart a course to higher ground where the mountaintop becomes more visible."

And the folks that participated in the Hoover Nuclear Threat Initiative Conference include another list of eminent people in the field.

How am I doing on time?

MR. BROWN: Four minutes left.

MS. GORDON: So there is a new national campaign called the Campaign for a Nuclear Weapons Free World, and it is a national NGO campaign to support the effort or support the vision that I was addressing in the paper by Kissinger and others. And their talking points include: Complex transformation reflects outdated thinking. Momentum is building behind a broad bipartisan consensus that it is in the security interests of the United States to pursue a nuclear weapon free world. A 2007 world opinion poll indicated that 73 percent of Americans support this goal. The US must get back on the path of a nuclear weapon free world by adopting a comprehensive and balanced nuclear nonproliferation strategy.

Complex transformation puts the cart before

the horse. The Department of Energy is proceeding with this proposal in the absence of a plan for the future role of nuclear weapons or the future size of the stockpile. It is unreasonable and premature to invest in a major overhaul of the nuclear weapons complex without a reexamination of the role of nuclear weapons in US security strategy. The next president should, and by law, will undertake that review.

Nuclear weapons serve no useful purpose in dealing with current international security dangers faced by the United States. Nevertheless, US military strategy calls for maintaining more than 2,000 deployed strategic nuclear bombs two decades after the end of the Cold War, with thousands more in reserve. The US should work to achieve dramatically deeper reductions in US and Russian nuclear and missile stockpiles and engage other countries in negotiations to reach zero nuclear weapons.

The DOE's complex transformation proposal is inconsistent with the US national and international security goals, which depend upon improving the global system to stop nuclear weapons proliferation and moving toward nuclear disarmament. Through the 1968 nuclear nonproliferation treaty, the

United States has committed to implement deeper, verifiable, and irreversible nuclear weapons reductions, and to support the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

Failure to fulfill these obligations and renounce new warhead production erodes confidence that the nuclear weapons states intend to fulfill their NPT commitments and complicates efforts to repair the beleaguered nonproliferation system. There are practical steps leading to a world without nuclear weapons. The United States can lead the world in reducing the nuclear threat and earn the world's respect and goodwill as a result. The US can lead by example, renounce the development of new nuclear weapons, and ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Thank you.

MR. BROWN: Thanks very much.

Okay. Scott is next and Kay Stillion will be next.

MR. SCOTT KOVAC: My name is Scott Kovac, K-O-V-A-C, with Nuclear Watch New Mexico. Thank you, thank you.

It seems to me that this SPEIS has at least two parts to it. One section or one part of it seems to be consolidation of materials, reduction of

footprints, behind this retracting back behind an easier, dependable security fence. This would all be good. This should have happened a long time ago at Pantex. They need to withdraw and consolidate and protect these materials.

Another part of the SPEIS seems to be all about expanded pit production, at Los Alamos in particular, or at Los Alamos. There are enough pits. We have enough pits. LANL has a 20 pit per year capacity. We also, the United States plans on reducing the stockpile, which means pits will be taken out of existing warheads, increasing the number of pits. There will be extra pits of all types of our existing weapons.

NNSA destructively analyzes one pit per type per year. I don't know exactly how many warheads there are of different types. Maybe there is eight, but LANL produces plenty of pits to cover any that are destructively analyzed each year.

It seems to me that this capacity at LANL is for new pits, for new weapons. What else could it be for? Stockpiled stewardship works. LANL has been great at certifying our stockpile of weapons every year without any tests in Nevada, without any nuclear tests. This is good. This is a great thing. We

love -- we love the nonproliferation efforts at Los Alamos. We think that's good. We think the science at Los Alamos is good. We just cannot understand the need for any more expanded pit capacity at Los Alamos.

As far as the future, what will happen in the future, well, this complex transformation, and in the book itself, it's mentioned many times, the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. This thing is driven by the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review. We are due for a new Nuclear Posture Review in 2009. At the end of this year, we are also due for a report from a bipartisan committee, appointed by both Republicans and Democrats up at the Congress and Senate, to help us out and do a report on what the future of the stockpile should be. We feel that this complex transformation document is premature and should be withdrawn and re-released after the new Nuclear Posture Review in 2009.

A couple of things, just because the complex is reducing, there are several maps shown tonight, Xs, red Xs. One of the red Xs was the Hanford site, the scene of past weapons work, you know, for the weapons complex. That Hanford site is still there. It's being cleaned up. It may not be

an NNSA site, but it didn't go away. They are still cleaning it up.

I think that the unfunded environmental liability from legacy operations of the weapons complex is estimated at $260 billion. We need to analyze the impacts of directing funds away from cleanup toward unnecessary weapons programs.

I also would like to introduce another alternative, the no production alternative. Under the no production alternative, the NNSA would continue to operate only those facilities required to achieve safe, secure, efficient disassembly and dismantlement of nuclear warheads and disposal of their constituent parts. Weapons assembly operations would cease and resources would transition to disassembly. Thank you.

MR. BROWN: Thanks, Scott.

Kay Stillion, and Kay will be followed by Steve Harrington.

MS. KAY STILLION: I am Kay Stillion, and I am just a citizen. I am not with any group. I wouldn't even have known about this meeting if I hadn't have just happened to have the radio on Saturday. And what I heard kind of scared me, because I live between White Sands and Albuquerque.

And I went, wow. So I called my friends before I went to work and at work. Only one person knew about it.

I am very grateful that I live in a country that does ask for public opinion, but I am saddened that so few of us know about it. And I don't want any more pits, and I want a clean environment, especially where I live. I bought 20 acres, and I enjoy it and I want it clean.

And I respect the military, because when I first moved about 14 years ago, there was an information meeting at the community center in Mountainair, and so there were booths, kind of similar to what is in the back, and I asked one officer. I said -- now, I live on top of a mesa, and these, and I live under the air space. And I said, "These planes are just skimming my mesa. They are getting as close as they can, and I don't know, some day my roof might go off."

And so he said, "Well, they're not supposed to do that. It's probably kids playing, and if you see that happen, call us." So I didn't even have to call them, because it stopped.

So I know that the public does have input, and it's important. So please don't make any more

pits. Thank you.

MR. BROWN: Thanks very much. Steve Harrington. And Greg Miller will be after Steve.

MR. STEVE HARRINGTON: Hello, and thanks for having these hearings, even though of course they are required by law. I am a person that hates public speaking, but I do it when I have to, and instances like this require it. Let's just start talking facts.

This proposal, first of all, we are given a preordained three choices. They purport to take citizen input on the choices. I would take issue with that. One of the choices I want to see is something along the lines of the gentleman from Nuclear Watch proposed is, some of the ideas in the proposal are good. Consolidating, downsizing, having fewer points of failure, fewer points that we have to protect for security reasons, those are good ideas. But then you throw in, oh, and by the way, we are going to produce some new warheads. Oops, where did that come from? Not such a good idea.

Let's have one of those preordained three choices include the good ideas, minus that major bad idea. Let's just do that, what do you say? The citizens might like that.

Now, this hearing here is required by the National Environmental Policy Act. NEPA, passed in 1969 that law was. Well, incidentally, a year later in 1970, there was another law passed. I wonder what that was. I wonder if we are going to adhere to that law. I will tell you what that was. That was a treaty that the US ratified and the president signed, and it was called the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. Well, what's in that treaty, I wonder? Is it still in effect? Well, yeah, actually it is. It is still in effect, and we re-ratified it -- I don't know if that's the technical term -- in 1995. So it's still in effect, and we reinforced it in 1995.

So in 1969, we passed the National Environmental Policy Act, and we are all here holding these hearings because of that law. In 1970, we passed a law that says -- well, it's a treaty, which is law. That law says that at the time in 1970, there were 188 nations that signed that treaty. The US was a signatory. At that time, there were five countries that had nuclear weapons, and there was 183 that didn't. So we made a little bargain. We said, the five countries that have nuclear weapons will agree to, over time, get rid of their nuclear weapons. There wasn't a specific timetable, but it

was implied that it would be a reasonable amount of time. Those five countries had to disarm. The 183 that didn't have nuclear weapons agreed, in exchange, not to seek out nuclear weapons.

Well, its hard to hold anybody accountable for breaking their part of the bargain when we are breaking our part of the bargain. It's true that since that time, several other countries have acquired nuclear weapons, but it's also true that the five that agreed to disarm, well, we kind of, sort of, started to, and kudos for kind of, sort of starting to, but now all of a sudden, we are kind of sort of starting to want to build more. Well, what happened to the treaty? Isn't it still in effect? I think it is.

Now, that's a legal issue. Now, the bureaucrats here -- and I don't mean that in a derogatory sense -- but the public officials here rightfully say, "Well, we don't set policy. We just implement it. So, you know, it's our job to just do what we are told, and we don't really get to say what the politicians tell us we have to do."

Kind of a fair point, sort of, but also, well, there's some personal responsibility, too. Remember after World War II, the Nuremberg trials, a

lot of the Nazi war criminals were tried in Nuremberg. The defense that most of them used or attempted to use -- it was so commonly used that it's now known as the Nuremberg defense -- and that was, the defense was, well, yeah, we did some things, but we were just following orders.

Well, you know most of these guys got convicted. Following orders is not a sufficient excuse. You have got to obey the law and you have got to obey common standards of ethics. So there is some personal responsibility, even if you don't set policy.

Finally, or not finally, third, this is simply unneeded, and some of the other speakers alluded to the fact that it's unneeded, and, gosh, liberal, you know, anti-war people like Kissinger even say it's unneeded. You know, if you have Kissinger saying a weapon is a bad idea, boy, that guy, he has rarely met a weapon he didn't like, and he has used a lot of them. One of the principal architects of the Vietnam war is saying this is a bad idea, I think you better listen.

Moreover, the question is, do they need to produce these pits? Think about that. Well, the argument is, we have got to produce these pits

because our stockpile is ageing. It's getting old. Sounds like grandpa. Grandpa is getting a little long in tooth. Well, their own scientists say these things have a shelf life of at least a hundred years, so they are not really all that long in tooth, folks. They have got a long shelf life. Their own scientists tell them that. So don't buy the spin.

I think a lot of these guys, when you are a bureaucrat, you want your agency to continue getting funding, and that makes some sense on an individual level. Back to the Nuremberg defense, there was a movie that came out about a year ago called, "Thank You for Smoking." I didn't see the movie, but it was based on a book. In the book the guy coined a term called "the yuppie Nuremberg defense." The yuppie Nuremberg defense is, well, it's not just, I am following orders. It's, "Hey, it pays the mortgage." You know, you can do something wrong, but, "Hey, it pays the mortgage."

Well, sometimes you have got to stand up and do the right thing. Now, its important that we know that -- and the gentleman from the nuclear watch alluded to this -- when they put in these pretty slides up here that talk about sites that have been closed down, they never tell you the history of those

sites. Boy, wouldn't it be interesting to know the history of some of those sites. Well, he mentioned the history of one of them and how they are still cleaning it up.

Well, I bet you, I'm willing to bet you money, dollars to donuts, that every site on that list that has been closed down had to have some of cleanup done, and I know a lot about one of them. It's called Rocky Flats in Colorado. Everybody here in the audience, if you are not sure about these things, whether they are a good idea or not, I encourage you to go home tonight and Google Rocky Flats. Google it and do some reading on it. Find out what happened at Rocky Flats. Find out about the tritium that got in the water supply. Find out about the sand that blew off site. Find out about how they had, the government, two or three times -- I forgot how many times -- bought land around it to expand the perimeter. Kind of like, well, we keep making these environmental problems. If we just buy more land, it will keep it safe. Unh-unh.

You know what finally happened? There was a class action lawsuit. 12,000 landowners formed a class, and there was a lawsuit against the government and its contractors. I think it was Dow and

Rockwell. There was a class action lawsuit which ultimately settled in court for all the environmental damage that was caused. Now, you should ask some of these bureaucrats if they would like to go live where Rocky Flats is. Some of them might even fib and say, sure, I would live there. Well, you can't. The government still has a couple thousand acres that are off limits to humans. So even if they fibbed, you know, it's illegal to live there because it's still contaminated.

MR. BROWN: You have about a minute left.

MR. HARRINGTON: Thank you.

Now, Dr. Lopez, who I guess kind of endorsed the idea of building new nuclear weapons -- which, I don't know. That surprised me -- he mentioned that we should use fact and not emotions. Well, I am using both. I am emotional about this, but everything I said is fact.

Finally they use some warm, fuzzy words. They used warm, fuzzy words like stewardship. It's supposed to make us feel good. Centers of excellence. Boy, if it's got the word excellence in it, you know it's good. Well, sometimes if it's got the word excellence in it, they put it there for a spin. Or we only want reasonable comments. Well, I

would like some reasonable proposals. Thank you very much.

MR. BROWN: Thank you. Greg Mello, and Joe Martz will follow Greg.

MR. GREG MELLO: Good evening. It's a pleasure to be here, an unexpected pleasure to see George and Ted and our colleagues who have been working very hard and for a long time on this. Thank you for coming here, and thank you for the degree of open-mindedness that you are able to bring.

I don't want to pretend that I know more than any of you about this. I do have a different perspective, and I'm not as bound, as some of you are, by the language that you have to work with and the constraints that you have to work with in your jobs. I don't know exactly the boundaries of those constraints, and it's quite likely or possible that there are more degrees of freedom there than we know. That's usually true for most of us.

I would like to begin, I think, by endorsing what Scott said, the no production alternative. I don't know whether you want to make it an alternative, but that's what I would like you to do. We don't need to make pits. As the previous gentleman said, it's lasted a very long time. The

nation spent a lot of time learning this piece of information, a lot of money. We have spent tens of billions of dollars in the stockpiles stewardship program to learn this sort of thing, and it would be a shame if we didn't use this information to save money and to focus our investments and our expenses from this point forward.

That, however, is kind of what we are doing, and so I would like to make that a little bit more specific. Although it's not part of this particular NEPA process, the chemistry and metallurgy research replacement facility is really the elephant in the room here tonight. It is the largest facility, the largest project, capital project, in the history of Los Alamos lab in costs and dollars, and it is the biggest single issue in this Environmental Impact Statement, even though it's never mentioned. It's the pivotal facility for actually producing the new weapons, which are being discussed and are the driving force behind the responsive infrastructure that you would create.

This CMRR facility has an uncertain production capacity, but we all know that in any large production operation, that sort of capacity can't remain idle if it is going to be real. And I

don't mean to isolate the CMRR, both of the CMRR buildings from the existing PF-4 building, from the pit radiography facility, from the nuclear materials safeguard and security upgrades project, from the radioactive liquid waste treatment upgrades project, from the TA-54 waste upgrades project, all of which work together to dramatically expand the production capacity at Los Alamos National Laboratory.

Those who are nearing the end of their careers will not be around to help direct what all of this investment does after they retire, and most of the people -- I guess Joe Martz is here -- Joe will not have -- Joe does not now have any sort of span of control that will enable him to say what happens there or what does not happen there, as much as he would like to say one thing or another.

These facilities, once put in place can be put to other uses. That is what we mean by responsive. That's what the former NNSA administrator, Linton Brooks meant, when he said that we have to start building this infrastructure now to prepare for the nuclear arsenal that we want decades from now. He said, we will need new weapons for the new threats of the 21 century.

Stripping the euphemisms away, this means

preparing for nuclear war. There is no credible deterrent without a usable deterrent, without the adversary or enemy actually believing that the nuclear arsenal could be used. This means usable nuclear weapons. This means specific threats of which responsive infrastructure is supposed to be a major part.

This production complex at Los Alamos is going to cost more than $3 billion from this point forward. The nuclear facility in the CMRR project, as NNSA has stated, it's more than $2 billion. The radiological laboratory is 164 million plus its fixtures. The fence is 240 million. The pit radiography facility, I gather it's on the order of 25 million. Someone here probably knows. In addition, there is, as Scott and the previous speaker alluded, there is always demolition, decontamination, clean-up costs, both for the old CMRR building, and then at the end of these buildings' lives, of these buildings. So there is a significant life cycle cost running in the tens of billions, somewhere in the 20, 30, billion dollar range for these particular buildings.

These costs for construction and maintenance and safety operations are going to cut

into Terry Wallace's science programs at Los Alamos National Laboratory, and dramatically decrease them from their present, pathetic state. I disagree about what Scott said about science being good at Los Alamos. There are excellent scientists at Los Alamos, but from the very beginning of my involvement with the laboratory, it's also been clear there is also a lot of terrible science at the laboratory. And on a dollar per dollar basis, our society can't afford that kind of crappy science and combined with that much power.

I recall just recently one of Los Alamos' most senior scientists took us out to dinner and said, we can't get the C students from the third rate schools anymore. This place is just sliding down. And one of the reasons that it's sliding down is because of its emphasis on plutonium and plutonium manufacturing. If an educational institution in New Mexico wants to ally itself with good science, the good science lies in other fields.

We can't just cling to the coattails of the Cold War forever. This is the science of 50 years ago. As John Manley, Oppenheimer's deputy said, "There is only so many ways you can redesign a toothbrush." That's mostly what we are doing here,

is redesigning toothbrushes. My joke is that what Los Alamos does is learn how to crush things. They have been crushing things for 60 years.

I want to -- let's see, how much time do I have?

MR. BROWN: About a minute and a half.

MR. MELLO: About a minute and a half.

The previous speaker alluded to some big picture questions about nuclear weapons, and indeed, all of that was very well put, and so did Susan Gordon. And those who have been to international gatherings to discuss nuclear nonproliferation, for example, the NBT review conferences and preparatory conferences, have heard other countries laughing at the United States. We have a long way to go to climb back up in the world's eyes. Building new factories for nuclear weapons is not the way to do it. The CMRR facility was just recently mentioned in a "Times of India" article as requesting a $100 million this year for a new plant, for new warheads in the United States. They read this in Iran. They read this in Muslim countries. They read this all over the world. How can we keep this country safe, if we are pushing ahead with these plans?

Finally, I guess, wrapping up quickly, all

of this is really still not the biggest picture. We face an energy and climate crisis, and we are embroiled right now in the first stage of a very serious economic downturn, all of which commands our very urgent attention, and that means our financial attention and our investment on really a massive scale. We need to build energy conservation and efficiency, protect the vulnerable in our society, build energy security for our households, and make millions of jobs and career pathways for young people in these fields. This is the cutting edge, not nuclear weapons, and we have a hard time, given that we all have a finite amount of attention, and our political system has a finite amount of attention, we need to move that attention into these new areas.

Thank you. Thank you very much.

MR. BROWN: Thanks.

Okay. Joe Martz.

MR. JOE MARTZ: I, too, would like to thank the organizers for the opportunity to speak. I am a plutonium metallurgist and chemist. I have worked at Los Alamos since the beginning of my career. And even though that's where I continue to work, my comments tonight are just my own as a private citizen.

I want to say I would like to support the preferred alternative as outlined by the NNSA and the Department of Energy, and I would like to see the record of decision reflect that alternative when that time comes due.

I would like to spend just a little bit of time explaining why I think the preferred alternative and the record of decision is the right decision for the country. But before I do that, I want to thank many of the prior speakers. I have been to a lot of these hearings. I have been attending them for almost 20 years. I have seen familiar faces here. As Greg Mello acknowledged me, I will acknowledge him. It's quite remarkable, actually, how we are coalescing to more and more common ground as the years go by. Certainly we are going to disagree on some things. As I have often told Greg, I think we are both headed toward the same objective. We just may differ on some of the means.

I have said since I was a graduate student, that I would like to see within my career a dramatic reduction, and perhaps even an elimination of nuclear weapons in my lifetime. I think it's a great dream and a great goal. I think the editorial we have seen from very preeminent former members of Presidential

administrations supports that goal as well. I have had the fortunate opportunity to speak with several of the authors of that editorial, including former Secretary of Defense, Bill Perry.

I believe that the preferred alternative, as outlined by the NNSA, actually provides the road map and means to implement much of what these authors have been suggesting. Complex transformation contains within it a very exciting and important new concept, the idea that our capability can become a key component of our deterrence. I would rather see capability stand in for deterrence, and to put that more directly, that's the work of myself and my colleagues protecting our security, rather than the need to deploy thousands of nuclear weapons to accomplish those same means.

I was born in 1965. From that period to today, we have seen a reduction of over 90 percent in our nuclear arsenal. To those that argue we have to provide a concrete sign to other countries of our commitment to disarmament, I will point you at that simple fact. In fact, that is an accelerating trend. It's not one that was started and stopped. Seventy-five percent of that reduction has occurred since the end of the Cold War in 1991, and indeed,

half of it has occurred since the Bush administration took office in 2001.

So let us discuss the facts that we see before us, and recognize the good that has been accomplished, oftentimes hidden by our rhetoric. And many of us here agree on other points as well. The consolidation of nuclear materials, improving the safety and security of those operations, reducing the footprint of our operations is something that I think I have heard every speaker here tonight support. So I would like to commend the NNSA for that visionary planning that they are conducting as part of this complex transformation process.

I still think we are on track to meet the vision that I have had for much of my life, to see a dramatic reduction in our reliance on weapons, and I am proud to work for a laboratory and complex that can support that decision by relying more on our capability and our competence. But I would also, as Greg brought it up, I will mention one side point. Greg, I disagree with your assertion of crappy science at Los Alamos. I may be a crappy scientist, but I think some of our science is pretty good.

A number of speakers have alluded to the plutonium aging and the pit lifetime work. I will

note, I was one of the lead investigators for that work for over 10 years, and I hope I have some credibility with this audience, because I gave the answer that science showed, not the answer that politics demanded or an administration desired to hear. We provided the answer that we found, the truth that we found in our studies of plutonium.

So, Greg, I hope you would include the plutonium ageing and pit lifetime work in that small subcategory of good science that has occurred at Los Alamos.

I would like to make a few comments directed at the PEIS process, if I may. I have actually reviewed that document fairly carefully. In the preferred alternative, particularly the consolidation of nuclear materials and the lessened number of transportation that has to occur, it is my belief that you have not adequately represented all of the environmental benefits of that consolidation within your document. I think if you look closely and you perform a fair assessment of what consolidation will do, compared to the no action alternative, I think you will find just commonsense says, if we are reducing our footprint by a third, if we are moving from 60-year-old facilities into a

modern building, including modern safety features and modern standards, and we are reducing the transport and movement of nuclear materials dramatically, all of those things will add up to dramatically reduced environmental safety and security impacts. It is my belief that a thorough analysis of that in the final PEIS will show that to be a dramatic benefit.

My other comment related to the PEIS document is, it is narrowly constrained looking at NNSA facilities. As this enables future stockpile reductions, as this visionary plan lays out a means by which we can achieve the vision that was outlined in the Wall Street Journal editorial and others, that the reduced number of weapons that this will allow will have further environmental safety and security benefits, both within the NNSA complex and in DOD and elsewhere. It is my belief that the PEIS should reflect the sum total environmental safety and security benefits that that plan will enable, not just those narrowly confined within DOE sites.

Thank you very much for your attention.

MR. BROWN: Thanks.

That brings to an end the folks who had signed up ahead of time to speak. So let me ask if there is anyone in the audience who would like to add

comments at this point, just to raise your hand and please step forward. Dr. Van Romero.

DR. VAN ROMERO: My name is Van Romero, and I would like to first make a comment as a citizen of New Mexico whose family has lived here for over 200 years. I certainly support the preferred alternative. I think it technically makes good sense, and I think also socially and economically it makes good sense. I base some of that decision on what I have heard today, but also living in New Mexico for as long as my family has, I think we are convinced that Los Alamos has done a good job of stewardship of the environment here in New Mexico, in that it has had an overall positive impact on this state in the past 60 years.

The next comment I want to make is as the vice president for research here at New Mexico Tech, and as someone who has done a lot of research in encountering terrorism, not just since 9/11, but since long before, I think this action is good to counter terrorism throughout the world. It is exactly what we need at this time.

I would also like to encourage Los Alamos to continue it's close working relationships with all the universities here in New Mexico, because I want

to see our students find good jobs and good jobs in New Mexico. I am tired of sending our students out of New Mexico to find places where they can do good science and good engineering. I know that Los Alamos has been a source for that, and I would like to see it continue into the future. Thank you.

MR. BROWN: Thank you.

Would anyone else like to add comments at this point? We are scheduled to remain available for comments through 10:00, so what we will do is recess at this point. You're welcome, again, to review the materials in the back, talk to the staff, and if anybody decides they would like to add a comment, please see me. We will reconvene and the court reporter and Ted Wyka will remain available for your comments. So we will recess at this point. Thank you.

Let me add, if there is anyone who would like to make a comment to the court reporter without the audience, you're welcome to do that as well, and Ted will be available to listen in.

(A recess was taken between 8:38 p.m. and 9:54 p.m.)

MR. BROWN: I am reconvening this meeting at 10:00. And asking if any other members of the

public would like to add a comment. Noting that no one has indicated an interest in further comment, this meeting is officially adjourned.

(The hearing concluded at 9:54 p.m.)

COMPLEX TRANSFORMATION
DRAFT SUPPLEMENTAL PROGRAMMATIC
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT (SPEIS)
PUBLIC HEARING, PUBLIC COMMENT PORTION
March 10, 2008

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I, Sally Peters, RPR, CCR #57, Certified Court Reporter in the State of New Mexico, do hereby certify that the foregoing pages constitute a true transcript of proceedings had in the matter herein stated.

In testimony whereof, I have hereunto set my hand on March 18, 2008.

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